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This dissertation traces the development of an American 
masculinity, using the concept of the national subject 
(borrowed from Frantz Fanon), through three different 
stages of the American capitalism: mercantile, or 
market, monopoly, and corporate, or late-capitalism. It 
constructs a genealogy of American maleness and then 
examines how this genealogy was altered and 
reconstituted during times of economic crisis and 
technological innovation. It argues that successive 
technological revolutions in the symbolic apparatus of 
American culture allowed elite political and economic 
interests to gain consensus by deploying the national 
subject using various media. In the early national 
period Franklin and Crevecoeur used the national 
subject to encourage immigration and expansion; in the 
Jacksonian era, Jackson and his supporters used the 
national subject to sanction Manifest Destiny; and in 
the late 1880s, Andrew Carnegie and Horatio Alger, Jr. 
used the national subject to valorize the practices of 
industrial capitalism. In the forties, the national 
subject was resurrected to sanction the emergent 
structure of corporate capitalism, or what Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno called late-capitalism. 
The final three chapters of this dissertation examine 
the relationship between the writings of Eugene
The final three chapters of this dissertation examine 
the relationship between the writings of Eugene 
O'Neill, Tennessee Williams, and Arthur Miller and the 
advent of late-capitalism. Specifically, I examine how 
O'Neill, Williams, and Miller challenge the dominant 
version of the national subject by offering a counter­
discourse to the consumerism and nationalism advocated 
by popular conceptions of American masculinity. Using 
the writings of Jacques Lacan and the Frankfurt School, 
I attempt to situate the drama of O'Neill, Williams, 
and Miller in a broader historical context, a context 
which has thus far been either ignored or repressed.
v
Chapter One
The Autonomy of the National Subject: An Overview
At 4:00 p.m. on January 13, 1982, Air Florida Flight 
#90 took off from Washington's National Airport in a 
snowstorm. Approximently twenty seconds later the Boeing 
737 skidded across the 14th Street Bridge and crashed 
into the Potomac River. Seventy-seven people died 
instantly. Investigators later discovered that the plane 
had not been properly de-iced. In the hours that 
followed the crash, Washington and a national television 
audience watched as volunteers, park rangers, and police 
and firemen struggled to rescue six survivors floating 
in the icy water. Five would live. The dramatic images 
of Martin "Lenny" Skutnik diving into the water to save 
Patricia Tirado made him an instant celebrity. The 
footage of helicopter pilot Donald Usher and paramedic 
Gene Windsor hovering over the water and dragging the 
survivors to safety also made them instant heroes. In 
the days that followed the tragedy, the Washington media 
reported that the five survivors— Kelly Duncan, a flight 
attendant, Joe Stiley, a business executive, Patricia 
Felch, Stiley's secretary, Bert Hamilton, also a 
businessman, and Patricia Tirado, who lost her husband 
and child in the crash— were just "ordinary" Americans 
who had miraculously survived.
1
Two years later, on April 1, 1984, NBC aired a 
"docudrama" called Flight #90; Disaster on the Potomac. 
The movie starred Richard Masur and Dinah Manoff and was 
advertised as a "realistic dramatization" and a "fact- 
based account" of the Air Florida crash. According to 
the producers of the show, John McGreevey's teleplay was 
based on a 137-page federal report on the accident. In a 
review in The Washington Post on the same day, media 
critic Tom Shales called the movie "a loathsome, 
ghoulish production" filled with "third-rate Hollywood 
actors" (L:7). In the same review, Shales argued that 
"absolutely nothing in this pathetic recreation...can 
equal the impact or challenge the memory of the 
unforgetable news tape of the real rescue attempts and 
the aftermath of the crash" (L:7). Watching Disaster on 
the Potomac that night, one couldn't help but agree with 
Shales. Nothing in the movie represented my 
recollections of that day in Washington; nothing in the 
movie conveyed the sense of shock and loss I felt as I 
watched the crash coverage on local television. A 
blizzard had made travel in the city nearly impossible, 
but when the Air Florida jet crashed at the beginning of 
the afternoon rush hour— and a subway train crashed a 
half an hour later— the city was almost paralyzed. It 
took weeks for Washington to return to normal, yet 
nothing in McGreevey's teleplay reflected what I
remembered about that day. Instead, what McGreevey 
"challenged" my memory with was, as Shales wrote, a 
script that rigorously followed the formula of "Irwin 
Allen disaster films" (L:7).
The most notable thing about this film, however, was 
not its shallow exploitation of a tragic event, but 
rather the way the people who made Disaster on the 
Potomac turned a violent, disturbing accident into a 
didactic tale using the dominant cultural 
representations of masculinity. The most egregious 
example of the teleplay's didacticism concerns the 
character of Joe Stiley. In real life Joe Stiley was a 
business executive who, by his own admission, was lucky 
have survived. His actions in the water after the crash 
were largely responsible for the survival of Patricia 
Felch, Patricia Tirado, and Kelly Duncan; because his 
injuries were the least severe of the five who survived, 
he was able to move around and help others in the water 
before they were rescued. In the movie version of the 
crash, Stiley, played by Stephen Macht, is an exemplar 
of American masculinity. The first time we see Stiley, 
he is hard at work for a company that he feels takes him 
for granted. At the same time, he expresses his desire 
to have his own business. These scenes are used to 
demonstrate that he will be "successful" because he is 
industrious and competent; he is technically proficient
and does not waste time. We are shown that Stiley 
possesses all the masculine qualities that will enable 
him to "get ahead."
Later, as passengers begin to board Flight #90, 
shots of Stiley hard at work are continually juxtaposed 
with shots of "lesser" men wasting time, flirting with 
flight attendants, or sleeping. As it becomes clear that 
the flight will be delayed because of bad weather,
Stiley confidently and expertly explains to his 
secretary the complex process of de-icing the airplane. 
Specifically contrasted with Stiley's competence is the 
incompetence of Patricia Tirado's husband, Jose, who is 
played by Richard Beauchamp. Before take off, Jose, 
consistently expresses his anxiety— in a heavy Spanish 
accent— about his failure to be a man in his relations 
with Patricia's family. He also expresses his doubts 
about providing for his family and about the ability of 
a plane to fly in a snowstorm. ("A plane can fly in this 
weather?" he asks his wife.) These brief scenes make it 
clear that Jose Tirado lacks the knowledge and autonomy 
(he is too dependent on his wife) that make Joe Stiley 
successful; and because Jose and the other men on board 
Flight #90 do not conform to the essentialized type of 
masculinity sanctioned by the movie, it is much easier 
for viewers to accept their deaths. That is, Disaster on 
the Potomac gives the impression that Joe Stiley
survived because he is industrious and ambitious and, 
therefore, deserves to survive, while Jose Tirado and 
the other men on the plane deserved to die because they 
did not behave like Stiley. This lesson is further 
underscored in the epilogue where we learn that Stiley, 
after recovering from his injuries, opens his own 
business: he lives because he has what it takes to "get 
ahead" in business, and because he has these qualities, 
he is given a second chance.
There is nothing particularly outstanding about the 
didacticism of Disaster on the Potomac. In fact, the 
depiction of masculinity in the movie is a typical 
example of a discourse that permeates the symbolic 
practices of our culture and, as Shales vaguely 
suggests, works to marginalize lived experience by 
replacing it with formulas made familiar by repetition. 
The construction of masculinity in Disaster on the 
Potomac is only a single telling of a story that is 
told, or witnessed, thousands of times daily in 
conversations, magazines, books, movies, newspapers, and 
on television. The formula of the narrative is so 
omnipresent that, for most of us, it is completely 
natural. We have seen it and heard it before, and we 
will see it and hear it again. "Work hard," it says; 
"You'll 'get ahead.'" The natural trajectory of the 
American citizen is "moving forward" or "working up the
corporate ladder." The formula tells us that "hard work 
pays off," that we have nothing to fear but our own 
laziness— because that's the only thing that will "hold 
us back." Its voice is other to us, and it speaks to us 
and sometimes through us. It tells us, through Ronald 
Reagan, "that government should not do for men what they 
can do for themselves." It tells us, through Dan Rather, 
that "Ava Gardner died today. The daughter of a North 
Carolina sharecropper, she rose to the height of 
Hollywood fame and fortune." It tells us about Nolan 
Richardson, an African-American basketball coach whose 
Arkansas team is about to compete in the National 
Semifinals, that "he was born into a poor family with 
eleven brothers and sisters." It speaks as a frustrated 
olasnost entrepreneur: "In America they teach you to be 
rich, in Russia they teach you to be poor." It says in 
Reader's Digest that the "ultimate key to success is 
persistence."
This "it" is the voice of the other, a fragment of a 
dream first assembled during the early national period 
of American history. At present, it remains as a 
simulacrum, disconnected from its historical origins, 
"writ large" by the publicity apparatus of late 
capitalism.1 As a body of knowledge, as ideology, it
1 For an explanation of simulacra see Jean 
Baudrillard 253-81.
represents a unit of what Homi Bhabha calls "the 
national pedagogy" (i.e. the American Dream).2 As such, 
it produces a universal American citizenship through the 
(re)production of a national identity, or subject. It 
deploys a transcendent model freed from history and the 
determining structures of our culture: economic, racial, 
sexual, familial. That is, an "American" is normally 
thought as white, middle-class, male and heterosexual, 
or as someone who possesses the values of such a person. 
At the same time, the national identity, or subject, 
functions, as David Lloyd writes, "to occlude 
troublesome and inassimilable manifestations of 
difference by positing a transcendent realm of essential 
identity" (x).
The national identity was first consciously and 
deliberately constructed by America's eighteenth-century 
revolutionary elites as a strategy to gain economic 
independence for the colonies. As such, the national 
identity is a formation of the mercantile, or market, 
stage of capitalism (in America roughly 1700-1830). The 
rhetoric of the emergent nation— "America"— defined 
itself against the static, class-bound monarchy of 
eighteenth-century England and Europe. As the writings 
of J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Thomas Jefferson
2 For details see Bhabha 291-322. Lauren Berlant 
calls this discourse the "National Symbolic." See 
Berlant 19-56. See also Sacvan Bercovitch 5-42.
and Benjamin Franklin demonstrate, the hero of the new 
nation was the subject set free from the determining 
structures of Europe. (Their texts are discussed in 
greater detail in chapter two.) This nationalist 
rhetoric was an attempt to construct what Benedict 
Anderson calls the Hnation-ness of the nation" (12); it 
worked not only to invent America as a nation, but also, 
more importantly, it functioned as a sort of ideological 
glue to bind people together in an "imagined community" 
at a time when feudal organizing structures— monarchy 
and the Church— were becoming obsolete.3 From our 
perspective of the late twentieth-century, it is perhaps 
too easy to dismiss the national identity as an 
ideological formation or trick. Still, in the context of 
eighteenth-century America, the emergent national 
identity represented desires and aspirations that were 
often possible (for white males) given the structures of 
an agrarian or mercantile economy. A man's labor did, in 
fact, many times permit him to improve his conditions 
and those of his family significantly. The desire for 
self-improvement is reflected in the writings of 
Crevecoeur and Jefferson who both present, as David 
Robinson remarks about Crevecoeur, "a vision of a 
society of social and economic equals, made independent 
through their economic dependence on the land alone yet
3 For details see Benedict Anderson 11-16
bound together in a supportive and compassionate 
community" (17). The paradigmatic national subject of 
Franklin's autobiography, on the other hand, is 
determined by the structures and practices of an early 
urban market economy. Nevertheless, what these writers 
emphasize— above all— is the autonomy of the national 
subject, the ability of an "American" to use, or misuse 
his labor to determine the course of his life.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
emergence of industrial capitalism transformed the 
localized agrarian and mercantile economies of the 
National period. The conditions under which men lived 
and worked were radically altered as a national economy 
developed and as its structures became more and more 
centralized and regulated.4 New technologies in 
communication, navigation, transportation, and 
production made it possible for large industries (steel 
for example) to increase profits and efficiency by 
controlling every stage of the production process. 
Because factories could now produce goods cheaper and 
faster than craftsmen in small towns and villages, or 
the local entreprenuer in urban areas, and because they 
could distribute their products nationwide at low cost,
4 For a discussion of the effects of industrial 
capitalism on American culture, see T. J. Jackson Lears 
(No Place of Grace) 4-58.. See also Christopher Wilson 
39-64 and Richard Ohmann 135-70.
local goods were replaced by the brand-name products of 
an emergent national market. In addition, the 
consumption that industrial capitalism encouraged 
opposed the traditional methods of buying and selling, 
or methods of barter, that people in an agrarian or pre­
industrial economy understood. "Conspicuous 
consumption," as Thorstein Veblen named it, disrupted 
the practices of thrift, sacrifice, and saving that were 
necessary for small communities or households to survive 
in isolated areas as self-sufficient units. The relative 
independence of these economic systems favored the 
autonomous modes of production and labor used by the 
small farmer and the small entreprenuer in the National 
period.
The restructuring of the economy caused a crisis in 
the national pedagogy because it threatened to make the 
autonomy of the national subject obsolete. As the 
"Taylorized" labor of the factory replaced the self­
regulated labor of the farm or the small shop, and as 
wage labor became a permanent fixture for millions of 
lives, the autonomy of the mercantile economy 
disappeared. Massive immigration and urbanization during 
this period, as well as a series of depressions at the 
end of the century, exacerbated competition for jobs and 
further restricted male autonomy. Westward expansion, it 
was argued, offered men a "safety valve" in which they
could reclaim their lost autonomy; this idea, in fact, 
was the driving force behind what has come to be known 
as "Jacksonian Democracy." As Emerson wrote at mid­
century, "The land is wide enough, the soil has bread 
for all" (541). Significantly, Andrew Jackson emerged 
during the election of 1828 as the embodiment of the 
national subject. That is, like Napoleon, Jackson became 
a representative man. The press often constructed 
Jackson as a common man, as "one of us," as a 
frontiersman who rose to the presidency. Like Napoleon, 
who was perhaps the most popularized figure of the 
nineteenth century, "Old Hickory" represented the 
autonomy that the common man desired, the autonomy that 
was ironically beginning to vanish. Not coincidentally, 
for Eugene O'Neill in A Touch of the Poet and More 
Stately Mansions, the popularity of Jackson and Napoleon 
becomes a cultural symptom that represents the betrayal 
of the utopian values of the Revolution, a crucial point 
in American history where "the ethics commerce" supplant 
"the old values."
The emergence of monopoly capital in the final 
decades of the century, however, produced a more serious 
"legitimation crisis" for the national pedagogy.5 As 
production and labor became more rationalized and
5 The term legitimation crisis is borrowed from 
Jurgen Habermas. For a detailed discussion of the term 
see Habermas 33-94.
segmented, labor lost control of the workplace. 
Hierarchical, or managerial, structures replaced 
autonomous practices, and fewer and fewer men made the 
decisions that controlled the lives of millions of 
others. Machines "deskilled" labor and eliminated 
thousands of jobs. For a time, labor openly rebelled 
against capital, but business and the state acted to 
repress strikes and "bust" unions. At the same time, 
intellectuals provoked anxiety by announcing the 
"closing of the frontier." America then looked outside 
its borders to expand it markets. In the midst of this 
crisis, as Jackson Lears, Richard Terdiman, Richard 
Ohmann, and others make clear, the "consciousness 
industry" was born. The spectacle of advertising gave 
men a way to (re)enact the desired autonomy by 
purchasing goods. In other words, the emergence of mass 
culture in the 1880s can be linked, in part, to the need 
of industrialists to sell their products; in order to do 
this, they used magazine and newspaper advertising to 
convince people to abandon older cultural practices and 
modes of consciousness. More specifically, at precisely 
this moment of crisis, rags-to-riches narratives and 
examples of masculine power and individualism began to 
proliferate in mass circulation magazines, books, and 
the penny press. However, whereas, earlier 
representations of the national subject were in some
ways representative— the images of manhood that 
Crevecoeur, Franklin, and Jefferson wrote about did 
correspond to the opportunities available to large 
numbers of white adult males in a pre-industrial 
economy— representations of the national subject found 
in emergent mass cultural texts were disconnected from 
the historical conditions and processes that gave rise 
to the national identity and the version of masculinity 
vrhich it sanctioned. Capital took advantage of the 
available technology ("the magazine revolution" of the 
1890s) to rechannel desire for autonomy into desire for 
consumption.
The core assumptions about the national subject 
survived in the new mass cultural texts in a slightly 
altered formula that reflected the social Darwinism of 
the period. In sum, these representations constructed 
social relations between men in very unproblematic, 
ahistorical ways. They represented America as a unique 
place where everyone had the opportunity to rise (i.e. 
to become wealthy and powerful) through hard work and 
industry, and that there were no constraints on self- 
determination except personal behavior and will. If a 
man wanted to be successful, he would be successful, and 
if he failed, it was his own fault. Summarizing Theodore 
Greene's research on magazine biographies and profiles 
between the years of 1894-1903, Richard Ohmann concludes
that "The typical subject of a biography at this time is 
a man (almost always) characterized above all by his 
power, of thought and of will. His achievement flows 
from extraordinary personal qualities and especially 
from his strength and determination. He has risen from 
his humble origins. The main criterion of his success is 
fame" (Ohmann 164).6 This characterization also 
describes the typical trajectory of Horatio Alger's 
best-selling protagonists as well as the rising self 
found in popular autobiographies written by famous men 
like Andrew Carnegie and Teddy Roosevelt— and of the 
heroes that appeared in hundreds of cheap magazines like 
Work and Win. Pluck and Luck, and Fame and Fortune 
Weekly. (Alger and Carnegie are discussed in greater 
detail in chapter two.) As John D. Rockefeller said in 
1906, "No boy, howsoever lowly— the barefoot country 
boy, the humble newsboy, the child of the tenant— ’need 
despair....They have but to master the knack of economy, 
thrift, honesty, and perseverence, and success is 
theirs" (qtd. in Rodgers 35).
This rationalization of the national subject 
decontextualized it and initiated a process whereby the 
national subject eventually became a simulacrum, or what 
Baudrillard describes as "the generation by models of a 
real without origin or reality" (253). The advent of new
6 See Theodore Greene, especially 110-65.
media technologies in the 1920s, 30s, and 4 0s, along 
with successive technical revolutions in mass 
production, prepared the way for what Max Horkheimer and 
Theodore Adorno first called late capitalism in the 
early forties. Their research theorized a mutation in 
subjectivity brought about by the structures of 
industrial modernization, which produced what they 
called an "administered society."
In their view, the autonomous individual had ceased 
to exist; he had been "reduced to the nodal points of 
conventional responses and modes of operation expected 
of him" (Horkheimer and Adorno 28). Knowledge was now 
heteronomous; reason had become instrumental. What 
Horkheimer and Adorno called the Culture Industry 
constituted citizens as consumers and consumers as 
citizens. That is, the Culture Industry, or what I call 
the publicity apparatus, programmed subjectivity so that 
it became an effect of the economy. As Bob Harper 
insists in Tennessee Williams' The Last of Mv Solid Gold 
Watches (1945), business reduced individuality to "vital 
statistics." "Individual" desire was massified (Sartre's 
term), so that the essence of one was the essence of 
every other. In expressing his uniqueness— in the 
prescribed manner, of course— a man expressed the desire 
of every other. Men were thus isolated from each other
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in their (same) desire, which was organized by the 
images and the othodoxies of the Culture Industry.
As Horkheimer, Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse were 
aware, their discovery of late-capitalism destablized 
the central myth of American culture— the autonomy of 
the American male. Their discovery also revealed a 
contradiction. As Marcuse suggested in 1941, masculine 
desire for freedom had been turned into a repressive 
instrument of control. He theorized that radical self- 
interest, which had been a progressive force during 
mercantile capitalism, was in the process of being 
transformed into a repressive ideology by "the totality 
of instruments, devices and contrivances which 
characterize the machine age" ("Social Implications"
138) :
Individuality, however, has not disappeared. The 
free economic subject rather has developed into the 
object of large-scale organization and coordination, 
and individual achievement has been transformed into 
standardized efficiency. The latter is characterized 
by the fact that the individual's performance is 
motivated, guided and measured by standards external 
to him, standards pertaining to predetermined tasks 
and functions. The efficient [i.e. successful] 
individual is the one whose performance is an action 
only insofar as it is the proper reaction to the 
objective requirements of the apparatus, and his 
liberty is confined to the selection of the most 
adequate means for reaching a goal which he did not 
set. Whereas individual achievement is independent 
of recognition and consummated in the work itself, 
efficiency is a rewarded performance and consummated 
only in its value for the apparatus. ("Social 
Implications" 142)
Thus, according to Marcuse, "Under the impact of this
apparatus, individualistic rationality has been
transformed into technological rationality" and "Reason
has found its resting place in the system of
standardized control, production and consumption"
("Social Implications" 141, 146).
Significantly, at approximently the same time the
Frankfurt School was rewriting Freud's theory of
introjection to reflect the new subjectivity (or what
they called instrumental reason or technological
rationality), Jacques Lacan was rewriting Freud's theory
of primary narcissism to account for the same cultural
transformation. By introducing the concept of the mirror
stage at the fourteenth International Psychoanalytical
Congress at Marienbad in 1936, Lacan disclosed a
structure of self-alienation similar to the structure of
self-alienation inherent in the Frankfurt School's
conceptualization of instrumental reason. According to
Lacan (I am quoting from his 1949 essay on the mirror
stage, which is a revision of the earlier paper),
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is 
precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation— and 
which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the 
lure of spatial identification, the succession of 
phantasies that extends from a fragmented body image 
to a form of its totality that I shall call 
orthopaedic— and, lastly, to the assumption of the 
armour of an alienating identity, which will mark 
with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental 
development. (Ecrits 4)
Lacan adds that this development in the life of the 
subject is "experienced as a temporal dialectic that 
decisively projects the formation of the individual into 
history" fEcrits 4). In other words, and I will have 
more to say about this in chapter three, the infant's 
identification with the "specular image" of his (m)other 
is a misrecognition, or what Lacan calls meconnaissance. 
which grants to the child a unity or coherence that the 
child does not yet possess. The structure of this 
primary relationship presents the child with the 
"illusion of autonomy," given from the outside, that is 
the "source of all secondary identifications" (Ecrits 6, 
2). The self-alientating structure of the mirror stage 
propels the subject into history, or human knowledge. As 
Jane Gallop comments, "The mirror stage is a turning 
point. After it, the subject's relation to himself is 
always mediated through a totalizing image that has come 
from outside" (79).
The Frankfurt School's theorization of instrumental 
reason and Lacan's development of the mirror stage are 
partially determined by the crises of the thirties and 
forties— American technocracy and consumerism, on the 
one hand, and Nazism on the other. Both apparatuses 
deployed technologies that mediated subjectivity from 
the outside in order to produce consensus and conformity 
through misidentification. Significantly, the same
recognition of the subject as a social construction
takes place in the plays of Eugene O'Neill, Tennessee
Williams, and Arthur Miller. Up to now, however, it has
gone unnoticed because (first) a narrow formalism has
dominated American dramatic criticism and (second) the
field has been neglected and therefore has not undergone
the same critical revisions that have taken place in the
study of other genres. All this, hopefully, is changing.
In his important book Communists. Cowboys, and
Queers; The Politics of Masculinity in the Work of
Arthur Miller and Tennessee Williams (1992), David
Savran writes,
In questioning the popular images of these two 
playwrights, this book is designed, in part, as an 
answer to the double-dealings, recriminations, 
obfuscations, and amnesia that seem to have 
afflicted so many writers and critics at the height 
of the Cold War and that, deplorably, remain 
widespread in highly visible portions of the 
theatrical and intellectual communities. This book 
represents my critique both of the formalism of the 
1950s and of its continued domination of much of the 
scholarship of Miller and Williams. (6)
Like Savran, I consider my work a response to the
formalism that has dominated the field, especially as it
has affected the reception of the plays by Arthur
Miller, Tennessee Williams, and Eugene O'Neill discussed
in this dissertation. As a critique of these practices,
my project argues that to decontextualize Death of a
Salesman. The Glass Menagerie. A Touch of the Poet, or
More Stately Mansions with a universalizing gesture is
to miss something fundamental about their construction 
as drama and as text; and it is also to miss something 
fundamental about the historical moment of their 
creation.
All three playwrights, as Savran remarks about 
Miller and Williams, focus our attention on the 
hegemonic construction of masculinity during the 
emergence of late-capitalism in order to expose the 
contradictions inherent in that construction. As George 
Lipsitz's research has shown, the economic policy of the 
United States government during World War II helped an 
emerging corporate structure consolidate its power by 
subventing "the greatest capital expansion in American
history" (Class 4). Lipsitz concludes that this
transformation "permanently altered economic and 
political power relations within American society, and 
produced a totalitarian oligarchy of the. major interest 
groups" (Class 2).7 As in the 1890s, the national 
pedagogy was again deployed to sanction the emergent 
social relations. Specifically, if economic expansion 
were to continue, the conversion to a peace-time economy 
involved keeping consumption at its high war-time 
levels. This was partially accomplished by the expansion 
into foreign markets that the rebuilding of Japan and
7 See Lipsitz, especially chapter one of Class and
Culture in Cold War America.
the Marshall Plan made possible. Consumption at home, 
however, also had to be refocused as individual 
consumption, which had been disrupted by the 
dislocations of the Depression and 'World War II. The 
technologies of cinema and television were therefore 
deployed to rechannel male desire; and as in the 1890s, 
the anxiety produced by the (further) decline of 
masculine autonomy was displaced onto consumption by 
using residual images of masculinity to erase the 
historical transformations then taking place. The 
subject was thus restored to fullness by engaging in 
programmed consumption.
The plays of O'Neill, Williams, and Miller written 
during this period contest new subject-formation in 
American culture by exposing the national subject as an 
ideological illusion or as an effect of the economy. 
Their critique of the standardized modes of masculinity 
advocated by the publicity apparatus amounts to a 
cultural inversion; they turn the standardized model 
inside out and reveal an automaton at the heart of 
autonomy.
Specifically, in A Touch of the Poet (1943) and More 
Stately Mansions (1939), Eugene O'Neill discloses the 
national subject as predetermined, as subject to and 
subjugated by the twin evils of consumerism (what 
O'Neill calls materialism) and nationalism. Neither
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consumerism nor nationalism is able to provide the 
masculine subject with meaning; both are bestowed upon 
the subject by a mediating other which Homi Bhabha calls 
the national pedagogy. As a result, the subject 
mistakenly masters himself— gains what O'Neill calls 
self-sufficiency— by dispossessing himself, by embracing 
an ideological mirage. Like Lacan, O'Neill had read 
Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), and like 
Lacan, O'Neill rewrote Freud's work to reflect his 
understanding of human subjectivity. O'Neill's 
reconstruction of Freud, as we shall see in chapter 
three, is remarkably similar to Lacan's in that both 
rewritings point to the historical mutation of the 
subject I have been describing.
Williams' and Miller's rewritings of the subject are 
more closely related to the Frankfurt School's ideas 
concerning instrumental reason. Both authors attempt to 
document the dislocations of late-capitalism through the 
examples of paradigmatic male characters. In The Last of 
Mv Solid Gold Watches (1945) and The Glass Menagerie 
(1945), Tennessee Williams represents the normative 
desires of American masculinity as predetermined and 
destructive. Jim O'Connor's desire to express his 
"uniqueness" is what makes him "ordinary"; in other 
words, O'Connor's uniqueness is expressed as the 
heteronomous knowledge of the apparatus, which makes him
no different than any other (American) man who 
identifies with the metanarrative of national identity. 
His reason— "Knowledge— Zzzzp! Money— Zzzzzzp!— Power! 
That's the cycle democracy is built on!" (100)— can thus 
be viewed as the utter banality of programmed 
conformity. Williams opposes the normative model of 
subjectivity by, as David Savran points out,
"celebrating various subjugated masculinities" (81). In 
The Glass Menagerie, for instance, Williams uses the 
artistic values, or what Marcuse called autonomy of 
reason, of Tom Wingfield to resist the instrumental 
reason represented by O'Connor. But this resistance is 
incomplete since, in the end, Wingfield (and Williams) 
cannot restructure what is.
The debate surrounding the tragic stature of Death 
of a Salesman (1949) has diminished the radicalness of 
Arthur Miller's play. As I suggest in chapter five, most 
criticism of the play focuses too narrowly on the 
individuated character traits of Willy Loman and the 
attendant issue of tragic stature. As Kenneth Tynan 
wrote in 1967, "Death of a Salesman... is not 
tragedy....What ultimately destroys Willy is economic 
injustice, which is curable, as the ills that plague 
Oedipus are not" (67). Tynan's assessment is 
representative and from his perspective it is certainly 
accurate; that is, economic injustice is (or should be)
curable, but the fate that structures Oedipus' life is 
not. Tynan's judgement, however, when viewed from a 
different perspective, ignores the fact that Miller has 
rewritten the classical, or Aristotelian, structure of 
fate to reflect the economic reality of postwar America. 
For Willy, the economy, or apparatus, is his fate; it 
structures his life from without, and he is completely 
unaware of its processes, much like Oedipus is 
completely unaware of the forces that influence his 
life. Or, to put this another way, as Horkheimer and 
Adorno suggest in 1944, "The actual working conditions 
in society compel conformism--not the conscious 
influences which also made the suppressed men dumb and 
separated them from truth. The impotence of the worker 
is not merely a stratagem of the rulers, but the logical 
consequence of the industrial society into which the 
ancient Fate— in the very course of the effort to escape 
it— has finally changed" (37) .
My purpose here is not to redeem Death of a Salesman 
as tragedy— -that would be (is) irrelevant— but rather to 
call attention to Miller's historically specific 
rewriting of the subject, which has, to this point, been 
either ignored or repressed. Willy Loman, as I argue in 
chapter five, represents the death of the subject; he 
is, like his precursor Jim O'Connor, a product of the 
initial stages of late-capitalism and, as such, he too
is other to himself having been transformed by the 
ghostly Other of the Culture Industry.
Chapter Two
Formations and Reformations of the National Subject
I.
Stage One:
From Political Economy to Market Capitalism
Narratives praising the industry and autonomy of the 
American farmer and small entrepreneur became widespread 
as America's Revolutionary leaders rhetorically 
distanced the colonies from England in preparation for 
war. Franklin and Jefferson, the architects of The 
Declaration of Independence, believed that the 
independence of the colonies depended upon population 
growth and territorial expansion, so, in an effort to 
promote American independence, they constructed a 
trajectory of American citizenship that encouraged 
immigration.1 Not surprisingly, representations of the 
small farmer managing his farm and the small 
entrepreneur operating his shop began to appear 
frequently in publications on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Before the Revolution, these types of 
representations of American life began to dominate the 
print culture of the colonies and then became part of an
1 See Benjamin Franklin's essay "Observation 
Concerning the Increase of Mankind" (Writings) 367-374. 
For a detailed discussion of the migration of Scottish 
and English citizens to America in the years immediately 
preceding the Revolution, see Bernard Bailyn, especially 
126-203.
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emergent "Republican ideology" as the colonies became a 
new nation. According to these representations, America 
was a unique place: a country with a new social order 
and unlimited opportunities for the white male who was 
willing to work hard and save his money. Within a few 
years after setting foot in America, the emigrant, 
having labored hard for other men and saved his money, 
would be able to buy land and start his own farm; and, 
in time, if he was frugal and prudent, he would be able 
to buy more land and have other men work for him. If he 
was truly industrious, he could even rent his land to 
other men. In America, the story went, a man could start 
with nothing and end up with everything: wealth, 
property, and political power.
The political documents that created the United 
States also helped to promote this version of America.
In The Declaration, individual self-determination was 
linked to the independence of the colonies; and in "The 
Bill of Rights," the "pursuit of happiness" set forth in 
The Declaration was legalized when the authors 
guaranteed (on paper at least) individual rights and 
personal liberty. In America, citizens would no longer 
be subject to the arbitrary rule of a foreign power, nor 
would they be subjected to the rigid class structures of 
eighteenth-century Europe, which made it almost 
impossible for a man to rise above the station into
which he was born. America, these texts suggested, 
provided the social and political conditions that 
guaranteed social mobility and individual success.
During this stage of American capital, the trajectory of 
the national subject has its most typical articulation 
in the writings of Thomas Jefferson, J. Hector St. John 
de Crevecoeur, and Benjamin Franklin.
If the "American experiment" was to succeed, 
Jefferson, Crevecoeur, and Franklin insisted that a 
specific type of masculine citizenship was necessary. 
Specifically, they argued that America offered unlimited 
opportunities because it was essentially an open, 
agrarian society; they also believed that because 
America had a vast frontier into which its population 
could expand, the new nation would not suffer from the 
overcrowding and the economic crises that plagued 
European countries.2 Jefferson, for instance, in his 
first inaugural address, spoke of a "rising nation, 
spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the 
seas with the rich production of their industry, engaged 
in commerce with nations who feel power and forget 
right, advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach 
of mortal eye" (492) . The optimism of Jefferson's speech 
was supported by his belief that individual and national
2 For a detailed discussion of these matters see 
Drew R. McCoy, especially 13-104.
progress could be maintained indefinitely if the economy 
of the United States remained predominantly agrarian. He 
was convinced that individual males engaged in the 
practice of farming were autonomous and independent, and 
that their autonomous labor would keep the nation free 
from the class turmoil he associated with Europe. As he 
suggests in Notes on the State of Virginia. "Corruption 
of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phaenomenon of 
which no age nor nation has furnished an example. It is 
the mark set on those, who not looking up to heaven, to 
their own soil and industry, as does the husbandman, for 
their subsistence, depend on the casualties and caprice 
of customers. Dependence begets subservience and 
venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares 
fit tools for the designs of ambition" (290-91).
Jefferson's belief in the virtues of husbandry is 
typical of the political economy of the eighteenth 
century. Its American manifestation, as Drew McCoy 
notes, was typical of "classical republicanism," which, 
McCoy argues, Jefferson was trying to "reconcile...with 
more modern social realities" (10). According to McCoy, 
"In its purest form, classical republicanism stipulated 
that republics had to be rather rude, simple, pre- 
commerical societies free from any taint of luxury or 
corruption. The essence of corruption was the 
encroachment of power on liberty, an insidious process
most likety to occur in advanced, stratified societies 
where great wealth and inequality promoted avaricious 
behavior and dangerous dependencies among men" (67). The 
way to retard this eventuality, in Jefferson's mind, was 
to make all American men property owners, so that they 
would, as Voltaire put it in Candide, mind their own 
gardens and remain independent of commerce and the 
vagaries of a full-blown market economy. In other words, 
their labor managing their farms would make men 
productive and self-sufficient and therefore autonomous. 
Manufacturing jobs, on the other hand, would make them 
dependent on the ups and downs of the market or the 
practices of unscrupulous men.
Crevecoeur's Letters from an American Farmer (1782) 
provides a more concrete description of the husbandry of 
the period. The centerpiece of this book— "Letter III"—  
asks in its title, "What is an American?" and Crevecoeur 
answers the question by essentializing male identity.
The letter begins with the stereotypical claim that 
America was an asylum for men "who, when convulsed by 
factions, afflicted by a variety of miseries and wants, 
restless and impatient, took refuge here" (66). What 
made America so attractive to the dispossessed of Europe 
was that the new country did not yet possess a 
stratified social structure: "It is not composed, as in 
Europe, of great lords who possess everything and of a
herd of people who have nothing. Here are no 
aristocratical families, no courts, no kings, no 
bishops, no ecclesiastical dominion, no invisible power 
giving to a few a very visible one” (67). What America 
possessed, instead, writes Crevecoeur, was ”a pleasing 
uniformity of decent competence” (67) and opportunity: 
"new laws, a new mode of living, a new social system" 
(69). In America, the dispossed "become men" because 
"they receive ample rewards for their labours; these 
accumulated rewards procure them lands; those lands 
confer on them the title of freemen, and to that title 
every benefit is affixed which men can possibly require" 
(69). According to Crevecoeur, the opportunity that 
America provided— autonomy through industry— was within 
the grasp of every man if he was "sober and 
industrious." If he "embraced" these "new principles" 
and threw off the poverty and idleness of Europe, then 
he would succeed and in doing so become an American; but 
if he failed to achieve even an "easy, decent 
maintenance by his industry" (81), he had no one to 
blame but himself since, unlike Europe, "[t]here is room 
for everybody in America" (81).3 To illustrate the
3 The complete passage from Crevecoeur's text reads
"He [the immigrant] does not find, as in Europe, a 
crowded society where everyplace is overstocked; he does
not feel the perpetual collision of parties, that
difficulty of beginning, that contention which oversets 
so many. There is room for everybody in America; has he 
any particular talent or industry? He exerts it in order
efficacy of these new principles in a more concrete 
form, Crevecoeur provides us with the "the short history 
of a simple Scotchman," Andrew the Hebridean. Andrew's 
story, as Crevecoeur tells it, does not contain "a 
single remarkable event to amaze the reader" but is 
included in the book to "delineate the progressive steps 
of a poor man, advancing from indigence to ease, from 
oppression to freedom, from obscurity and contumely to 
some degree of consequence— not by virtue of any freaks 
or fortune, but by the gradual operation of sobriety, 
honesty, and emigration" (90). Andrew's story precisely 
follows the elements of the universal American narrative 
that Crevecoeur constructs in the previous pages of the 
letter: he lands on the new continent a penniless exile, 
but through his hard work, honesty, and moderation, 
Andrew becomes an American: "a freeholder, possessed of 
a vote, of a place of residence, a citizen of the 
province of Pennsylvania" (102). Andrew's history—  
because Crevecoeur suggests that it is not remarkable 
but representative— becomes the history of a new race of
to procure a livelihood, and it succeeds. Is he a 
merchant? The avenues of trade are infinite. Is he 
eminent in any respect? He will be employed and 
respected. Does he love a country life? Pleasant farms 
present themselves; he may purchase what he wants and 
thereby become an American farmer. Is he a labourer, 
sober and industrious? He need not go many miles nor 
receive many informations before he will be hired, well 
fed at the table of his employer, and paid four or five 
times more than he can get in Europe" (81).
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men called Americans. The narrative functions to 
universalize Andrew's experience as the experience or 
personal history of all Americans, and because the 
letter has the force of a moral exemplar, it sanctions a 
specific kind of behavior or competence.4 Crevecouer's 
letter also functions to exclude or marginalize what he 
calls "freaks or fortune"— social or economic barriers 
that prevent(ed) immigrants from achieving the 
sanctioned life he describes.5
Franklin's Autobiography (1791), as Leo Lemay points 
out, "is the only enduring best-seller written in 
America before the nineteenth century" (xiii). Lemay and 
Zall note that "[n]o other classic of English or 
American literature has served as a model for the lives
4 For a discusion of de Crevecoeur's utopian vision 
see David M. Robinson 17-31.
5 This was the beginning of the process whereby 
participation in the national pedagogy was at once 
symbolically extended to all people but granted only to 
those Americans who fit the essentialized version of 
national identity: white, male, non-Irish immigrants 
from Northern Europe. A contemporary reader of 
Crevecoeur's letter would have had a very different 
response from a present-day reader. In Crevcoeur's time, 
it was assumed that the subordinated classes— women, the 
Irish, and slaves— were non-persons and therefore not 
citizens. An uncritical, present-day reader, however, 
will have a slightly different response. S/he will 
assume that all Americans have the same opportunity to 
succeed and that failure to do so is an individual 
problem, thereby ignoring the lived experiences of race, 
class, sexuality, and gender.
of so many people" (xiii).6 More important, however, 
Lemay and Zall argue that the Autobiography offers "the 
definitive formulation of the American
Dream.... expressed by the standard cliche, the rise from 
rags to riches" (350). During the height of its 
popularity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the Autobiography was read in Europe as a 
"true" account of American life. Because Franklin 
anticipated this reading, the story that he tells shows 
a representative American and the social and political 
conditions that produced him; it tells the story of a 
new man in a new land, a land where the Individual has 
the right to determine his own history. As a exemplar of 
the national subject, the persona that Franklin creates 
stresses many of the same values as Crevecoeur; he too 
suggests that America has a revolutionary social order 
that guarantees individual autonomy and wealth; he too 
traces the progress of an immigrant (in this case, an 
immigrant's son) from "rags to riches," and he also 
asserts that the paradigmatic American possesses 
specific qualities that make him "successful."
Franklin intended his Autobiography as a model for 
young males to help them acquire "some degree of wealth, 
power, and reputation" (1). On the first page, for
6 See Lemay and Zall's introduction to Beniamin 
Franklin's Autobiography.
example, he writes, "Having emerg'd from the Poverty and 
Obscurity in which I was born and bred, to a State of 
Affluence and some Degree of Reputation in the World and 
having gone so far throf Life with a considerable Share 
of Felicity, the conducting Means I made use of, which, 
with the Blessing of God, so well succeeded, my 
Posterity may like to know, as they may find some of 
them suitable to their own Situations, and therefore fit 
to be imitated" (1) . The "conducting Means" turn out to 
be a repetition of the qualities that Crevecoeur's 
American possessed, except that they are articulated in 
a more formal, extended manner in the Autobiography. The 
famous thirteen "Virtues," which appear in part two of 
the book, are intented to give the reader a guide to 
follow in order to "acquire the Habitude of all these 
Virtues" (68). The reader should not, warns Franklin, 
attempt to acquire all the virtues at once, but he 
should rather attempt to acquire them one at a time 
since "one being acquired, would keep [him] firm in 
[his] Endeavors to obtain all the subsequent virtues" 
(68). The accomplishment of "Frugality and Industry." he 
insisted, "by freeing me from my remaining Debt, and 
producing Affluence and Independence, would make more 
easy the Practice of Sincerity and Justice, etc. etc"
(68). Daily examination, of course, was necessary, and 
in order to make this task more easy, Franklin created a
schedule to chart his (our) progress. The motivation 
behind the habitude was to provide readers with a way to 
create affluence and independence by practicing the 
11 ■virtues” associated with the labor of a entrepreneur, 
which, as we know, Franklin was.
The advice that Franklin offers to his readers is 
not done for purely altruistic reasons, however. Like 
Jefferson, Franklin believed that for the United States 
to become politically independent the country had to 
become economically independent. To gain acceptance for 
his viewpoint, Franklin constructed a narrative that 
encouraged the labor and economic practices that would 
make independence easier to accomplish.
Like Jefferson, Franklin linked the autonomy of the 
individual to the independence of the nation. The 
philosophy of individualism espoused in the 
Autobiography— represented by the social practices of 
industry, sacrifice, and diligence— was inextricably 
linked to the progress of the United States of America. 
By symbolically making the autonomy of the national 
subject the essential ingredient of American 
citizenship, and the economic progress that 
automatically accompanied that citizenship if certain 
modes of conduct were followed, Franklin helped to 
publicize the conceptual framework whereby the national 
identity worked, as David Lloyd remarks in a different
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context, "to occlude troublesome and inassimilable 
manifestations of difference [e.g. slavery] by positing 
a transcendent realm of essential identity" (x). In 
addition, Franklin's vision of social relations in the 
new Republic suggested that competition between men was 
not only normal but also necessary, and that those 
wishing to succeed as entrepreneurs should be prepared 
to seize any opportunity to get ahead. (As we shall see 
in chapter five, this is part of Franklin's legacy that 
Arthur Miller is acutely aware of.) Evidence of this 
belief is illustrated by Franklin's willingness to bribe 
delivery riders in order to get his paper distributed.
Further, the "competitive spirit" and desire for 
self-improvement that Franklin exemplifies in the 
Autobiography represents "the manners and situation of a 
rising people." and as Benjamin Vaughan points out in a 
letter to Franklin included at the beginning of part 
two, "It will moreover present a table of the internal 
circumstances of your country, which will very much tend 
to invite it to settlers of virtuous and manly 
minds....I do not know of a more efficacious 
advertisement than your Biography would give" (59; 
italics original).7
7 For a early discussion of Franklin's 
Autobiography as it relates to the historical processes 
at work in modern European civilization, see Max Weber 
47-78.
What needs to be emphasized here is that the 
political philosophy of Jefferson, Crevecoeur, and 
Franklin represents the political economy of the period. 
Their representations of social relations in early 
America are also part of an emergent nationalism, which 
American historians identify as "republicanism.118 Like 
Drew McCoy, Joyce Appleby uses republicanism to 
conceptualize the dominant cultural and political 
practices of pre-Civil War America. In the historical 
period under discussion— the national period (roughly 
1780-1840)— the political ideology of republicanism 
constructed American society as essentially classless 
and asserted that the best way to keep America free from 
the corruption of stratified wealth was through the 
independent labor of free men. It was argued that self- 
interest based on property ownership created a community 
with shared values, in which equivalence of status (i.e 
property ownership) insured social harmony. As Appleby 
points out, to the theorists of political economy, 
property did not possess exchange value but rather 
social value. Ownership, that is, was an expression of 
community and not of individual desires or needs. 
According to Appleby, "Commerce which prompted private
8 For a historical discussion of American 
republicanism, see Joyce Appleby 461-73 and (The 
Republican Vision of the 1790s) 1-78. See also Linda 
Kerber 474-95 and Cathy Matson and Peter Onuf 496-531.
In addition, see Robert Shalhope 49-80 and 334-56.
interests...threatened civil order," and therefore "Men
deeply involved in their own business, in getting ahead,
and seizing opportunities for [private] gain were not
proper candidates for public office" [Vision 9). Nor
were they proper citizens. In addition, Appleby notes,
that the ideas which we tend to associate with
industrial capitalism— "free enterprise and greater
productivity"— "did not inspire confidence, but rather
provoked anxiety" (9).
By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, a
market economy had emerged in America. According to
Lawrence Kohl,
In the half-century since the Revolution the 
population of the country had nearly quadrupled. The 
nation's boundaries had been pushed southward to the 
Gulf of Mexico and westward to the foothills of the 
Rockies. Industrialism took root in the Northeast, 
while America's burgeoning population poured over 
the Appalachains in search of fertile land. These 
pioneers, however, did not remain isolated in the 
west for long. A transportation revolution linked 
them by way of roads, canals, and, later, railroads 
to the east and ultimately to markets abroad. 
Economic enterprise throughout the nation was 
stimulated by legal changes which enhanced the 
opportunities of the risk-taker in the economy.
State banks proliferated, offering easy credit to 
those willing to expand their operations. 
Storekeepers became merchants, craftsman became 
capitalists. Even simple farmers were caught in the 
restless pursuit of wealth. Enticed by new 
opportunities, they increasingly turned from a 
household economy of self-sufficiency and barter to 
production for the market and the cash nexus. High 
geographic mobility became inextricably linked with 
the desire for social mobility. The idea of the 
self-made man emerged as individuals scrambled to 
improve their situation in life. (4)
The "civic values" associated with the husbandry of the 
political economy were replaced by the values of 
commerce and "the common man." Significantly, the 
national subject was stripped of its more communal 
responsibilites as the concept of self-interest came to 
signify the private interests of the individual.
Outsider texts— Tocqueville's Democracy in America 
(1835) and Harriet Martineau's Society in America 
(1840), for example— record this shift by organizing 
themselves around the concept of democracy.
As Robert Remini points out, "By 1837 the word 
democracy had largely supplanted the term republicanism 
in the national discourse" (8; italics removed). 
According to Remini, this "substitution occurred because 
[Andrew] Jackson and company...deliberately worked to 
bring about that substitution" (8) .
Jackson was president from 1829 to 1837. During that 
time, he embodied the national subject. Like Franklin 
before him and Lincoln after, Jackson literally 
represented the rags to riches trajectory of the 
national subject. Born into "humble circumstances," he 
eventually gained wealth and status. Popular 
representations of Jackson, however, differ in one very 
significant way from Franklin's self-representation in 
the Autobiography. Jackson was figured primarily as a 
frontiersman and Indian fighter— and not as an
entrepreneur— because he became a national figure at a 
time when the expansionist policies of the United States 
dominated national politics. At this historical 
juncture, then, the practices associated with the small 
entrepreneur and the small farmer were merged with the 
figure of the frontiersman, who came to stand for the 
(reconstituted) national subject.
The ideology of Jacksonian democracy is a radical 
reformulation and reinterpretation of the republicanism 
of the revolutionary fathers. That is, it pushed the 
earlier ideology to its limits by extending the role of 
the "people," by inviting them to participate in (all) 
the institutions of the state. Jackson declared the 
people "sovereign" and attempted to eliminate all 
vestiges of aristocracy in order to promote the 
interests of commerce and the common man. Jackson's 
supporters in the political intellegensia and the 
national press began to associate democracy with 
individual autonomy and the expansion of the nation. As 
this happened, Jackson's status as a frontiersman and as 
an Indian fighter were fused with older conceptions of 
enterprenurial and agrarian capital.9 (This is the 
formative moment of a syndesis that I will discuss in
9 For an excellent discussion of America's 
nationalist discourse during this period see Wai-chee 
Dimock 9-21. See also Joyce Warren 1-19. For a related 
discussion of the link between nationalism and racism 
see Richard Drinnon 219-349.
greater detail in chapter five.) At the same moment, the 
republican notions of disinterested virtue and civic 
responsiblity as the "hallmarks" of citizenship were 
sheared from the new politics of self-improvement and 
radical self-interest. This was accomplished, at least 
partially, through the governing practices of Jackson 
and his supports, who, for the first time in the 
nation's history, appealed to the masses by promoting 
the doctrine of the right of instruction (a strict 
adherence to majority rule) and rotation ("the spoils 
system"), as well as appealing directly to the common 
man for support in legislative and political battles.
The Jacksonians' political agenda reflected their 
profound suspicion of aristocratic forms, or what they 
viewed as republican elitism— basically, anything that 
inhibited social mobility or the individual white male's 
ability to produce wealth and status. As Remini notes, 
this is a strong misreading on the Jacksonians part 
because Jefferson and the other founding republicans, 
especially Madison and Adams, never intended for the 
majority to rule since "majority rule...could jeopardize 
the personal and property rights of the minority" (24) 
Furthermore, "the Founding Fathers were not attempting 
to eliminate aristocratic government. They believed in a
mixed government with elements of aristocratic, 
republican, and democratic forms embedded in the whole" 
(25) .
Jackson's administration, as Kohl notes, managed to 
"anticipate" the spirit of the age (6), The excessive 
autonomy that it promoted, and its vehement distrust of 
political and cultural forms that hindered the progress 
of white males, were the result of the nascent 
industrialization of rural and urban communities during 
the period, which initially contributed to the 
geographic and economic mobility of thousands of 
Americans. Until the 1880s in America, as James O'Connor 
points out, "individualism in the sense of both economic 
and social integration found greater material expression 
than in any other country" because "free land, cheap 
resources, favorable climates, and independent property 
inhibited the hegemony of large-scale capital" (17). 
Nevertheless, the Jacksonians' obsessive concern with 
autonomy can also be read as a reaction to the initial 
centralizing movement of modernization, especially their 
opposition to a central bank and to large-scale finance 
capital. Democrats were suspicious of the new lending 
practices of large banks because they felt that these 
practices would enslave the commom man by making him 
dependent on the whims of opportunistic bank owners, who 
were anxious to make easy money (i.e. wealth without
labor or industry) by lending to poor men. Resistance to 
the early centralization of the economy produced 
representations of victimization of the small man. In 
the process, Jackson the Frontiersman came to embody the 
desires of the common man; and the economic practices 
and values that he sanctioned—-private accumulation 
driven by personal industry and labor and their ability 
to produce individual wealth and economic growth— were 
organically linked to a market economy. Therefore, the 
frontiersman and the values that he represented marked a 
slight reformulation (a minor adjustment compliments of 
a market economy) of the national subject, which had 
previously been embodied by Crevecoeur's farmer and 
Franklin's entrepreuneur.
What should be emphasized about all three models of 
the national subject (the farmer, the entrepreneur, and 
the frontiersman), however, is their similarity. First, 
all three represent the autonomy through industry 
trajectory of American citizenship. Second, all three 
are essentially mimetic. That is, their sanctioned 
behavior is generated by economic structures specific to 
the historical period in which they arose. In other 
words, the autonomy represented by the farmer, the 
entreprenuer, and the frontiersman closely corresponded 
to the actual structures of economic life in eighteenth- 
and early nineteeth-century America; and, as I argue
below, these representations were far more "accurate" 
than the rationalized discourse of self-determination 
that emerged with the advent of monopoly capital. This 
is not to suggest, however, that every white male in 
early nineteenth-century America had the opportunity for 
economic self-determination. That claim would be untrue.
II.
Stage Two:
Monopoly Capital and the Transformation of Memory 
In his study of the American working class between 
the years of 18 65 and 1920, Melvyn Dubofsky speculates 
as to why "workers continued to come to the United 
States from Europe and why they continued to move from 
the country to the city" given "the prevalence of 
poverty, the recurrence of economic depression, the 
drabness of working-class neighborhoods, [and] the 
severe shock by preindustrial peoples adjusting to 
industrial society" (28) Dubofsky also wonders, given 
these social conditions, "why rebellion appeared so rare 
an event" (28). As he asserts in Industrialism and the 
American Worker (1975), the years between the Civil War 
and the end of World War I were unprecedented in terms 
of their economic instability and social conflict.
During this period, the United States evolved from a 
largely agrarian nation of small communities and towns 
into a modernized urban and industrial society. This
transformation, as Ernest Mandel argues, was the result 
of three successive "technological revolutions" in the 
mode of production, transformations that delineate the 
second stage of capitalism, what Mandel and others call 
"monopoly" or "industrial" capitalism: " [one] 
craftsworker-operated (and craftsworker-produced) 
machines driven by steam engine; [two] machinist- 
operated (and industrially produced) machines driven by 
steam motors; [three] assembly line combined machines 
tended by semiskilled machine operators and driven by 
electric motors" (43). These successive changes in the 
mode of production, Mandel notes,
"presuppose...different types of labor organization. The 
transition from one to another has historically involved 
serious working-class resistence...because it implies 
serious deteriorations in working conditions, not 
necessarily linked to a lowering of real wages or to an 
increase in the physical work load, but felt and 
understood by a signifcant part of production workers as 
a deterioration in overall labor conditions" (43). The 
deterioration of overall labor conditions associated 
with these technological advances was (is) most often 
experienced by workers as a loss of autonomy— an 
alienation of their labor and a loss of control over the
conditions of their labor; it was also experienced as a 
loss of control over the general conditions of their 
lives.
The emergence of industrial capitalism radically 
altered social relations in America. The autonomy of 
"island communities," as Robert H. Wiebe calls the 
isolated, self-sufficient cities and small towns of 
preindustrial America, disappeared as the economy was 
industrialized and consolidated.10 As this happened, 
there was an attendant loss of individual autonomy; the 
workplace was reorganized and this reorganization 
displaced traditional skills and forms of worker- 
controlled labor. Traditional labor practices were 
further displaced as capital "rationalized" the 
production process. Horizontal and verticle integration 
of business were introduced and new administrative, 
scientific, and technological practices were deployed to 
ensure that owners had complete control of machinery, 
labor, production, and distribution so as to "maximize" 
profits by ensuring a smooth flow of goods for 
consumption. By the 1890s, as Alan Trachtenberg notes, 
"the corporate office virtually dominated the work 
place, imposing demands for speed, regularity, and
10 In addition to Robert Wiebe, see Nell Painter, 
Alan Trachtenberg, Jackson Lears (No Place of Grace) 4- 
58, and Warren Susman 237-85. See also Glenn Porter, 
David Noble, Leo Marx, and John Higham 73-102.
quotas of output. As a result, human effort fell more 
and more into mechanical categories, as if the laborer 
might also be conceived as an interchangeable part"
(56). As this took place, a hierarchy emerged in the 
workplace that increasingly subjected workers to the 
dictates and "expertise" of a growing managerial class, 
which became responsible for work-related decisions and 
the daily operations of larger factories and 
corporations. This new class of managers and their 
practices, collectively known as "scientific 
management," radically segmented the labor process and 
deskilled large numbers of workers so that a new class 
of capitalists, such as Andrew Carnegie and John D. 
Rockefeller, could control "the new system."
The new modes of work were at odds with the dominant 
labor practices of antebellum America. In the early 
nineteenth century, as David Montgomery shows, it was 
common for workers to practice a "mutualistic ethic." 
Workers often asserted collective control over the 
workplace by determining "their own conduct" and working 
hours, and, as Montgomery points out, "these rules were 
not negiotiated with the employers, but were 
unilaterally adopted by the workers" (The House of Labor 
17).11 As machines and management came to dominate the
11 For a more detailed discussion of the 
transformation of working conditions in industrializing 
America and how these changes affected social relations,
workplace, however, the older forms of labor were 
displaced. Workers were now continually supervised and 
their labor subject to the pace, regulations, and 
authority of others. The rationalization of labor also 
had a more profound effect-— the loss of "wqrker 
knowledge." "With machines performing more of the work 
previously performed by people," comments Trachtenberg, 
"workers themselves were required to know less in order 
to perform their tasks— to know less because their 
machines know more" (68; italics original). This 
"transference of technical knowledge from workers to 
machines" resulted in a "process mediated by a new corps 
of engineers" whereby the "rise of specialized skills 
and arcane knowledge corresponded precisely to the 
obliteration of traditional knowledge among skilled 
[craftsmen and] manual laborers" (68-9).
Workers did not, however, passively submit to the 
"proletarianization" of work. They rebelled, as has been 
well-documented; and many times their resistance brought 
results, especially in the 1870s and 80s before 
capitalists established control of the economy and 
before they learned to use the repressive apparatus of
see Daniel Rodgers 1-93, Melvyn Dubofsky, Herbert Gutman 
(Work. Culture, and Society in Industrializing America) 
71-92 and 213-54 and (Power and Culture] 3-78 and 211- 
60. See also Francis Couvares 9-30 and 80-95, David 
Gordon 1-15 and 48-165, and David Montgomery (The House 
of Labor) 1-57 and 214-256. In addition, see 
Montgomery's Worker's Control in America.
the state to defeat mass strikes. Nevertheless, to 
return to the point Dubofsky raises, if working-class 
living and working conditions during this period were so 
horrible, and open rebellion at times appeared imminent, 
why was it so "rare an event"? A partial answer has 
already been given: business, with the cooperation of 
the state, violently supressed the more radical parts of 
the labor movement. Capitalists understood, however, 
that government-endorsed violence was not a long-term 
solution to worker resistance. For the new system to 
function properly, periods of instability, such as those 
brought about by mass strikes or depressions, had to be 
avoided. Everything— materials, markets, machines, 
managers, workers— had to submit to the structures of 
the system. Anything that disrupted the process, as did 
worker resistence, had to be transmuted. Consequently, 
what also had to be transmuted were older economic 
practices and modes of thinking. To put this another 
way, order (or consensus) could also be maintained by 
symbolic violence. If the new social relations were to 
be accepted, then those relations had to be naturalized 
or stabilized. If workers were to become submissive 
laborers and consumers, then a new cultural paradigm had 
to be created.
As it turned out, however, the new paradigm was not 
all that new; it was based on pre-existent, or residual,
versions of the national subject, which were 
(re)deployed— using the emergent technology— to 
authorize the new social relations and the practices 
necessary for the functioning of a consumer economy. In 
the 1890s, "American manhood," notes Amy Kaplan, became 
a "spectacle" rather than something organically linked 
to history or lived experience ("Romancing the Empire" 
661). A secondary- or after-effect of this 
rationalization of the national subject, but equally 
important, was the transformation of cultural memory. 
Individual, local, and communal memory were increasingly 
colonized by representations disseminated in mass 
cultural texts. As Sherwood Anderson commented in 1919, 
"Books, badly imagined and written though they may 
be...are in every household, magazines circulate by the 
millions of copies, newspapers are everywhere" (71).
Mass cultural texts were so pervasive that Anderson 
argued they had replaced the "beautiful childlike 
innocence" of the small village so that the "farmer by 
the stove is brother to the men of the cities, and if 
you listen you will find him talking as glibly and as 
senselessly as the best city man of us all" (71). As 
mass-produced representations became part of the 
discourse of industrial capitalism, memory became the 
site where masculinity materialized itself and thus 
helped to reproduce existing social relations. The
national subject, (re)present in memory, became part of 
what Richard Terdiman describes as a "complex of 
systems" developed in the late nineteenth century "to 
insure that the practices and knowledges which make 
social production and reproduction possible would be so 
thoroughly internalized as to function in effect outside 
memory" (20). Just as important, this initial 
colonization of memory marks (or makes possible) the 
advent of what is now— from the perspective of late 
capitalism— theorized as "the precession of simulacra" 
(Baudrillard) or "instrumentalized knowledge" (the 
Frankfurt School) or "the death of the subject" (Lacan)- 
What is important to note here, however— because of its 
consequences for the social subject— is that memory 
became the site of the other, the heterogeneous 
knowledge that, as Terdiman suggests, functions as if 
outside (but within) memory to reproduce dominant social 
relations. It is also important to note here that, as 
Fredric Jameson argues, the passage from market to 
monopoly capitalism produced a crisis in "figuration": 
the publicity apparatus produced "a growing 
contradiction between lived experience and structure, or 
between a phenomenological description of the life of an 
individual and a more properly structural model of the 
conditions of existence of that experience"
(Postmodernism 410). Stephen Crane's "The Blue Hotel"
(1899) offers a nascent allegory of the effect of this 
contradiction on the reading subject since the "Swede" 
in Crane's story is killed because he confuses the codes 
of dime westerns with real social relations.
The "cult of strenuousity" that developed during 
this period along with the mass production of success 
narratives and masculine adventure stories were 
symptomatic of the contemporary crisis in figuration and 
produced what Jameson theorizes as "tabulation"; these 
narratives offered compensation for "social and 
historical impotence, of the blocking of possibilities 
that leaves little option but the imaginary"
(Postmodernism 3 69). According to Jameson, fabulation 
becomes a substitute for "real history": "here the 
making up of unreal history is a substitute for the 
making of the real kind. It mimetically expresses the 
attempt to recover that power and praxis by way of the 
past and what must be called fancy rather than 
imagination" (Postmodernism 369). Historically, the 
"fabulation" of the national subject was used by the 
emerging cultural elite for three reasons. First, it 
sanctioned current social relations by repressing 
problems associated with industrial capitalism.12 In
12 According to Jackson Lears, "What most [critics] 
have missed is that sentimental literature, by 
contributing to the evasive banality of the official 
culture, actually helped to legitimize modern industrial 
capitalism...Evasiveness underlay a central tenet of the
other words, by reemphasizing the rewards of industry 
and hard work, these narratives helped to create 
imagined social relations that marginalized conflict and 
rebellion. Second, as Amy Kaplan argues, the national 
subject was reasserted to sanction American imperialism. 
She specifically notes that the adventure novels that 
emerged in the 1890s "offer a cognitive and libidinal 
map of US geopolitics during the shift from continental 
conquest to overseas empire. By looking back with 
nostalgia at a lost wholeness, they created fanciful
modern world view: faith in individual autonomy. The 
official creed held not only that progress was 
inevitable but that the key to it was the disciplined, 
autonomous self" (No Place of Grace 17). Lears also 
argues that certain strains of "realist" fiction, 
functioned to ameliorate the conflicts created by 
expansion: "As the United States was becoming the most 
aggressively expansionist society in the world, American 
literature increasingly celebrated a sentimental vision 
of mutually dependent social relations. In the name of 
'realism,' fiction concerned itself largely with 
decorous conversations and parlor intrigues; the 
domestic problem novel became the self-proclaimed 
'modern' mode. The most distinguished realist, William 
Dean Howells, urged that American writers focus on 'the 
more smiling aspects of life, which are the more 
American'" (No Place of Grace 17). Lears, of course, is 
not alone in this belief. For an excellent discussion of 
William Dean Howells' fiction as a response to the 
emergent mass cultural forms, particularly "popular 
novels and mass-circulation newspapers," and the class 
conflict brought about by industrialization, see Amy 
Kaplan (American Realism) 15-64. For a discussion of 
Howells' fiction as a "pedagogy" for the emergent middle 
class, see Alan Trachtenberg 182-207. For a related 
discussion of how the novels of Booth Tarkington 
"salvage[d] the idea of individualism," see Richard 
Ohmann 164-68.
realms on which to project contemporary desires for 
unlimited expansion" ("Romancing the Empire" 661).
Third, and most important, mass-produced success 
narratives introduced workers to the new doctrines of 
work and consumption. The fiction of upward mobility 
helped to create a disciplined, subordinate workforce. 
The fiction of upward mobility also naturalized the 
emerging class hierarchy and the growing poverty and 
social inequality. In essence, it taught that autonomy 
was still an effect of American citizenship, provided 
that a man worked hard. In addition, men also had to be 
indoctrinated into the economy of consumption; they had 
to be persuaded to abandon the practices of local 
production, thrift, sacrifice, and saving used to 
survive in the small, isolated towns, villages, and 
neighborhoods of the older culture. These practices had 
to be transmuted because they were barriers to the 
structures of a consumer economy. To accomplish this, to 
establish what Jackson Lears calls the "ideology of 
consumption," businessmen introduced national 
advertising campaigns in the 1880s. The practice was an 
effort to "rationalize" another part of the system by 
controlling sales. This became possible during the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century for a number of 
reasons, the most important of which, as Richard Ohmann 
and Theodore Greene stress, was the rapid growth of the
magazine industry, which provided advertisers with a 
mass audience.13 To sell more magazines (and 
newspapers), owners "hit on a elegantly simple formula: 
identify a large audience that is not affluent or 
particularly classy, but that is getting on well enough, 
and that has cultural aspirations; give it what it wants 
to read; build a huge circulation; sell a lot of 
advertising space at rates based on that 
circulation.... sell the magazine at a price below the 
cost of production, and make your profit on ads" (Ohmann 
140) .
The emergence of advertising at this time cannot be 
isolated from the emergence of mass culture as a field, 
nor can it be isolated form other social practices used 
to legitimate the new economic and political order; 
advertising also used received cultural knowledge 
concerning masculine autonomy and mobility in order to 
sanction an "ideology of consumption." As advertising in 
magazines and newspapers became part of the 
"consciousness of everyday life," it revised the older
13 For an excellent discussion of the rise of mass 
culture and "the new discourse of advertising" and how 
they functioned to structure consciousness, see Richard 
Ohmann 135-68. For a discussion of the emergent 
"ideology of consumption," see T. J. Jackson Lears 
("From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and 
the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880- 
1930") 3-39 and Christopher Wilson 41-64. See also 
Theodore P. Greene 59-109. For a related discussion see 
Richard Terdiman (Discourse/Counter-Discourse) 25-81 and 
117-46.
version of masculinity by continously associating 
personal consumption with feats of masculine adventure 
and power. Mobilty and autonomy were now asserted or 
expressed in the marketplace, by consuming goods. 
Progress was now judged by a man's dependence on the 
market; his independence was asserted by what Thorstein 
Veblen called "conspicuous consumption." As autonomy 
outside the home was increasingly closed off, men were 
directed to make the home an expression of their 
masculinity by buying goods and services for themselves 
or for their families. Like their predecessors in the 
national period, Horatio Alger and Andrew Carnegie 
construct masculinity in very unproblematic and 
ahistorical ways. Their books, like Franklin's 
Autobiography and Crevecoeur's Letters, are intended to 
be didactic, to show young men how to act as proper 
Americans. As such, they reassert the national subject. 
In their texts, autonomy, or "success," is again 
constructed as intrinsic to the individual and 
contingent only upon personal will or character. Men who 
conform to the behaviorial codes found in the pages of 
Ragged Dick (1868) and Struggling Upward (1890) and The 
Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie (1920) are guaranteed 
success and can expect to experience opportunity, 
independence, and mobility. Alger's novels and 
Carnegie's writings demonstrate that the good, worthy,
or competent man or boy will possess honesty, industry, 
perseverence, and he will be an optimist; and because he 
possesses these "good qualities," he will have "good 
fortune." Those who do not possess these qualities, like 
the "lazy" Johnny Nolan, the "violent" Micky Maguire, or 
the "young aristocrat" Roswell Crawford in Alger's 
Ragged Dick, or the union organizers in Carnegie's 
autobiography, will not get ahead because they do not 
possess "good qualities" and therefore do not deserve 
good fortune. Moreover, these villians do not respect 
"democratic values" since they become obstacles for the 
expression of autonomy through industry and the 
automatic progress that this habitus brings.
Before analyzing Alger's and Carnegie's texts in 
more detail, however, it is necessary to point out how 
pervasive and typical the discourse they embody was 
between the years of 1865 and 192 0. Although there is no 
way to know for sure how dominant the male success 
narrative was in terms of constructing subjectivity and 
social relations, there is considerable evidence that 
suggests that it pervaded the culture. Richard Ohmann, 
Theodore P. Greene, Daniel T. Rodgers, and John G. 
Cawelti have all commented on the "ubiquity" of the 
success narrative during this period. Rodgers notes, for 
instance, that "Editors and interviewers never tired of 
the stories of the Andrew Carnegies and Henry Fords who
worked their way out of the factories and farms to the 
pinnacles of economic power” (36). The masculinity 
discovered in the typical success narrative of this 
period is consistent with the masculinity found in texts 
from the national period, with just a slight adjustment 
to fit the new culture. In the national consciousness, 
the inventor, business magnet, and politician of 
magazine and newspaper profiles and biographies began to 
replace the entrepreneur, farmer, and frontiersman so 
popular in the national period. Nevertheless, as Richard 
Ohmann points out, the formula and the core assumptions 
about the national subject remained the same: "The 
typical subject of a biography at this time is a man 
(almost always) characterized above all by his power, of 
thought and of will. His achievement flows from 
extraordinary personal qualities and especially from his 
strength and determination. He has risen from humble 
origins" (164). The discourse and its formula were 
pervasive; it could be seen in everything from cheap 
magazines like Success, Work and Win. Pluck and Luck. 
Fame and Fortune Weekly; Stories of Bovs Who Make Money 
to more "middle-class" magazines like McClure's. 
Munsev's. and Cosmopolitian to the more expensive 
magazines like Harper's . the Century, and Atlantic 
Monthly. It was also found in the millions of success 
guides and manuals published during this period, as well
as in autobiographies like Teddy Roosevelt's, Andrew 
Carnegie's, and Booker T. Washington's, and in popular 
novels like Owen Wister's The Virginian (1902) and 
Charles Major's When Knighthood Was in Flower (1898).
Horatio Alger's novels were, by the author's 
admission, designed to teach young boys "the gospel of 
success." The version of masculinity they sanction 
posits a simply formula that reduces complex social 
relations to a simple cause-effect logic; and although 
his texts often contradict this logic, especially if 
they are read in light of the deus ex machina appearance 
of rich benefactors, books like Ragged Dick and 
Struggling Upward— through the good example of their 
central character— attempt to assert personal agency as 
the only factor that influences individual mobility. If 
a weak or low-born boy wishes to escape his "humble" 
conditions, then he must simply display sufficient 
amounts of honesty, industry, initiative, perseverence, 
and desire, and he will be on his way up the corporate 
ladder; he will be on his way from being Ragged Dick the 
boot black to being Richard Hunter, Esquire. Alger 
continually reminds his readers that what his 
protagonists represent is universal, that "character" is 
egalitarian and something that all boys and men may 
possess: "To succeed in his profession, humble as it is, 
a boot-black must depend upon the same qualities which
gain success in higher walks of life" (125). In Alger's 
novels, application of these "good qualities" always has 
the intended effect: upward mobility. Boys like Ragged 
Dick, Henry Posdick, and Luke Larkin, for instance, are 
always quick to rise because they have the right stuff: 
they are "enterprising," "studious and ambitious to 
excel," "alert," "ordinarily cool and self-possessed," 
"reliable," "independent," "plucky," and "determined"; 
they are also eternal optimists; when obstacles are 
placed in their way, they resolve not to be disappointed 
and work even harder, and this is what makes them 
worthy, in Alger's eyes, of good fortune.
Bad boys or men, on the other hand, deserve what 
they get, which is usually nothing. Characters like 
Micky Maguire, Johnny Nolan, Roswell Crawford, and Jim 
Travis in Ragged Dick and Prince Duncan, Randolph 
Duncan, Tony Denton, and J. Madison Coleman in 
Struggling Upward are unworthy because, unlike the 
heroes of these novels, they are not proper citizens; 
they are snobs, thieves, drunkards, or just plain 
"lazy." In other words, they obtain either their money 
or their position by corrupt means; they do not labor 
for their just rewards and therefore, according to 
Alger, represent a type of citizenship that is anti­
democratic.
As the most visible spokesman of "triumphant 
democracy" during these years, Andrew Carnegie used his 
wealth to advertise, like Alger, the "gospel of wealth" 
and masculine and national progress. On the first page 
of Triumphant Democracy (1886), his two-volume "paean to 
the United States," Carnegie notes with pride that "The 
old nations of the earth creep on at a snail's pace; the 
Republic thunders past with the rush of the express. The 
United States, the growth of a single century, has 
already reached the foremost rank among nations, and is 
destined soon to out-distance all others in the race. In 
population, in wealth, in annual savings, and in public 
credit; in freedom from debt, in agriculture, and in 
manufactures, America already leads the civilized world" 
(Democracy 1).
In Carnegie's estimation, the reason for this 
success was simple: equality and opportunity. America 
made men; it did not "emasculate" them, as did Europe, 
by making them "feel that their own country decrees 
their inferiority, and holds them unworthy of privileges 
accorded to others" (Democracy 19). In America, he 
argues, repeating Crevecoeur's claim, there are "No 
ranks, no titles, no heredity dignities, and therefore 
no classes" (Democracy 19). Men "reach the shores of the 
Republic subjects (insulting word), and she [America] 
makes them citizens; serfs, and she makes them men"
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(Democracy 18; italics original). Carnegie, like his 
sometime protege Booker T. Washington, promoted this 
vision of American citizenship as a way to "overcome" 
the increasing class conflict brought about by rapid 
industrialization and urbanization, emancipation, and 
mass immigration— conflicts and dislocations that 
Carnegie had experienced in Pittsburg.
Carnegie's greatest fear was that ex-slaves and 
immigrants would not become properly assimilated into 
the new economy and would therefore pose a threat to the 
nation's stability. In Triumphant Democracy, he 
specifically singles out these two groups as 
troublesome, but then asserts that they represent no 
danger because the Republic has granted "every slave" 
and the "millions of foreigners who came from all lands" 
citizenship, an "equal voice in the State" (Democracy 
17-18). Carnegie uses the concept of universal equality 
to obscure complex and sometimes violent social 
relations and problems in order to sanction the emergent 
industrial economy, and this is why Carnegie, like 
Alger, stresses the duties of an American citizen. "One 
man's right is every man's right" (Democracy 19), he 
insisted. And if this was true, if, indeed, everyone was 
equal, then the problems associated with industrialism—  
labor unrest, class stratification, poverty, and 
violence— must somehow be personal. Carnegie insisted,
as did Roosevelt and most of the political elite of the 
time, that America was united, that the consent of the 
governed was obtained "by the foundation on which the 
political structure rests, the equality of the citizen"
(Democracy 19), and that those who resisted the new 
social order were simply "malcontents" who had not been 
properly "Americanized." And who better to Americanize 
the inexperienced immigrant or the recalcitrant worker 
or ex-slave than the Scottish immigrant who worked his 
way up from "honest poverty" to become one of the 
richest men in the world and a symbol of America's 
industrial power.
Carnegie's Autobiography (1920), like Franklin's, is 
a narrative of self-making; it is also the summation of 
his political ideology, having been completed shortly 
before his death. The plot is typical of the genre. 
Suffice it to say that because he was a "clever boy" and 
made himself useful, that because he was industrious and 
hardworking, that because he showed initiative and took 
risks, and that because he overcame many obstacles and 
disappointments, Carnegie was deemed worthy, and 
therefore rewarded with great wealth and power. Social 
relations are once again reduced to a simple cause- 
effect logic (i.e. if Carnegie resolved to do something, 
the task was accomplished), and Carnegie's humble 
origins, like those of Franklin's and Alger's heroes,
turn out to have been a great boon because they have 
been instrumental in his development of character:
"Among the manifold blessings I have had to be thankful 
for is that neither nurse nor governess was my companion 
in infancy. No wonder the children of the poor are 
distinguished for the warmest affection and the closest 
adherence to family ties and are characterized by a 
filial regard far stronger than those who are mistakenly 
called more fortunate in life" (Autobiography 85). 
Character, and the "good qualities" of which it is 
composed, also turn out to be the keys to masculine 
autonomy, which liberate the good citizen from the 
constraints of history.
The discourse of success that Carnegie preaches, so 
he wishes us to believe, is egalitarian simply because 
it is capable of being taught to anyone. For him, it 
becomes a unique cultural possession, something that is 
accessible to all "Americans" simply because they were 
born in or have settled in the United States. Those who 
would become like Carnegie, therefore, have only to 
follow his example, which achieves its authority because 
Carnegie is the immigrant par excellance; his life, like 
Franklin's, is paradigmatic.
The "good qualities" that make Carnegie's wealth and 
power inevitable, that "could not help" but make him a 
"respectable character," were given to him by his
parents, in particular his mother. In an episode where a 
relative suggests that young Andrew might earn a 
"considerable sum" selling "knickknacks... around the 
wharves," for example, Carnegie tells readers that this 
suggestion provoked an "outburst" so strong in his 
mother that it was one of the "most tragic scenes I have 
ever witnessed": "My mother was sitting sewing at the 
moment, but she sprang to her feet with outstretched 
hands and shook them in his face. 'What! My son a 
peddler and go among rough men upon the wharves! I would 
rather throw him into Allegheny River'" (Autobiograhov 
31-2). His mother's "outburst" was brought about on this 
ocassion, Carnegie explains, "not because the occupation 
suggested was peaceful labor, for we were taught that 
idleness was disgraceful; but because the suggested 
occupation was somewhat vagrant in character and not 
entirely respectable in their eyes" (Autobiography 32). 
Carnegie, of course, had been taught that "[a]nything 
low, mean, deceitful, shifty, coarse, underhand, of 
gossipy were foreign to [the] heroic soul"
(Autobiography 32). In fact, he assures us that a "keen 
sence of honor, independence, self-respect, pervaded 
[his] household" as a child (Autobiography 32). These 
gifts bestowed upon young Carnegie in his parents' 
household, and which are bestowed upon all citizens of 
his "beloved Republic," are the very same gifts that
Carnegie offers to bestow upon readers of his 
Autobiography. Like the nation, he is a prodigious 
giver, as the numerous examples of masculine success 
that cram the pages of his book are meant to 
demonstrate.
With the exception of two, his mother and his wife,
all his exemplars are masculine, and they all
demonstrate the same lesson: industry, determination,
honesty, initiative, self-reliance, independence (i.e.
what were known collectively at the time as "pluck") are
rewarded. Two relatively brief examples should be
sufficient to illustate the already familiar formula:
I have already spoken of the intimacy between our 
family and that of the Phippses. In the early days 
my chief companion was the elder brother, John.
Henry was several years my junior, but had not 
failed to attract my attention as a bright, clever 
lad. One day he asked his brother John to lend him a 
quarter of a dollar. John saw that he had important 
use for it and handed him the shining quarter 
without inquiry. Next morning an advertisement 
appeared in the "Pittsburg Dispatch": "A willing boy 
wishes work." This was the use the energetic and 
willing Harry had made of his quarter, probably the 
first quarter he had ever spent at one time in his 
life. A response came from the well-known firm of 
Dilworth and Bidwell. They asked the "willing boy" 
to call. Harry went and obtained a position as 
errand boy, and as was then the custom, his first 
duty every morning was to sweep the office. He went 
to his parents and obtained their consent, and in 
this way the young lad launched himself upon the sea 
of business. There was no holding back a boy like 
that. It was the old story. He soon became 
indispensible to his employers, obtained a small 
interest a collateral branch of their business; and 
then, ever on alert, it was not many years before he 
attracted the attention of Mr. Miller, who made a 
small investment for him with Andrew Kloman. That 
finally resulted in the building of the iron mill in
Twenty-Ninth Street....The errand boy is now one of 
the richest men in the United States...
(Autobiography 126-27)
A few pages later Carnegie offers a similar account of 
the "old story":
Our strict system of accounting enabled us to detect 
the great waste possible in heating large masses of 
iron. This improvement revealed to us a valuable man 
in a clerk, William Borntraeger, a distant relative 
of Mr. Kloman, who came from Germany. He surprised 
us one day by presenting a detailed statement 
showing results for a period, which seemed 
incredible. All the needed labor in preparing this 
statement he had preformed at night unasked and 
unknown to us. The form adapted was uniquely 
original. Needless to say, William soon became 
superintendent of the works and later a partner, and 
the poor German lad died a millionaire. He well 
deserved his fortune. (Autobiography 131)
Both examples reduce complex social relations to a
recognizable version of masculinity that is sanctioned
and rewarded. The man who acts like Henry Phipps or
William Borntraeger is rewared because his worth is
revealed by his industry and his success is therefore
"well deserved." Once again, masculine success is the
result of "inner worth," and other factors that might
constrain individual mobility, such as race or class,
are marginalized. Nevertheless, both passages also
reveal the contradictions in Carnegie's simple-minded
formula; Henry Phipps and William Borntraeger are not
self-made men. Like Benjamin Franklin, Ragged Dick,
Booker T. Washington, and Andrew Carnegie, Phipps and
Borntraeger are at least partially dependent on other
men for their wealth and power. That is, neither Phipps
nor Borntraeger would have become wealthy unless their 
"worth” was discerned by other men, and their contact 
with these sages was not determined by industry or 
personal initiative, but rather by the the social 
structures that determined their lives. In other words, 
Henry Phipps attracted attention because he was white 
and of Anglo origin; his ethnicity and social network 
gave him access to opportunity, not his "inner 
qualities." Likewise, because he was white and German, 
William Borntrager was able to get a job in the iron 
mills where his relative worked, so as to later impress 
Carnegie and become a superintendent and a partner. Race 
and family connections are the real heroes of these two 
passages since they provided the opportunities for these 
men to rise. For all his insistence on the rewards of 
industry in Up From Slavery (1901), Booker T. Washington 
would never have had the opportunities for wealth and 
position that Phipps and Borntraeger had, simply because 
he was not white.
The hidden, or perhaps not-so-hidden, agenda of 
Carnegie's autobiography is his desire for a passive 
workforce, a workforce that still believed in the 
national subject. The new social relations were 
therefore legitimized by re-presenting industrial 
capitalism and capitalists as benevolent, and this is 
why both Alger and Carnegie claim that the patriarchs of
the new economic order deserve to be where they are and 
that they have the nation's best interests at heart. In 
Alger's novels, capitalists never misuse their power for 
personal gain— -only petty bougoise figures like Prince 
Duncan in Struggling Upward are capable of such evil; 
and they always recognize and promote honest, clever 
boys who work hard and save their money.
Likewise, Carnegie's philanthropy, and the 
philanthropy of his friends, is meant to demonstrate the 
benevolence of the new system. Not only did the monopoly 
capitalists reward individual men for their 
determination and industry, but also they rewarded men 
collectively by donating parks, museums, college 
dormitories, concert halls, libraries, and other 
cultural institutions. As Carnegie put it, "there was no 
use to which money could be applied so productive of 
good to boys and girls who have good within them and 
ability and ambition to develop it, as the founding of a 
public library" I Autobiography 45). "The fundamental 
value of a library [or other cultural institution], 
Carnegie argues, "is that it gives nothing for nothing. 
Youths must acquire knowledge themselves. There is no 
escape from this" (Autobiography 46). There is also no 
escaping the fact that Carnegie's surplus value was, 
indeed, capable of producing something where there was 
nothing, and that collectively the men who ran the new
economy were capable of producing institutions that 
would enable good boys and girls to get ahead by 
reproducing the cultural knowledge that supposedly made 
this possible. In Carnegie's mind, philanthropy was 
possible because of the great wealth the industrial 
economy produced, and the implied threat in Carnegie's 
gospel of wealth was that any interference in the system 
would not only affect Carnegie but the thousands 
(perhaps millions) of people that Carnegie and his 
wealthy friends had helped to lead "onward and upward." 
In addition, Carnegie assured anxious readers that the 
"standard of commercial morality is now very high"
(Autobiography 166), but that this standard could only 
be maintained if the economy continued to expand: "It 
may be accepted as an axiom that a manufacturing concern 
in a growing country like ours begins to decay when it 
stops expanding" (Autobiography 217). Again, as we have 
seen in previous writers, free labor is responsible for 
the wealth and the progress of individuals and the 
nation, and anything that blocks its expression or 
expansion, either at home or abroad, contributes to the 
decay of the nation: "America is soon to change from 
being the dearest steel manufacturing country to the 
cheapest. Already the shipyards of Belfast are out 
customers. This is but the beginning. Under present 
conditions America can produce steel as cheaply as any
other land, notwithstanding its higher-priced labor. 
There is no labor so cheap as the dearest in the 
mechanical field, provided it is free [i.e. non-union], 
contented, zealous, and reaping reward as it renders 
service. And here America leads" (Autobiography 218).
Another "great advantage which America will have in 
competing in the markets of the world," Carnegie 
continues, "is that her manufacturers will have the best 
home market" (Autobiography 218). The home market aided 
business because it could be used "for a return upon 
capital, and the surplus product can be exported with 
advantage, even when the prices received for it do not 
more than cover actual cost" (Autobiography 218). 
Interestingly, in his Autobiography Carnegie strongly 
disapproves of the "annexation" of foreign territory. 
Like many Americans, he realized that our colonial 
experience, along with the national identity that was 
constructed during that struggle, made it extemely 
problematic for America to hold foreign possessions and 
deny foreign citizens the right to self-determination.
He calls the annexation of the Philippines, for 
instance, America's "first grievous international 
mistake— a mistake which dragged in into the vortex of 
international militarism and a great navy"
(Autobiography 353). Nevertheless, in spite of his 
opposition to imperialism in the Philippines, Carnegie
favored intervention in Central America to build the 
Panama Canal and in Cuba to free the island from Spain. 
This apparent contradiction, given that the official 
rationale for all three military actions was to free an 
enslaved population, is what William Appleman Williams 
calls "imperial anticolonialism.1,14 As a London Times 
editorial of 1900 explained, "Even anti-imperialists 
[like Carnegie] welcome an Imperial policy which 
contemplates no conquests but those of commerce" (qtd. 
in William Appleman Williams 23). In other words, 
Carnegie did not favor the acquistion and administration 
of foreign possessions; he did, however, favor 
intervention, as did (do) most American businessman and 
politicians, when it provided stable markets for the 
selling of American goods. He did favor the construction 
of an "informal empire" because it was in the "best 
interest" of American business.
Carnegie's support of American expansion during 
these years is inextricably linked to the pedagogy of 
masculinity expressed in his writings, and it is, as Amy 
Kaplan points out in a slightly different context, a 
manifestation of the "rescue mission for American 
manhood" under way at the time (659). By refiguring and 
extending the frontier/entreprenurial identity of 
Jacksonian masculinity to provide symbolic resolutions
14 See William Appleman Williams 24-44.
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to the problems associated with the emergence of 
industrial capitalism, "empire offered the arena for 
American men to become what they already were, to enact 
their essential manhood before the eyes of a global 
audience" ("Romancing the Empire" 659). The 
essentialized manhood projected by the texts discussed 
here claims that the general welfare and economic 
progress of the nation were dependent on the autonomous 
male producing goods and services for domestic and 
international markets. The national subject, and the 
"good qualities" associated with it, became identified 
with personal consumption at home and the selling of 
surplus goods abroad. The duty of the good citizen, 
then, was to contribute to the wealth of the nation by 
helping to produce surplus value and by engaging in 
personal consumption.
The representation of the national subject found in 
the writings of Horatio Alger and Andrew Carnegie are 
typical of a reformulated nationalist discourse that 
emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. Not 
coincidentally the ideology of masculinity they deployed 
was an appropriation of an earlier republicanism, which 
was used to marginalize class conflict and legitimize 
the emergence of an industrial economy. Cultural elites 
used the technologies of the emergent mass culture 
industries to legitimize the new social relations, and
thus sanctioned a version of masculinity that helped to 
perpetuate the new order. These representations helped 
to create what Frederic Jameson calls a "political 
unconscious."15 As mass-produced representations of 
masculine success and autonomy proliferated and began to 
permeate everyday life and the memory of individual men, 
men increasingly interpreted their experience in terms 
of a previously elaborated mastercode, which taught them 
to see social relations in very reductive ways. The 
narrative taught them that because there was virtually 
no limit on masculine aspiration in America, state 
intervention to correct the problems associated with 
industrialization, such as extreme social inequality and 
poverty, was unnecessary. These problems, the narrative 
suggested, would be corrected by the "free market," 
whose benevolent capitalists miraculously intervened in 
the lives of "worthy" young men. Economic failure or 
stagnation, then, expressed the failure of the 
individual, not the system. Masculine "character" was 
thus reduced to an essence that replaced political 
rights, so that one's "American-ness" was now determined 
by one's ability to re-present the practices and norms 
of mass-produced fictional models--formulas that were 
normally contradicted by lived experience.
15 See Jameson (The Political Unconscious) 17-102.
Chapter Three
Eugene O'Neill and the Liminality of the 
National Subject
In the decade of the 1930s, Eugene O'Neill turned 
his attention to American history. At this time, O'Neill 
started work on A Tale of Possessors. Self-Dispossessed, 
a proposed cycle of seven plays that attempted to trace 
the history of America from the French and Indian War to 
the Depression, through the generations of a single 
family.1 In a letter to Lawrence Langner in July of 
1936, O'Neill described the project as "primarily...the 
history of a family," but "not an 'American life' in any 
usual sense of the word": "I don't want anyone to get 
the idea that this Cycle is much concerned with what is 
usually understood by American history, for it isn't. As 
for economic history...I am not much interested in 
economic determinism, but only in the self-determinism 
of which the economic is one phase" (Bogard and Bryer 
452)
O'Neill never completed the Cycle and in 1952 
destroyed all but two of the proposed seven plays, A 
Touch of the Poet (1943), which he now considered a 
separate project, and More Stately Mansions (1939), 
which was unfinished. During the same period (roughly
1 For a history of the composition of the cycle 
plays see Bogard 366-453. See especially Floyd 215-22, 
as well as Gelb 790-805.
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1935-1944), as part of what are known as the "great late
works," O'Neill wrote The Iceman Cometh (1939), Long
Day's Journey Into Night (1941), and A Moon for the
Misbegotten (1944). All five plays mark an
intensification of O'Neill's obsession with what he
called in 1928 "the big subject": "the death of the old
God and the failure of Science and Materialism to give
any satisfying new One for the surviving religious
instinct to find a meaning for life in, and to comfort
the fears of death with" (Bogard and Bryer 311). Sixteen
years later, in an interview with James Agee shortly
after the Second World War, O'Neill remarked that
America had failed to provide that meaning:
...[I]nwardly...the war [World War II] helped me 
realize that I was putting my faith in the old 
values, and they're gone....It's very sad, but there 
are no values to live by today....Anything is 
permissable if you know the angles. I feel in that 
sense, that America is the greatest failure in 
history. It was given everything, more than any 
other country in history, but we've squandered our 
soul by trying to possess something outside it, and 
we'll end up as that game usually does, by losing 
our soul and the thing outside it too. (Estrin 188)
The failure of America— in O'Neill's mind the inability
of the nation to provide the "satisfying new One"—
manifested itself as what he called the "drama of
American possessiveness and materialism" (Bogard and
Bryer 452), a process that had "squandered" the utopian
promise of the nation's founding.
The "nation-ness" of the modern nation, as Benedict 
Anderson argues in Imagined Communities, was invented in 
the late eighteenth century, a time when previous models 
of political and social organization were breaking down. 
Nationalism (or what Anderson calls "nation-ness”) came 
about at precisely the moment when what O'Neill termed 
"old values" were being destroyed by "Enlightenment and 
Revolution" (Anderson 16).2 Anderson theorizes that each 
nation invented itself, or created its own narrative, 
which sought to unify it subjects by universalizing them 
in the concept of "the people." In this respect, the 
modern nation can be viewed as a compensatory act or 
gesture; it was invented to replace monarchy and 
religion as the organizer-of-society, as the giver-of- 
meaning; it was to be the "satisfying new One" by 
providing continuity.
The American-ness of America has its most powerful 
objectification in the autonomous subject. In fact, as I
2 Anderson comments further: "in Western Europe the 
eighteenth century marks not only the dawn of the age of 
nationalism but the dusk of religious modes of thought. 
The century of the Enlightenment, of rationalist 
secularism, brought with it its own modern darkness.
With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which 
belief in part composed did not disappear.
Disintegration of paradise: nothing makes fatality more 
arbitrary. Absurdity of salvation; nothing makes another 
style of continuity more necessary. What then was 
required was a secular transformation of fatility into 
continuity, contingency into meaning.... few things were 
(are) better suited to this end than the idea of the 
nation" (19).
suggest in chapter two, the project of America's
colonial leaders was the construction and dissemination
of a national subject liberated from the values and
structures of the Old World. As Gordon Woods writes in a
recent book, the triumph— or what he calls the
"radicalness"— of the American Revolution was that it
"brought respectability and even dominance to ordinary
people long held in contempt and gave dignity to their
menial labor in a manner unprecedented in history and to
a degree not equaled elsewhere in the world" (8). Not
only did the Revolution reconsitute "what Americans
meant by public or state power," but also "it made the
interests and prosperity of ordinary people— their
pursuits of happiness— the goal of society and
government" (8).
One of the first examples of the national subject
(Wood's "ordinary person") in pursuit of his happiness
is found in Letter III of Crevecoeur's Letters From an
American Farmer, where he describes the transformation
of a European emigrant into an American:
Let me select one as an epitome of the rest: he is 
hired, he goes to work, and works moderately; 
instead of being employed by a haughty person, he 
finds himself with his equal...his wages are high, 
his bed is not like that bed of sorrow on which he 
used to lie... hitherto he had not lived, but 
simply vegetated....He begins to forget his former 
servitude and dependence....He looks around and 
sees many a prosperous person who but a few years 
before was as poor as himself. This encourages him 
much; he begins to form some little scheme, the 
first, alas, he ever formed in his life....He is
encouraged, he has gained friends; he is advised and 
directed; he feels bold, he purchases some 
land....He is become a freeholder, from perhaps a 
German boor. He is now an American, a 
Pennsylvanian....He is naturalized; his name is 
enrolled with those of the other citizens of the 
province. Instead of being a vagrant, he has a place 
of residence.... From nothing to start into being; 
from a servant to the rank of master; from being the 
slave of some despotic prince....What a change 
indeed! It is in consequence of that change that he 
becomes an American.... it extinguishes all his 
European prejudices, he forgets that mechanism of 
subordination, that servility of disposition which 
poverty had brought him (Crevecoeur 82-3)
Crevecoeur's "good subject" represents what O'Neill 
calls "an American life" in the "usual" sense. As the 
"epitome," he stands in and for the rest (i.e the model 
has currency because it is e pluribus unum). The 
American-ness of the narrative is structured by a 
homology between "the nation" and "the people": a rising 
nation, a rising people. The teleology representing 
American history is progress, a shining future. For the 
immigrant, America represents a break with the past. The 
"mechanism" of the new country enables him to escape the 
poverty and dependence of Europe: the nation 
"extinguishes all his European prejudices." Crevecoeur's 
paradigmatic American is part of the enunciation of the 
"imagined community" of the nation; he joins the nation 
only to have his specific history replaced by his 
ascendancy as a subject. The nation becomes his 
community; it nourishes him like a "family"; it gives 
him sustenance; its "good effects" provide him with
food, friends, property, position. If he works hard, he 
will have "future prosperity"; he will improve his 
condition and the condition of his family. His new 
government, like his new community, offers him "new 
felicity" and "protection." With the purchase of 
property, this "nothing" becomes a citizen; he becomes 
autonomous; he serves no man— his past life vanishes and 
he becomes an "American."
Within the legal territory of the United States, 
then, the essential quality of the national subject is 
his autonomy. Just as the legal and political structures 
of the new nation constituted the territory and 
governing apparatus of the nation, so too the ideology 
of the subject-set-free (re)constituted and mapped out 
the new citizen. As the epic hero of the American story, 
the autonomous subject became a symptom of American- 
ness, or what Homi Bhabha calls the objectification of a 
"national pedagogy," whose narrative power rests in its 
ability to create a "unisonant" discourse that 
interpellates individual citizens— a process that 
inscribes individuals as subjects of/to the nation by 
providing cultural identification and cohesiveness.3
Eugene O'Neill's experience of the national pedagogy 
is (was) "disjunctive"; his writing resists the
3 For a further discussion of the concept of 
national pedagogy see Bhabha ("DissemiNation") 291-322.
totalizing or essentializing narrative of the nation.
His plays, especially the surviving Cycle plays and the 
late plays, are a supplement to the already inscribed 
narrative of national identity. His stories are 
constructed around what Homi Bhabha calls the 
"liminality" of the nation: the gaps and fissures that 
expose the apparent plenitude of the national subject as 
incomplete. As Bhabha writes, "Counter-narratives of the 
nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing 
boundaries— both actual and conceptual— disturb those 
ideological manoeuvers through which 'imagined 
communities' are given essentialist identities" 
("DissemiNation" 300).
More specifically, O'Neill disrupts the 
"simultaneity" or "temporality" of the nation by 
rewriting it, by substituting isolation for community, 
greed for progress, repetition for ascendancy, and 
alienation for autonomy. In his last plays, the imagined 
trajectory of American history and the rising subject of 
American history come to a grinding halt: America has 
stopped moving forward. As Larry Slade says in The 
Iceman Cometh. "It's a great game, the pursuit of 
happiness" (572).4 Or, as Jamie Tyrone says in A Moon 
for the Misbegotten. "There is no present or no future-
4 All references to O'Neill's plays are from Eugene 
O'Neill: Complete Plavs. 1932-43.
-only the past happening over and over again— now"
(920). Or, as Simon Harford remarks in More Stately 
Mansions. "As if Freedom could ever exist in Reality! As 
if at the end of every dream of liberty one did not find 
the slave, oneself, to whom oneself, the Master, is 
enslaved" (365). The pursuit of happiness has not 
liberated the citizen, has not provided him with the 
"satisfying new One to replace the surviving religious 
instinct." In fact, the very thing— self-interest— that 
was supposed to liberate the American citizen had 
enslaved him and destroyed any possibility of community. 
This contradiction, or "duality" as Louis Sheaffer calls 
it, is best figured in the character of Simon Harford 
(the male protagonist of More Stately Mansions). 
According to Sheaffer, "Simon's duality symbolized a 
rending duality in American life, a basic condition in 
which the forces of greedy materialism were ascendant 
and threatening to destroy all that was ennobling in our 
national heritage" (481).
The Second World War, as O'Neill's comments above 
suggest, destroyed his faith in the old values. 
Everything had become a shell game for him, a matter of 
knowing the angles. History had ended. The nation had 
betrayed itself. Utopia had turned into "cunning
acquisitiveness.1'5 The plays written during this period 
represent faith or meaning as a lack, or a fiction, as a 
drive that is just a drive— a representation of meaning 
without providing meaning; this is what O'Neill called 
"hopeless hope." The two plays that I will discuss in 
this chapter— A Touch of the Poet and More Stately 
Mansions— suggest that O'Neill believed American 
citizenship is constructed around a necessary lack (he 
calls this lack "pipe dreams") which simultaneously 
prolongs and destroys the life of the subject. That is, 
to use O'Neill's language, men (and women) need their 
illusions to survive, but these illusions alienate them 
from the two things that would give their lives meaning: 
themselves and other people.6 To quote Larry Slade
5 In a letter to Sophus Keith Winther on December 
26, 1942, O'Neill writes: "I am sorry if I have said 
anything to affront your faith in an upward spiral of 
mankind. Because I myself believe that perhaps a million 
years from now it may begin to dawn on Man...that he has 
been a damned fool. But I hope you put your upward 
spiral in hock during the next peace conference. 
Otherwise, you will surely be rudely goosed by the hard 
fact behind the flimflam, and fall and maybe severely 
fracture your tamborine. As Rabelais said, or would have 
said if he thought of it, you can't build Utopia out of 
turds!" (Bogard and Bryer 539).
6 Slavoj Zizek insists that alienation is a 
fundamental structure of "the democratic abstraction": 
"There is in the very notion of democracy no place for 
the fullness of concrete human content, for the 
genuineness of community links: democracy is a formal 
link of abstact individuals.... Critics of democracy are 
thus correct in a way: democracy implies a split between 
the abstract citoven and the bourgeois bearer of 
particular, 'pathological' interests, and any 
reconciliation between the two is structurally
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again: "To hell with the truth! As the history of the 
world proves, the truth has no bearing on 
anything....The lie of the pipe dream is what gives life 
to the whole misbegotten mad lot of us, drunk or sober" 
(570). In other words, the desire to possess something 
outside the self (the "satisfying new One"), in order to 
fill a lack or absence in the subject, gives the subject 
meaning. But that same desire is also destructive 
because the end of that desire does not satisfy the 
drive to attain it, because there is no end to that 
desire; there is only the fictional means to reach 
toward it. In O'Neill's mind, there is only the desire 
to satisfy the desire, which leads the subject outside 
himself into a quest that has no ending point. There is 
no ultimate meaning behind this quest. Meaning or 
satisfaction is understood as the process of the quest, 
and not as a specific destination or ending point. To 
use a more mundane formation (and one that is suggested 
by the last plays): materialism (or what O'Neill called 
the "economic phase" of self-determination) cannot 
fulfill the subject because its fruits— "power and
impossible. Or, to refer to the traditional opposition 
between Gesellschaft (society, as a mechanical, external 
agglomeration of atomized individuals) and Gemeinschaft 
(society as a community held together by organic links): 
democracy is definitely bound up with Gesellschaft; it 
literally lives on the split between the 'public' and 
'private,' it is possible only within the framework of 
what was once...called 'alienation'" (164).
wealth and possessions"— lead only to desire and the 
desire for more things. As 0"Neill pointed out, "life is 
a struggle, often, if not usually, unsuccessful 
struggle; for most of us have something within us which 
prevents us from accomplishing what we dream and desire. 
And then, as we progress, we are always seeing further 
than we can reach" (qtd. in Bigsby l: 42). My 
investigation of A Touch of the Poet and More Stately 
Mansions, then, will focus on the lives of the male 
protagonists of each play— Cornelius Melody and Simon 
Harford— as they "progress" and see further than they 
can reach. My investigation of these male characters 
will be supplemented with a discussion of how their 
desire affects the women closest to them: Nora Melody 
and Sara Melody Harford, respectively.
* * *
In Eugene O'Neill's New Language of Kinship. Michael 
Manheim argues that A Touch of the Poet is the precursor 
text for Long Day's Journey (8).7 More specifically,
7 This idea is commonplace; it was originally 
suggested, in print at least, by Arthur and Barbara Gelb 
in their biography of O'Neill (1960). According to them, 
"Despite its period setting and historical context, the 
play fA Touch of the Poetl was, like so many of his 
others, emotionally and psychologically the story of his 
own family" (800). This reading obscures what the Gelb's 
previously assert about the cycle, namely that in 
preparing to write it, O'Neill was, in their words,
"deep in books about the political, financial, 
spiritual, and cultural history of the United States" 
(799). Virginia Floyd notes, for instance, that one of 
the books O'Neill read during this period was Matthew
Manheim asserts that "There should be little doubt that 
A Touch of the Poet is primarily a play about James 
O'Neill, Sr" (106-07). Like James O'Neill/James Tyrone, 
1,Con Melody is a proud man who, having known success in 
his earlier days, is now forced to live in what he 
considers undeserved obscurity. He is also like the old 
actor in that the past he recalls seems linked to the 
role O'Neill's father played throughout so much of his 
career. Con thinks of himself as having once been a kind 
of young Edmond Dantes in his brilliant Napoleonic 
uniform, and like that character Con feels wronged by 
ill-meaning adversaries.... Con, like James Tyrone, uses 
his illusions about his glorious past to obscure his 
humble, shanty-Irish origins" (106-07). While Manheim's 
comparison is accurate, his description of the 
correspondences between Con Melody and James 
O'Neill/James Tyrone is, obviously, skewed.
Nevertheless, in trying to read Poet as an ur-text for 
Long Day's Journey. Manheim glosses over the 
complexities of the texts to insist upon a homology. My 
point here is this: by granting primacy to the 
"autobiographical motifs" of the earlier play, in order
Josephson's The Robber Barons: The Great American 
Capitalists. 1861-1901 (217). Additionally, although 
O'Neill finally completed work on Poet in 1943— two 
years after he finished Long Day's Journey— he began the 
play in 1935, four years before he started writing Long 
Day's Journey.
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to read it as an incomplete version of the later play, 
the historicity that O'Neill gives to Poet is lost. A 
more specific example will illustrate my point. Although 
the uniform that Con Melody wears throughout the play is 
from the Napoleonic era, it is not, per se.
"Napoleonic." In other words, unlike the Edmond Dantes 
character that James O'Neill played during his lifetime, 
Melody is not, nor does he think of himself, as a French 
aristocrat. For Melody wears the "brilliant scarlet 
full-dress uniform of a major in one of Wellington's 
dragoon regiments" (228; italics removed), and he views 
himself as an English aristocrat. Con Melody, in fact, 
fights against Napoleon's forces in the Peninsula War, 
and, significantly, the action of Poet takes place 
ninteen years to the day that Major Cornelius Melody 
distinguished himself at the Battle of Talavera. By 
ignoring this difference in favor of a homology, Manheim 
effaces the specific subject position that O'Neill 
creates for Melody (and, for that matter, for James 
Tyrone in Long Day's Journey). To be fair to Manheim, 
Melody's character is, of course, overdetermined, but to 
reduce his importance by way of a convenient comparison 
that sees Melody as a figure for O'Neill's father, or 
the play as another working out of O'Neill's oedipal 
problems, is to ignore the context in which the author 
places his characters and the lives he creates for them.
The subject position that O'Neill gives to Con 
Melody belies the disjunctive nature of O'Neill's 
experience of American-ness, a fissure or gap that 
threatens the plenitude of the imagined subject.
Melody's father, Ned Melody, an Irish peasant by birth, 
was, as the barkeep Mickey Maloy says, "a thieven 
shebeen keeper who got rich by moneylendin' and 
squeezin' tenants and every manner of trick. And when 
he'd enough he married, and bought an estate with a pack 
of hounds and set up as one of the gentry" (185). Ned 
Melody's newly acquired money and property, however, 
were not enough to gain him access to the class to which 
he aspired since "none of the gentry would speak to auld 
Melody" (185), nor would they let his son Con near their 
daughters. Neverthless, Ned Melody wanted his son to be 
a "true gentleman, so he packed him off to Dublin to 
school, and after that to the College with sloos of 
money to prove himself the equal of any gentleman's son. 
But Con found, while there was plenty to drink on him 
and borrow money, there was few that didn't sneer behind 
his back at his pretensions" (185). After college, Con 
Melody joined the British Army where he served as a 
cavalry officer in the Peninsula War and distinguished 
himself at the battle of Talavera where he earned the 
rank of major. According to his cousin Jamie Cregan, who 
fought with him in Spain, "[Con] was strong as an ox,
and on a thoroughbred horse, in his uniform there wasn't 
a handsomer man in the army. And he had the chance he 
wanted in Portugal and Spain where a British officer was 
welcome in the gentry's houses*1 (186) . Shortly after the 
Battle of Salamanca, Melody is dismissed from the army 
and sent home in disgrace for killing a Spanish nobleman 
in a duel over his wife. Melody returns to Ireland where 
his wife Nora has given birth to his daughter, Sara. 
According to Jamie Cregan, "He married [Nora] because 
he'd fallen in love with her, but he was ashamed of 
her...because her folks were only ignorant peasants on 
his estate, as poor as poor" (187). Melody "Then raised 
what money he still was able," and took "[Nora] and Sara 
here to America where no one would know him" (187). Once 
in America, Melody buys a "tavern" in a "village a few 
miles from Boston" (183). According to O'Neill's stage 
directions, "The tavern is over a hundred years old. It 
had once been prosperous, a breakfast stop for the 
stagecoach, but the stage line had been discontinued and 
for some years now the tavern has fallen upon neglected 
days" (183) .
Con Melody's immigration to America, however, has 
not given him the status that he enjoyed during the 
Peninsula War as an officer in the British army. 
According to Mickey Maloy, "The Yankee gentry won't let 
him come near them....But once in a while there'll be
some Yankee stops overnight wid his wife or daughter and 
then you'd laugh to see Con, if he thinks she's gentry, 
slidin' up to her, playin' the great gentleman and 
makin' compliments, and then boasting afterward that he 
could have them in bed if he'd had a chance at it"
(186). Maloy also notes ironically that Melody 
"considers the few Irish around here to be scum beneath 
his notice" (186).
It is, of course, by design that O'Neill sets the 
action of the play a few miles from Boston. He places us 
in (or near) "the cradle of the American Revolution," 
presumably Lexington or Concord. This allows him to tie 
the action of the play to the Revolution and its 
founding documents, especially the pursuit-of-happiness 
clause in the Declaration of Independence. Notably, the 
welcoming act of the local gentry is to "swindle" the 
newly arrived Melody, just as Melody's first act as an 
American is to be swindled. Sara Melody describes her 
father's "American estate" as "a bit of farm land no one 
would work anymore, and the rest all wilderness!" (195). 
In their pursuit of happiness the local gentry steal 
money from Melody and his family, and in his own self- 
interest Melody impoverishes himself and consequently 
his family (more about this below). Melody's action is a 
repetition of a desire that returns him to where his 
father began, a run-down bar. His desire to be other
than he is, to be one with the local gentry, is also a 
repetition of his actions in Ireland. Here again, Melody 
aligns himself with a class that has nothing but 
contempt for him because he is Irish. O'Neill makes this 
point clear in a conversation between Nora and Sarah 
Melody:
Nora: ...I'm worried about your father. Father Flynn 
stopped me on the road the yesterday and tould me 
I'd better warn him not to sneer at the Irish around 
here and call thim scum, or he'll get in trouble. 
Most of them is in a rage at him because he'll come 
out against Jackson and the Democrats and says he'll 
vote with the Yankees for Quincy Adams.
Sara: ...Faith, they can't see a joke, then, for 
it's a great joke to hear him shout against mob 
rule, like one of them Yankee gentry, when you know 
what he came from. And after the way the Yanks 
swindled him when he came here, getting him to buy 
this inn by telling him a new coach line was going 
to stop here. (193)
O'Neill underscores Melody's self-alienation here by
having him support John Quincy Adams in the election of
1828, thereby aligning himself with the Anglo-American
ruling class that has swindled Melody and regards him as
a "drunken Mick" (249), just as in Ireland he aligns
himself with the Anglo-Irish ruling class. Both
political structures allow him to participate in the
imagined community of his adopted country without giving
him access to the status or power that would make him a
gentleman. Like Wellington, who was also Irish, Melody
ironically fights to protect the commercial interests of
a colonial power. While Melody is in Spain fighting
Napoleon and helping to break a boycott on British 
exports, the ruling apparatus of British Imperialism is 
exploiting Irish land and labor. Indeed, at the time, 
the Irish-Protestant ruling class that Melody aligns 
himself with was responsible for the exploitation of 
Ireland's predominantely Catholic peasants— the class 
that Melody and his wife are both born into. The Anglo- 
Irish ruling class was also the beneficiary of the Act 
of Union (1800), which officially made Ireland part of 
the United Kingdom and set up an administrative 
apparatus for the "colony" open, for the most part, only 
to members of Protestant sects.8
Viewed retrospectively, from the position of recent 
post-colonial theorizations of the subject, Melody's 
position as an Irishman resembles what Salman Rushdie 
calls a "chamcha," an Urdu word which means spoon and 
which Rushdie uses to describe a class of natives who 
"suck up" to the colonial ruling class, or its 
surrogates, in order to gain power. Rushdie argues that 
the "British Empire would not have lasted a week without 
such collaborators among its colonized people" (8).9
8 For further details on this period of Irish 
history see MacDonagh 13-52. See also Boyce 123-191.
9 Melody's formative years would have been spent in 
what Abdul JanMohamed calls the "hegemonic phase" of 
British colonialism in Ireland: "By contrast, in the 
hegemonic phase (or neocolonialism) the natives accept a 
version of the colonizers' entire system of values, 
attitudes, morality, institutions, and, more important,
Melody's internalization of the empire's values— he 
speaks the Queen's English and has been educated as an 
English gentleman— is constructed around his lack of 
status; that is, he desires to be like them because he 
is not (Frantz Fanon calls this phenomenon the "native's 
envy").10 For the subject, this involves a negation of 
the self and the assumption, or introjection, of an 
imaginary other, which stands outside the self and 
presents to that aliented self a plenitude. The process 
is similar to Lacan's mirror stage during which the 
(m)other reflects back to the baby a "specular image" in 
order to give the child a unity or coherence that the 
child does not yet possess. Initially, subjectivity for 
the child is constructed around this alienated image. 
According to Jacqueline Rose, "This image is a fiction 
because it conceals, or freezes, the infant's lack of 
motor co-ordination and the fragmentation of its drives. 
But it is salutary for the child, since it gives it the 
first sense of coherent identity in which it can 
recognize itself" (30). However, as Rose points out, the
mode of production. This stage of imperialism does rely 
on the active and direct 'consent' of the dominated, 
though, of course, the tthreat of military coercion is 
always in the background" (62). Although JanMohamed is 
writing about the colonization of Africa, his 
theorization is applicable to Ireland's condition at the 
end of the eighteenth century.
10 For details see Fanon 35-105.
"image in which we first recognize ourselves is a 
misrecoanition (30; italics original).11
Con Melody's identity as a subject is constructed 
around a similar misrecognition, which operates along 
the same lines as Lacan's mirror stage. This reading is 
suggested by O'Neill's presentation of Melody in the 
play. His behavior is described in the stage direction 
as "that of a polished gentleman," but "Too much so": 
"He overdoes it and one soon feels that he is 
overplaying a role which has become more real than his 
real self to him" (197-98; italics removed). The excess
11 Shoshana Felman's reading of the miror stage is 
also pertinent here, especially in light of the unity 
that Melody tries to construct by gazing in the mirror: 
"Self-reflection, the traditional fundamental principle 
of consciousness and conscious thought, is what Lacan 
traces back to 'the mirror stage,' to the symmetrical 
dual structure of the Imaginary. Self-reflection is 
always a mirror reflection, that is, the illusory 
functioning of symetrical reflexivity, of reasoning by 
the principle of symmetry between self and self as well 
as between self and other; a symmetry that subsumes all
difference within a delusion of a unified and
homogeneous individual identity" (61). It should be 
noted here also that Melody's dual structure resembles 
what W.E.B. DuBois theorizes as a "double consciousness" 
that affects African-American subjects: "the Negro is a 
sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with 
second-sight in this American world,— a world which 
yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him 
see himself through the revelation of the other world.
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, 
this sense of always looking at one's self through the
eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity" (45).
in his manner is evidence of his lack of status.12 He 
overacts in order to protect himself from the symbolic 
order. Melody's self-alienation is most clearly seen in 
his relationship with the mirror which hangs in his bar; 
he is continually looking in this mirror throughout the 
play, and it is only when he sees himself in the forth 
act— after the intervention of the law— that he sees his 
"real" self. The first three times that Melody looks in 
the mirror, he cannot see his excess. In what has become 
a ritual act, he sees himself only as a gentleman:
"Thank God, I still bear the unmistakeable stamp of an 
officer and a gentleman" (203). O'Neill writes that 
"[Melody's] eyes are drawn irrestibly to the mirror. He 
moves in front of it, seeking the satisfying reassurance 
of his reflection there" (215; italics removed). The 
gestures accompanying the first three lookings are 
"exact" repetitions, followed by Melody's reciting his 
favorite lines from Lord Byron's Childe Harold's 
Pilgrimage:
I have not loved the World, nor the World loved me;
I have not flattered its rank breath, nor bowed 
To its idolatries a patient knee,
Nor coined my cheek to smiles,— nor cried aloud
In worship of an echo: in the crowd
They could not deem me one of such— I stood
Among them, but not of them.... (203)
12 Melody's excess also allows members of the 
ruling class to sterotype him. In his flirtations with 
Deborah Harford, for instance, in which he overplays the 
role of a "gracious, gallant gentleman," she asks him 
"Is this— what the Irish call blarney, sir?" (218).
The intended irony of these lines, which, of course, 
Melody is unaware of, is that in his desire to be a 
gentleman Melody has committed all the sins that he uses 
Byron to rail against;13 he has "flattered" rank,
"bowed" to idolatries, as well as "coined" his cheek to 
smiles. More important, however, he has "worshipped" an 
echo, which is a reflection of sound, by worshipping an 
image in a mirror, which is a reflection of an image.
The last line of the passage— "I stood/Among them, but 
not of them"— also points to Melody's confusion about 
his subject position. By quoting Lord Byron, Melody 
identifies with Lord Byron. Like Byron, he believes he 
is a victim of the ruling class (the Anglo-Irish and, 
later, the Anglo-American), but, unlike Byron, he is not 
born into that class. Melody misrecognizes his position 
by misidentifying with Byron; he believes that he is 
"among" the ruling class, but "not of them." This 
construction allows Melody to marginalize, or avoid, his 
present condition by making himself superior to the
13 Commenting on this stanza from Childe Harold's 
Pilgrimage (III, 113), Jerome McGann writes: "whenever 
Byron says, 'I have not loved the world, nor the world 
me' he is uttering a desperate and piteous lie. The 
truth is that he has loved it much too long and far too 
well, and that in this love his illusions (which are 
part of his loves) have always been threatened with 
collapse. Byron's poetry is born in the conflict of love 
and illusion, in the contradictions which are a 
necessary part of that conflict" (144). Likewise, 
Melody's illusions, and the contradictions they produce, 
are a necessary and sustaining part of his life.
class that refuses to grant him admission. O'Neill also 
uses the line to suggest, ironically, that Melody's 
class identification has aliented him from his wife and 
the men who frequent his bar. He stands, literally, 
among them, but his pretensions function to make him 
"not of them."14 In worshipping his cultural other, 
Melody denies himself access to those around him.
Nowhere is Melody's worship of the other made more 
apparent by O'Neill than in the mirror scene in act 
three. In this scene, Melody stands in front of the 
mirror in his British cavalry uniform, which he is 
wearing to celebrate the anniversary of Talavera; he 
looks at his reflection and begins to recite the stanza 
from Childe Harold. O'Neill tells us that he does this 
"seeking satisfying reassurance." Like Lacan's child, 
Melody is imagining himself as other using the image of 
his cultural other to sustain a coherent self. The image 
granted by the mirror, by England, as I suggest above, 
is self-alienating; in this misrecognition, Melody finds 
the satisfying reassurance that allows him to maintain 
his imaginary identity. His lack is subsumed by his 
glance, which constructs a unity that covers over what 
is missing.
14 In her article on A Touch of the Poet. Laurin 
Porter argues, convincingly, that Con's cousin Jamie 
Cregan and the "Irish locals"-— Dan Roche, Paddy O'Dowd, 
and Patch Riley— represent "Ireland and a past which Con 
seeks to escape" (371).
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Like Lacan's child, however, Melody cannot maintain 
this "one" indefinitely.15 In fact, as Melody begins to 
look into the mirror in this scene, he is interrupted by 
Henry Harford's lawyer, Nicholas Gadsby.16 Gadsby has 
come to Melody's bar to offer Melody a bribe so as to 
prevent Sara Melody from marrying Simon Harford (Henry 
Harford's son). Melody, at first, mistakes Gadsby's 
intentions and believes that he has come "to arrange, on 
Mr. Harford's behalf, for the marriage of his son with 
my daughter" (247) . Gadsby, however, informs him that 
Harford is "unalterably opposed" to any relationship 
between Sara and Simon since "There is such a difference 
in station" (247). Gadsby then offers to pay Melody 
three thousand dollars if he and his family "leave this 
part of the country" (247) . Insulted and enraged, Melody 
orders "his soldiers" Roche and O'Dowd to throw Gadsby
15 As Laurin Porter points out, this 
"transformation is destined to fail. In the first 
instance, as a Gael, the status he enjoys as a British 
officer is temporary at best; the English are still the 
enemy. Moreover, one efficacious ritual is missing: a 
communitarian context. Rituals emerge from a shared 
belief system, articulate the faith and hope of the 
community, and derive their power form communal 
participation. Con's incantations can only be performed 
when he is alone; an audience would not only break the 
spell, it would render the moment ridiculous" (373) .
16 Gadsby's name is a fusion of character names 
from Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsbv: Jay Gatsby and Nick 
Carraway. O'Neill uses a similar combination in Strange 
Interlude when he combines the painters Charles Sheeler 
and Marsden Hartley to come up with Charles Marsden. 
O'Neill does this to suggest a duality in the character.
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out of the bar. Melody then sets off with Jamie Cregan 
to extract an apology from Henry Harford, or "By God,
I'll face him at ten paces or across a handkerchief"
(249).
When Melody and Cregan arrive at Harford's mansion, 
they are met at the door by Harford's servants. Melody 
demands to see Harford by insisting on his rights as a 
British officer. As Cregan narrates it, "Con spoke with 
the airs av a lord. 'Kindly inform you master,' he says, 
'that Major Cornelius Melody, late of his His Majesty's 
Seventh Dragoons, respectfully requests a word with 
him'" (265). The servants refuse Melody's request and 
then insult Melody and Cregan by calling them "drunken 
Micks" and saying "'the place for the loiks av you is 
the servants' entrance'" (266). A fight begins, and 
Melody and Cregan manage to overpower Harford's 
servants. But just as they are about to enter the 
mansion, the police arrive and drag Melody and Cregan 
into the street, where Melody and Cregan are savagely 
beaten; they are then jailed and released only after 
Henry Harford intervenes on their part. At the end of 
the night, Cregan returns to the bar "half-supporting, 
half-leading" Melody.
O'Neill's stage directions indicate that Melody's 
condition does not signify "drunkenness," but something 
more serious: "It is more as if a sudden shock or stroke
had shattered his coordination and left him in a stupor" 
(264; italics removed). O'Neill continues: "His scarlet 
uniform is filthy and torn and pulled awry....His eyes 
are empty and lifeless. He stares at his wife and 
daughter as if he did not recognize them (246; italics 
removed). In this state, Melody conflates his drunken 
brawl with the police and the Battle of Talavera, after 
which he curses himself— "like a rum-soaked trooper, 
brawling before a brothel on a Saturday night, puking in 
the gutter" (267)— and runs to the barn where he kills 
his thoroughbred mare ("the livin' reminder...av all his 
boasts and dreams" £273]). Melody then begins to speak 
with a brogue and act as "auld Nick Melody's son" (274). 
He rejects his desired identity— "I'll be content to 
stay meself in the proper station I was born to" (274)—  
and gives his daughter "a bit av fatherly advice": if 
she wishes to rise in the world, she should "Remember 
the blood in your veins and be your grandfather's true 
descendant." In other words, Sara "must make the young 
Yankee gintleman [Simon Harford] have you in his bed, 
and afther he's had you, weep great tears and appeal to 
his honor to marry you and save you" (274). Sara and her 
mother are confused and outraged by Melody's behavior, 
which they attribute, respectively, to his "play-acting" 
or a blow to the head during his fight with the police. 
Melody assures them that he is not playing a game—
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"You'll find it's no game. It was the Major played a 
game all his life...and cheated only himself" (274)— and 
returns to the bar as "fresh as a man new born" (277) to 
drink with his Irish-American peers, where he tells 
Cregan, Maloy, O'Dowd, Roche, and Riley that "I'll vote 
for Andy Jackson, the friend av the common men like me" 
(279) .
Before joining his friends, however, Melody stands 
in front of the mirror for a fourth and final time. In 
his dirty, torn British uniform, he says, "To hell wid 
Talavera!" (277) and begins to recite the familiar 
stanza from Byron's Childe Harold, but this time, as 
O'Neill indicates in the stage directions, there is a 
difference; his gestures are not a repetition: "He 
strikes a pose which is a vulgar burlesque of his old 
before-the-mirror one" (277; italics removed, emphasis 
added). The "old before-the-mirror one" has 
disintegrated in the face of the symbolic order.
Melody's rebirth, as O'Neill describes it, is his 
belated entry into the symbolic.17 The unity of the
17 Laurin Porter sees Melody's "abortive attempts 
at establishing himself as a businessman and American 
aristocrat" as "valiant exertions of his imagination 
[i.e. imaginary]" (373). Further, she argues, "only when 
he is disgraced in his attempt to duel Henry Harford, a 
real aristocrat... is he finally forced to acknowledge 
the changes that time has wrought, to re-enter the 
stream of history. But even then, he eludes reality, 
shadowboxing with the present. In discarding the role of 
the Major he accepts another, becoming not 'himself,' if 
you will, a distinguished but poor proprietor of a New
mirror is interrupted first by Harford's lawyer and 
then, more dramatically, by the local police— both 
force, or enjoin, Melody to take up his position as a 
subject relative to a social hierarchy, or structure, 
that Harford has the power to control. For Melody, there 
can be no admission to Harford's house; he cannot gain 
access, for his admission would be a transgression that 
Melody's "Irishness" will not permit. To Harford and his 
servants, Melody represents a stereotype— another 
"drunken Mick"— that should recognize his place and use 
the servants' entrance. The outcome of the brawl is that 
Melody submits, or takes up, the position assigned to 
him by the symbolic order. Sara and Nora interpret his 
actions as either the result of his perverseness or of 
an injury. Melody, on the other hand, interprets his 
actions, as do many critics, as a consequence or 
comeuppance of/for his "ambition." These 
interpretations, while they are at least partially 
accurate— he is perverse, his change does occur after 
the police club him on the head, and his pride is 
destructive— -ignore the cultural apparatus that 
functions to subjugate Melody.
England inn, but his father, with a brogue so broad it 
becomes self-parody" (373). I disagree with Porter 
because, as I suggest below, Melody does not accept his 
role as an Irish-American; he is forced to accept this role.
Like Lacan's child in the mirror stage, Melody's 
unified "one" is disrupted by "the name of the father"—  
that place in the order of culture represented by the 
father's function in the castration complex. In the 
structure of the castration complex, the father becomes 
the "expression" of a "paternal metaphor" that initiates 
the child into the already-existent values and 
representations of a culture (i.e. the law[s] of the 
father). In Juliet Mitchell's reading of Lacan, "The 
castration complex is the instance of the humanisation 
of the child in its sexual difference....If the specific 
mark of the phallus, the repression of which is the 
institution of the law, is repudiated then there can be 
only psychosis" (19). The oneness of mother and child is 
broken by the intervention of the father, and the 
normative cultural values the father stands for (and 
stands in for) enjoin the child to take up a position in 
the symbolic order as either male or female. In much the 
same way, the intervention of the law (Nicholas Gadsby 
and the police, acting for Harford) acts as a catalyst 
that forces Melody to accept his difference. From this 
point of view, his earlier class pretensions appear as a 
kind of psychosis as he refuses to be subjected to (or 
by) the cultural order in which he lives.
Melody's preten(d)sions make him a disjunctive force 
because he is, in some ways, an absolute believer in the
national pedagogy, and this absolute belief makes him 
disjunctive; that is, he refuses to yield to the order 
of culture that makes his value only seeming. As his 
daughter Sara says, "he's the easiest fool that ever 
came to America!" because "when he came here the chance 
was before him to make himself all his lies pretended to 
be. He had education above most Yanks, and he had money 
enough to start him, and this is the country where you 
can rise as high as you like, and no one but the fools 
who envy you care what you rose from, once you've the 
money and the power that goes with it" (193-94). Sara, 
of course, believes that Melody is self-dispossessed 
because he allows himself to be tricked by the Yankee 
gentry into buying a worthless piece of property, but 
Melody is not just self-dispossessed; he is ripped off 
by a hereditary aristocracy that controls the wealth of 
the community into which he moves his family. Melody 
believes he is a member of this community because he 
possesses the criteria that should enable him to join 
its apparatus: he has money, and he has been properly 
educated. His "lies," as it were, represent a cultural 
capital that should open doors. Like many immigrants, 
Melody believes in Jefferson's concept of a "natural 
aristocracy," an aristocracy based on education and 
individual merit and not inherited wealth and power. 
Unfortunately for Melody, the local gentry does not
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recognize his merits. In fact, his "gentlemanliness," 
like his drinking, becomes an "excess" that makes his 
difference visible to the ruling class; his "overplaying 
a role" (197) makes him "unnatural" to a community that 
values priority and the proper ethnicity as the 
standards for gentlemanliness. Melody, like Crevecoeur's 
farmer or Jefferson's natural aristocrat, fails to 
acknowledge the constraints established by the pre­
existent structures of a class system, a system which 
the founding of the nation was supposed to erase.
Viewed in this light, Melody's subjectivity is 
disjunctive; he is not autonomous since his life in the 
United States is a repetition of his life in Ireland. 
America has not eliminated the class mechanisms of 
Europe— the old subjectivities and dependencies do not 
disappear in Massachusetts because they have been 
transported to America, along with quasi-European class 
structures (what Melody calls "old-world standards"
[205]). American history does not represent a break with 
the past, but a repetition. Subjectivity becomes 
recursive since Melody is subject to the same 
inequalities as in Ireland. In other words, the new 
nation becomes a stage on which Melody reenacts his 
colonial relationship with England. In Poet, the 
community is not a "melting pot" where everyone is 
welcome, but rather a space where opportunity is
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transformed into greed and radical self-interest, which 
act in tandem to destroy the community by alienating 
individuals.
In Poet, the structure most disrupted, or alienated, 
by masculine desire is the family. In other words,
Melody's desire to be other is most problematic for his 
wife and daughter. Travis Bogard comments that this 
pattern is the central concern of O'Neill's last plays: 
"What happens to a man who cannot deny his dreams? What 
happens to his woman when he fails to deny them?" (389).
In Poet, as in all of the late plays, the answers are 
inextricably linked, for Melody is dependent on his wife 
and daughter to define his dreams. Like any proper 
gentleman, he needs servants to insure his superiority.
He models his "American estate," as his daughter calls 
it, on the patriarchal forms of European civilization, 
but the space in which he operates as lord of the manor, 
a bar, serves only to parody his aristocratic 
pretensions. Nevertheless, as O'Neill suggests, Melody's 
treatment of Nora has consequences that are other than 
comic. Because Melody feels their marriage is exogamous, 
he treats Nora as a social inferior, as a servant. While 
he rides his mare and entertains his friends, Nora and 
Sara are de facto responsible for the daily operations 
of the bar. In fact, the bar would not function— and 
thereby earn the family a living— without Nora and Sara.
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Nora acts as cook, and Sara is the bar's only waitress. 
Melody, however, hires a bartender so that he will not 
have to work.
Melody's desires have also put the family in debt.
Any cash earned in the bar is spent on feed for Con's 
horse, while the mortgage and grocery bills are left 
unpaid. Nora and Sara are also responsible for 
negotiating with creditors when payment is demanded. In 
addition, Nora's rheumatism is never treated because 
Melody spends the family's money on his horse. As Sara 
says, "The mare comes first, if she takes the bread out 
of our mouths....he cares more for a horse than he cares 
for us" (191). Although Nora and Sara have more control 
over their lives, Melody exploits his family in the same 
manner that Harford exploits his hired servants. Because 
Melody sees them as peasants, especially his wife, when 
he speaks to them "His tone condescends" and he 
addresses them as if they are persons of "inferior 
station" (198; italics removed). Melody complains to his 
wife, "I tried my best to educate you, after we came to 
America— until I saw that it was hopeless....You won't 
even cure yourself of that damned peasant's brogue. And 
your daughter's becoming as bad" (201). Commenting on 
these lines, C.W.E. Bigsby suggests that "Nora Melody's 
subservience is underlined by her accent, as her 
daughter's rebelliousness is by hers." Bigsy also
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suggests that Nora's "linguistic reticence marks...her 
social impotence" (95) . Another mark against her, in 
Melody's eyes, is her physical appearance: "For God's 
sake, why don't you wash your hair? It turns my stomach 
with its stink of onions and stew" (202). To which Nora 
responds: "I do be washin' it often to plaze you. But 
when your standin' over a stove all day" (202).
Melody, on the other hand, is immediately attracted 
to Deborah Harford, who O'Neill deliberately contrasts 
with Nora's "peasant" qualities. While Nora is 
overworked and "worn," making her look "much older" than 
her forty years, Deborah is "forty-one, but looks to be 
no more than thirty"; while Nora is "dumpy...with 
sagging breasts, Deborah has a "fragile, youthful 
figure"; while Nora is dressed in "old clothes" with 
"cracked working shoes," Deborah "is dressed in white 
with calculated simplicity" (190, 215-16; italics
t
removed). Deborah embodies Melody's desire in that she 
represents an object of exchange which Melody believes 
he can use to gain status, just as he was able, albeit 
temporarily, to gain access to the ruling class in Spain 
by possessing a nobleman's wife.
When Sara points out to her mother that Melody 
devalues her by treating Nora like a slave, Nora insists 
that "I've pride in my love for him....For the love of 
God, don't take the pride of my love from me...for
without it what am I at all but an ugly, fat woman 
gettin' old and sick" (192-93). Nora's "pride of love" 
is her pipe dream. Her pride is also what O'Neill views 
as the culturally specific behavior of a "typical pure 
Irish family." In a letter to Eugene O'Neill, Jr., 
O'Neill describes the quality: "My family's quarrels and
'TV-tragedy were within. To the outer world we maintained an 
indomitable united front and lied and lied for each 
other. A typical pure Irish family. The same loyalty 
occurs, of course, in all kinds of families, but there 
is, I think, among Irish still close to, or born in 
Ireland, a strange mixture of fight and hate and 
forgive, a clannish pride before the world, that is 
peculiarly its own" (Bogard and Bryer 569). Nora's love 
for Melody, then, can be seen in the context of the 
play, and in O'Neill's experience of his "Irishness," as 
a way to hold the family together, as an attempt to 
build a community where there is none, or where none is 
provided. Nora's endurance of Melody, and the hardship 
he exposes the family to, is a product of her habitus 
(i.e. the internalization of her class position—  
Catholic Irish peasant). Her "clannish pride" is a 
residual practice of her peasant background, which 
enables her to survive in a Protestant culture, first in 
Ireland and later in the United States.
In Emigrants and Exiles. Kirby Miller uncovers a 
"series of basic distinctions...between native Irish 
Catholic culture and Protestant Irish, British, and 
American cultures": "In broadest terms, much evidence 
indicates that, in contrast to the Protestants they 
encountered in Ireland and North America, the Catholic 
Irish were more communal than individualistic, more 
dependent than independent, more fatalistic than 
optimistic, more prone to accept conditions passively 
than to take initiatives for change, and more sensitive 
to the weight of tradition than to innovative 
possibilities of the future (107). Historically, Kirby 
argues, these practices were created so Irish Catholic 
peasants could survive the deprivations of rural poverty 
and a rigid class system that prevented mobility. It is 
somewhat ironic that Nora Melody is forced to employ 
Kirby's categories in order to survive in America. 
Certainly, there is an economic change in her station 
since her days in Ireland, but she still uses what 
Crevecoeur would call the "mechanisms of dependency," 
for the community she has entered is not, as the 
national pedagogy asserts, assimilatory. In fact, in 
many ways, O'Neill suggests that America is the same as 
Europe. Nora's communal approach to life is a repetition 
of her life in Ireland; she has not been liberated from 
the oppressive class system of Europe by coming to
America; she does not better her condition. Ultimately, 
she is left with Melody's debts and eventually retires 
to a convent. In O'Neill's mind, America provides the 
same opportunities for exploitation as Europe; there is 
little difference. Immigrants do not escape their past—  
the New World subject is recursive.
* * *
The sequel to A Touch of the Poet is More Stately 
Mansions. In Mansions. Sara Melody has risen from the 
poverty of her youth by marrying Henry Harford's son, 
Simon. The play begins four years after the action of 
Poet (1836) and traces the marriage of Sara and Simon 
Harford until 1842. In Mansions. the overt political 
context of the setting (i.e. the rise of Jacksonian 
Democracy) is not as foregrounded as in Poet. One 
possible reason for this is that the manuscript is 
unfinished and survives merely by chance. O'Neill did, 
in fact, believe he had destroyed the play. Another 
possible reason for this adjustment is that in Mansions 
O'Neill turns his attention more specifically to the 
pathology of "cunning acquisitiveness" (i.e. the big 
subject), to which he gives a psychological reading 
(Freudian).18 That is, success, or the desire for 
success, is not attributed to some positive, simplistic
18 O'Neill's knowledge of Freud is well-documented. 
See Bogard 345-47 and Sheaffer 244-45.
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national pedagogy, but rather a maternal lack within the
male subject. Men are not materialistic because they
choose to be successful, or because they possess
opportunity and mobility, but because they
psychologically have to be. In O'Neill's mind, men are
acquisitive because they lack the "satisfying new One"
that would give their lives meaning. More important,
their desire is not the projection of an autonomous
will; it is predetermined by the structure of the pre-
oedipal relationship with the mother. In fact, the
desire for autonomy (what O'Neill calls "self-
sufficiency" or "self-possession") is only ever
expressed in absolute terms and is therefore always
destructive, which is what O'Neill evokes when he uses
the phrase "possessors, self-dispossessed."
To help readers identify the psychological
dimensions of Mansions. O'Neill provides us with a clue
in the second scene of Act III, where Simon retells a
"fairy tale" that his mother has told him as a child:
There was once upon a time, long ago in the past, a 
young King of a happy and peaceful land, who through 
the evil magic of an evil enchantress had been 
dispossessed of his realm, and banished to wander 
over the world, a homeless, unhappy outcast. Now the 
enchantress...had in a last moment of 
remorse...revealed to him that there was a way in 
which he might regain his lost kingdom. He must 
search the world for a certain magic door....She 
told him that there was no special characteristic to 
mark this door from other doors. It might be any 
door, but if he wished to find it with all his 
heart, he would recognize it when he came to it, and 
know that on the other side was his lost kingdom.
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And so he set forth and searched for many years, and 
after enduring bitter trials, and numberless 
disappointments, he...found himself before a door 
and the wish in his heart told him his quest was 
ended. But just as he was about to open it...he 
heard the voice of the enchantress speaking from the 
other side...."Before you open I must warn you....If 
you dare to open the door you may discover this is 
no longer your old happy realm but has been 
changed...into a barren desert, where it is always 
night, haunted by terrible ghosts....So you better 
be sure of your courage,” the enchantress called 
warningly, "and remember that as long as you stay 
where you are you will run no risk of anything worse 
than your present unhappy exile befalling 
you”....She did not speak again, although he knew 
she remained there...waiting to see if he would dare 
open the door...But he never did....He felt she was 
lying to test his courage. Yet, at the same time, he 
felt she was not lying, and he was afraid. He wanted 
to turn his back on the door and go far away, but it 
held him in a spell and he could never leave it. 
(443-44)
In the context of the play, Simon's story is an allegory 
of male desire. The "young King" is Simon Harford as a 
child, while the "beautiful enchantress" is Deborah 
Harford, his mother. The "happy and peaceful land"—  
"long ago in the past"— is the pre-oedipal unity, or 
oneness, shared by son and mother, in which "all [was] 
happiness and beauty and love and peace." In this state, 
Simon's relation to his mother is "presocial"; he has 
not yet taken up his position in the symbolic order. As 
Nancy Chodorow argues in a different context, he "is not 
yet under the sway of the reality principle. The child 
does not originally recognize that the mother has or 
could have any separate interests from it. Therefore, 
when it finds out that its mother has separate
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interests, it cannot understand it" (79). The young 
King's banishment or exile from the kingdom, then, marks 
his entry into the symbolic order through the structure 
of the castration complex; he is forced to give up his 
mother as an object of desire and find "suitable" 
substitutes. For Simon, this is the moment of the "lost 
kingdom," after which he is forced "to wander over the 
world, a homeless, unhappy outcast."
All is not lost, however. In an effort to recreate, 
or "regain," the oneness of the pre-oedipal 
relationship, "He must search the world for a certain 
magic door." This magic door, identified only by the 
article "a," has "no special characteristics" to mark it 
from other doors. It can only be discovered or 
recognized by his desire (i.e. "with all his heart").
But his search for the door, unfortunately, never ends, 
for after he pursues the door "for many years...and 
numberless disappointments," he finds himself standing 
"before a door" (not "the" door) that he cannot enter: 
the enchantress warns him that if he enters the door 
(behind which she stands), he may discover that the lost 
kingdom is really a "barren desert...haunted by terrible 
ghosts." If he does not enter, however, he will remain 
as he is in his "present unhappy exile" (what Freud 
views as normal adult unhappiness). In the end, Simon 
can neither turn his back on the door nor can he enter
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the door, so he remains "standing before the door...a 
beggar, whining for alms" (444). The final gesture— the 
inability to enter or to leave— marks Simon's 
ambivalence toward his mother.19 Because he still 
desires the oneness of their primary relation, he is 
both angry at her and attracted to her; he is still 
dependent on her (because he desires her) at the same 
time that he desires not to desire her. As Simon tells 
his mother, "You dispossessed [read: abandoned] yourself 
when you dispossessed me. Since then we have both been 
condemned to an insatiable unscrupulous greed for 
substitutes to fill the emptiness, the loss of love we 
had within us" (534) .
The "necessary concrete symbol" (533) of this 
emptiness, or loss, becomes the structure of desire 
revealed in the fairy story, the search for a magic 
door. The door can never be entered; it can only be 
sought after as a door because the original object ("the 
One") is irretrievably lost to the subject. This is the 
lack that, in Lacan's view, constitutes desire. Simon's
19 Linda Ben-Zvi argues that this ambivalence is 
paradigmatic of male identity in many of O'Neill's 
plays; she identifies the structure as the "pull 
between... two seemingly dichotomous poles": "freedom and 
fixity." In Mansions. for instance, Simon represents 
"the dual image of the man who would go and the man who 
would stay...O'Neill presents in [Mansions] one 
character with a dual self, desiring both movement 
toward individuation and a commensurate movement back to 
infancy, mother and primal home" (21-2).
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goal can never be reached because its completion would
bring incest (and madness), and so in seeking out
substitutes for his mother, he never attains, or catches
up to, his mother. Yet his mother is always "speaking
from the other side" of each door that he finds himself
before. In many ways, Simon's quest resembles what
Slavoj Zizek describes as the "paradox" of Lacan's
object petite a ;
A goal, once reached, always retreats anew. Can we 
not recognize in this paradox the very nature of the 
psychoanalytic notion of driTve, or more properly the 
Lacanian distinction between its aim and its goal?
The goal is the final destination, while the aim is 
what we intend to do, i.e., the way itself. Lacan's 
point is that the real purpose of the drive is not 
its goal (full satisfaction) but its aim: the 
drive's ultimate aim is simply to reproduce itself 
as drive, to return to its circular path, to 
continue its path to and from the goal. The real 
source of enjoyment is the repetitive movement of 
this closed circuit. (5; italics removed)
The structure of desire (drive/goal/aim) in the play is
constructed around Simon's loss of the pre-oedipal
object, his mother. He then compensates for this
separation by finding substitutes for his desire. As he
says, "What has been taken for me, I take back" (529).
His abandonment marks his entry into the symbolic order,
in which he gives up his mother as an object and
identifies with his father's role, a feat that is only
fully accomplished when Henry Harford dies.
The literal loss of the imaginary in Simon's life is
marked by his abandonment of his vocation as a poet, as
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a would-be writer of utopian tracts. When he gives up 
his mother, who encourages his writing, and becomes as 
his father (a husband, a father, a rich businessman), he 
also renounces his utopian project, the authorship of a 
book "to show people how to change the Government and 
all the laws so there'd be no more poor people, nor 
anyone getting the best of the next one, and there'd be 
no rich but everyone would have enough" (305). Simon 
begins his project in Poet, where he lives, after 
graduating from Harvard and refusing to work for his 
tycoon father, in a cabin— which he builds— by a lake.
The cabin's measurements, as described in O'Neill's 
stage directions, are the same as those of Thoreau's 
cabin on Walden Pond, according to Virginia Lloyd.20 
O'Neill links Simon to Thoreau in order to underscore 
Simon's eventual rejection of Thoreau's politics, which 
are embodied in Simon's desire to construct a society, 
as David Robinson remarks in another context, "of social 
and economic equals, made independent through their 
ecomomic dependence on the land alone yet bound together 
in a supportive and compassionate community" (17).21
20 Floyd calls the cabin "an exact replica of 
Thoreau's hut at Walden" (217).
21 This rejection is underscored in the stage 
directions at the beginning of Act Two, where O'Neill 
describes the cabin as "[giving] evidence of having been 
abandoned for years. The mortar between the stones of 
the chimney has crumbled and fallen out in spots. The 
moss stuffing between the logs hangs here and there in
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O'Neill links the action of Mansions to the ideology of 
the Revolutionary fathers in order to underscore the 
spiritual abandonment of the principles of the 
Revolution. That is, Simon's rejection of Utopian 
politics for the greedy acguisitiveness of a robber 
baron parallels a similar rejection in the collective 
values of the nation; and given Simon's subject 
position, O'Neill sees this trajectory as inevitable; he 
becomes like his father because he can be nothing else, 
or, to put this in terms that I have already used, his 
life is structured by a structure that, O'Neill 
suggests, is at once universal and particular.
As I suggest above, the structure that most 
determines Simon's life is the oedipal structure within 
his particular family. Inseparable from this 
construction— indeed part of it— is the specific class 
habitus O'Neill gives to Simon. That is, as a 
child/member of the ruling class, Simon has access to a 
network of opportunity (a set of specific social 
relationships) that is denied to someone born into a 
lower class (Sara Melody, for example). Simon's class 
position therefore enables him to compensate for the
straggly strips. The windows have baords nailed across 
them" (314). As Simon becomes more corrupt, he is unable 
to remember how he built the cabin or even how to repair 
it without using the labor of others: "I shall have to 
send someone out here to repair things. I wish I could 
do it myself. What labor it cost me to build this 
without help. Yet I was never happier" (318).
maternal lack in very specific ways. Simon's start in 
business, for instance, is provided by a loan from his 
mother, which he uses to buy into a friend's textile 
mill. These doors are not open to either Con or Sara 
Melody, or even to Simon's mother. Further, after his 
father dies, Simon is invited by his family to take over 
the Harford Company, which he then merges with his 
cotton mills to form a corporation ("His Company must 
cease to exist. There must be only my Company" [375]). 
His assumption of his father's role, however, as Laurin 
Porter notes, leads to a "complication": "Unlike his 
father [Simon] is not content with the role of business 
tycoon. Having experienced the world of the imagination 
at his mother's feet...he knows that life holds more 
than the thrill of concluding another deal" (377). Yet 
while he may recognize this, he is powerless to change 
his life precisely because he sat at his mother's feet 
in the imaginary, and so his desire oscillates back and 
forth between the maternal and the material. As he says 
to Deborah, "I'll admit I do get deathly sick of the 
daily grind of the counting house— the interminable 
haggling and figuring and calculation of profits, the 
scheming to outwit the other man, the fear that he may 
outwit you— a life where Mammon is God, and money the 
sole measure of worth! It is not the career I would have 
chosen. I would have lived here [his cabin] in freedom
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with Nature, and earned just enough to support myself, 
and kept my dreams, and written my book" (331). At the 
same time, however, as his wife argues, "when he's 
himself, there's no one takes more joy in getting ahead.
If you'd see his pride sometimes when he comes home to 
tell me of some scheme he's accomplished" (306).
Simon's "duality," as Travis Bogard calls it, 
gradually gives way to an insatiable greed. He renounces 
his utopian book in order to become the "King of 
America," a phrase that O'Neill often juxtaposes with 
the word "Napoleon." Deborah, in fact, often refers to 
Simon as "the Company's victorious little Napoleon" or 
"the conquering Napoleon" (434, 515). This combination 
is not accidental; it is used not only to comment on 
Simon's character, but also the "character" of the 
nation. From O'Neill's perspective, as the nation became 
more interested in "commerce," it betrayed its 
democratic principles in favor of a "false aristocracy" 
of Industry, just as in France, Napoleon the Liberator 
betrayed the French by becoming Napoleon the Tyrant, a 
dictator who, in the name of freedom, attempted to 
enslave Europe. O'Neill also uses Napoleon as a figure 
to represent what he saw as the brutality of the "greedy 
capitalist ruling classes" who were destroying the 
country for profit and eliminating what he referred to 
as the "Forgotten Class": "the small businessman, shop
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keeper, white collar worker, professional man, small
farmer, etc....The people who are the finest type of
American" (Bogard and Bryer 528-29, 539).
Simon, of course, is a representative of the former
and, like Napoleon, becomes so greedy that he cannot see
when his own greed begins "devouring itself" (Bogard and
Bryer 529). Phrased differently, he becomes a slave to
his "possessive instincts," which he mistakes for
freedom, autonomy, and self-sufficiency. As he insists,
"the possession of power is the only freedom" (392).
This is the "foundation of the new morality" that, in
his mind, replaces the utopian dream:
The game of Commerce has its own ethics, and they 
are more frank and honest— and so, more honorable!—  
truer to the greedy reality of life than any 
hypocritical personal ones. The only moral law here 
is that to win is good and to lose is evil. The 
strong are rewarded, the weak are punished. That is 
the sole justice which functions in fact. (388)
A codicil to the new moral law is the "true revelation
of [man's] nature": "What he desires is what he is"
(361). In Simon's mind, the objects of his desire
ostensibly replace the pre-oedipal self-sufficiency of
the mother-child relationship. As I have been
suggesting, his desire enacts a substitution that is
supposed to compensate for the loss of the mother, but
the loss is never satisfied. Significantly, every
accomplished deal leaves Simon feeling empty: "It's the
usual reaction. I concentrate all my mind and energy to
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get a thing done. I live with it, think of nothing else, 
eat with it, take it to bed with me, sleep with it, 
dream of it— and then suddenly one day it is 
accomplished— finished, dead!— and I become empty, 
exhausted, but at the same time restless and aimless and 
lonely, as if I had lost my meaning to myself— facing 
the secret that success is its own failure" (389) .
At this point, the quest for the lost object begins 
again. As he tutors his wife, "You must keep your eyes 
fixed on the final goal of your ambition....Keep your 
whole mind and will concentrated on what must still be 
accomplished before your Company can be out of danger, 
safe and absolutely self-contained, not dependent on 
anything outside itself for anything, needing nothing 
but itself. Until that is done, how can you enjoy any 
true freedom within yourself— or any peace of happiness" 
(499). The outcome, however, will always be the same: 
emptiness, loss, frustration. The consequence of this 
revenge against the maternal is that the objects of 
Simon's desire have no use value, only exchange value. 
Caught up in a circuit of horizontal expansion, he 
accumulates possessions that bring him no satisfaction 
or meaning, just endless repetition and a desire to 
"complete the chain" (499). That is, in order to make 
his cotton empire self-sufficient, he not only buys 
cotton mills but also slaves, plantations, slave
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dealers, slave ships, shipping companies, banks, 
railroads, retail stores; and his "crowning 
achievement," that "would complete the circle with a 
vengeance," is to "conceive a scheme by which the public 
could be compelled to buy...cotton goods" (500). In the 
end, however, as Simon says, "One finally gets a sense 
of confusion in the meaning of the game, so that one's 
winnings have the semblance of losses" (413).
Simon's confusion, or lack, ultimately leads him 
full circle to his mother, the inaccessible object. In 
Act IV, Simon attempts to give the fairy tale a "happy 
ending" by entering his mother's "forbidden summerhouse" 
(445).22 As Deborah says in an earlier conversation with 
Simon, "I remember how resentful you were at the 
[original] ending. You used to insist I imagine a new 
ending in which the wicked enchantress had reformed and 
become a good fairy and opened the door and welcomed him 
home and they both were happy ever after" (444). Simon 
then confesses that he has confused the door in the 
story with the door to his mother's (real) summerhouse.
In the climax of the play, Simon tries to stage the 
happy ending by passing through Deborah's door in order 
to reconstitute the imaginary: "Mother....All I ask is 
that you go back and change that— change the ending—
22 In Poet Deborah calls the summerhouse "a little 
temple of liberty" (224).
open the door and take me back....There will be only 
love and faith and trust in life....There will be only 
you and I! There will be peace and happiness to the end 
of our days!*' (535). Simon's return to the maternal, 
however, is doomed to failure because it signifies 
psychosis. Crossing the threshhold of the "forbidden" 
door would be incest, an absolute transgression because 
it is a denial of the symbolic. Simon's act will not 
bring, as he desires, "greedless security and content 
with what we have" (535); it can only bring only madness 
and suffering for him and for Deborah. In the end, 
however, Sara upholds his position in the symbolic by 
maintaining her position; by acting as his wife, and not 
an acquisitive whore (more about which in a moment),
Sara rescues Simon by restoring him to his proper post- 
oedipal role, father and husband. Ultimately, her 
actions force him to forget his mother.
Sara begins the play as Simon's business partner. As 
Simon's chief advisor, she is conspicuously involved in 
the daily operations of the Harford Company. But as 
Simon's appetite grows, a traditional division of labor 
arises. Sara becomes more and more responsible for the 
children and the household, while Simon focuses 
exclusively on making deals. Simon becomes so obsessed 
with business that he eventually stops sleeping with his 
wife and moves to another bedroom. To alleviate her
loneliness, Sara begins a friendship with her mother-in- 
law that eventually excludes Simon from the domestic 
operations of the home. As Simon complains, "I was never 
anything more than a necessary adjunct of a means to 
motherhood— a son in one case, a husband in the 
other...so I am left alone, an unwanted son, a discarded 
lover, an outcast without any meaning or function in my 
own home" (391). At this point, as Laurin Porter notes, 
"He becomes a fondly tolerated outsider who wrests a 
living from the world and returns home at night, a 
member of the family in name more than essence" (374). 
Feeling "left entirely out of it" (389), Simon prepares 
to "take back what belongs to me" (391). Using the 
knowledge he has gained as "a Napoleon among traders," 
Simon sets in motion "the strategy of dividing in order 
to conquer— of creating strife and rivalry, and waiting 
until the two opponents are exhausted destroying each 
other— then I step in to take advantage of their 
weakness to possess them both" (392-93). In the end, 
however, Simon possesses nothing since his strategy 
eventually leads to Deborah's madness and death and to 
Sara's spiritual transformation.23
23 It should be noted here, albeit perhaps too 
briefly, the implicit criticism of the bourgeois family 
structure that Porter sees in the play. That is, because 
the family is necessarily constructed around the demands 
of a the market, because the father travels out everyday 
to the world of commerce to support the family, he 
becomes a member of his family in name only. He becomes,
Sara's spiritual rehabilitation occurs only after 
she succumbs to and then rejects the dominant values of 
the play, which Simon represents. This is also O'Neill's 
way of denouncing the dominant, acquisitive (masculine) 
values of American culture. As Simon's wealth and power 
increase, Sara's goal, at first, is to build "more 
stately mansions" on the property where his utopian 
cabin stands in ruins. About this property, Sara says to 
her mother: "There's over two hundred acres, and he 
bought it for a song, and the little lake on it is 
beautiful, and there's a grand woods that would make a 
fine park. With a mansion built on the hill by the lake, 
where his old cabin was, you wouldn't find a better 
gentleman's estate" (305). Hearing this, Nora tells Sara 
"Glory be, but you sure av havin' your way" (305). To 
which Sara responds, "I am, Mother, for this is America 
not poverty-stricken Ireland where you're slave! Here 
you're free to take what you want, if you've the power 
in yourself" (305). The irony of this statement is that 
in rising Sara becomes a "slave," or enslaved, by her
as O'Neill suggests, an outcast without any meaning or 
function in his home. He does, however, have a meaning, 
and this meaning, as Nancy Chodorow argues, is 
reinforced by his absence: "Although fathers are not as 
salient as mothers in daily interaction [within the 
family], mothers and children often idealize and give 
them ideological primacy, precisely because of their 
absence and seeming inaccessibility, and because of the 
organization and ideology of male dominance in the 
larger society" (181).
desire. As she puts it, "for where is the glory of life 
if it's not a battle where you prove your strength to 
rise to the top and let nothing stop you!" (305). Like 
Simon, however, enough is never enough; there is no end 
to accumulation or consumption. Sara's original dream, 
"to make him [Simon] retire, a landed gentleman the 
minute we've enough" (336) never materializes because 
Simon is never satisfied. O'Neill, again, as in Poet, 
constructs Sara's desire as different from Simon's. Her 
subject position, and its habitus, does not give her the 
same options as does Simon's— although, interestingly, 
it gives her the same goals: wealth and power. As she 
tells Simon, "I'm a fool always dreaming of wealth and 
power...even while I know in my heart that it doesn't 
matter at all, that your love is my only wealth— to have 
you and the children. But I can't help dreaming.... I've 
known what you haven't--poverty— and the lies and dirt 
and hurt of it that spits on your pride while you try to 
sneer and hold your head high" (308-09). In a similar 
vein, she tells Deborah, "I may have greed in me. I've 
had good reason to have. There's nothing like hunger to 
make you greedy" (335).
Nevertheless, because she is essentially 
subordinated to Simon's desire, because of her unequal 
gender and class status within the marriage, the family, 
and the culture, she enslaves herself by embracing his
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desire; she identifies too closely with his masculinity.
In other words, her possession of power is always once
removed and always dependent on the other; she can only
have access to power through her husband, through his
desire. In this respect, she resembles, for a brief
period, what Shari Benstock calls "woman-in-the-
feminine." The role she plays, or represents, for the
masculine acts as a "guarantor" of the cultural system
that oppresses her.24 She participates in his desire
when Simon, as part of his "campaign" to destroy the
union of mother and wife, asks Sara to become his
"mistress." In order to repossess his house, to "become
absolute master" (396), Simon negotiates a deal with
Sara whereby she agrees to become his business partner
by becoming his whore:
This is a new secret life for us...which concerns 
the Company's life, since it will be lived here in 
it. So it must be strictly a business partnership, a 
deal for profit on both our parts. A double life of 
amorous intrigue for each of us....You will be 
revenging yourself on your husband who has grown 
bored with his virtuous wife, by selling yourself to
a lover. And I think the husband will be keeping a
beautiful mistress to take my wife's place. (411)
Sara's payment for her services will be a "piece by
piece," or trick by trick, acquisition of "the whole
Company," which is already bankrupt, made worthless by
Simon's desire for complete autonomy. At this point,
24 For a detailed discussion of "woman-in-the-
feminine" see Benstock 3-46.
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Sara is a symptom of Simon's desire since he cannot get 
pleasure but through acquisition. For him, all purchase 
has become equal, in business and in love. Again, 
everything has only exchange value. Sara's "use” 
satisfies nothing; it is merely a trick he plays on 
himself by becoming dependent on his desire.
As Sara gradually purchases the business, she 
becomes like Simon. She acts as if she is "an understudy 
learning to play [his] part" (414). "As you learn,"
Simon says, "I will let you act in my stead now and then 
until finally you will find yourself capable of taking 
my place" (414). It is only, however, when she stands in 
his place— in the position of male power and dominance—  
that she is able to reject Simon's desire and thereby 
overcome her own. In the penultimate scene of the play, 
Simon gives her "full authority" to act for him in a 
meeting with Benjamin Tenard (492). He instructs Sara to 
"humiliate" Tenard— a former bank president who Simon 
has "ruined"— so that Tenard will come to work for the 
Harford Company. According to Simon, Tenard's "old- 
fashioned ethics and honor" made him "open to attack 
and...easy to ruin" (491). Simon's final words of advice 
to Sara before he turns the meeting over to her are 
"Just bear in mind that the end you desire always 
justifies any means and don't get life confused with 
sentiment" (491).
Fortunately, for both Tenard and Simon, Sara does 
confuse life with sentiment, or feeling. As she is 
acting as Simon, trying to "swindle" Tenard by forcing 
him to submit to Simon's brutality, which s/he can do 
only because Tenard is unemployed and has a family to 
support, Sara can imagine herself only as the other of 
Tenard and Simon. When she tells Tenard that he will be 
required "to conduct [her] banking business with the 
entire ruthlessness as to the means used of a general in 
battle," and that "where it is necessary, you must 
faithfully do things which may appear to your old 
conceptions of honor like plain swindling and theft" 
(495), he refuses her offer of a job. "I'd rather starve 
in the gutter," he says (495). Enraged Sara berates 
Tenard: "Arrah, God's curse on you for a manI You and 
your pride and honor! You're pretending to love your 
women and children and you're willing to drag them down 
with you to suffer the bitter shame of poverty, and 
starve in the gutter..." (495). Tenard thanks her for 
reminding him of his "duty," and he then accepts the 
job. O'Neill's stage directions describe Sara's outburst 
in the following way: "[she] suddenly bursts out in a 
strange rage as if he had touched something deep in her 
and infuriated her— [she lapses] into broad brogue, 
forgetting her office attitudes" (495; italics removed). 
Sara's forgetting of her office decorum is caused by a
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recollection of the destructiveness of masculine desire, 
specifically her father's pride, which she and her 
mother experienced as suffering and deprivation. Because 
of the unequal family relations of her youth, Sara can 
only know herself through her previous subordination, 
and she is therefore ultimately unwilling to align 
herself with Simon and his male perspective. In other 
words, she can imagine herself as Tenard's daughter or 
his wife and does not want them to suffer as has she. In 
regaining this knowledge, Sara in turn renounces the 
end-justifies-the-means business practices, or 
acquisitiveness, that O'Neill sees as the dominant mode 
of American masculinity, and which Sara sees as the 
cause of her suffering. She warns Simon that she'll 
leave the Company and "take my children and go to the 
old farm and live a decent, honest women working in the 
earth" (496). And she makes good on her promise, for in 
the epilogue of Mansions, Simon and Sara and their 
children are living on the "old farm" in Simon's "old 
cabin by the lake," where they are content and working 
the land (548; italics removed). Here, Sara tells Simon, 
who is recovering from a "brain fever," that she'll 
never ask him "to succeed again" (556) and that they are 
at last free "from the soul-destroying compulsion to 
keep on enslaving [themselves] with more and more power 
and possessions" (555).
On O'Neill's part, the gesture of Sara's return to 
the Thoreauvian cabin by the lake partially represents a 
nostalgia for an agrarian utopia as set forth in the 
writings of Crevecoeur, Jefferson, and Thoreau, a 
strategic retreat from the complex historical problems 
the nation was facing in the 1940s. Sara's refusal, 
however, also represents a utopian moment amidst the 
despair of O'Neill's late plays, where any kind of 
redemption seems to be illusory, or a necessary fiction. 
The return to the cabin is a genuine committment on 
Sara's part, and O'Neill's, to recover America's utopian 
book ("the old values"), to construct an imagined 
community where "there'd be no more poor people, nor 
anyone getting the best of the next one, and there'd be 
no rich but everyone would have enough" (305). Sara's 
plan, however, is always in danger of being disrupted by 
a repetition of masculine desire, an eruption of the 
national subject, for as her son Jonathan says in the 
epilogue: "No, I don't want to be a farmer....There's no 
money in farming. You can't get ahead. And I'm going to 
get ahead" (550). The ambiguity created by the 
juxtaposition of Sara's and Jonathan's speeches (and the 
ideologies they represent) at the end of the play works 
to supplement the more sanguine message of Mansions. and 
produces a reading more in line with the pessimism of 
O'Neill's final plays. That is, by suggesting that
Simon's sons will repeat their father's mistakes, just 
as Sara and Simon reenact their fathers' pathologies, 
O'Neill underlines the recursive, predetermined nature 
of American subjectivity, a pattern that the national 
pedagogy denies. In addition, O'Neill also suggests, as 
do Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller a few years 
later, that men have little choice about what they 
become; their lives are predetermined. O'Neill's more 
"psychological" interpretation of American culture, 
however, stresses that the basic structures of American 
life— the family and the economy— provide men with 
little satisfaction or meaning.
Chapter Four
Tennessee Williams and the Instrumentality of Reason
During the 194 0s, the Frankfurt School theorized a 
new stage of capitalism, what Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno called late-capitalism; and, as Frederic Jameson 
reminds us, their model stresses two fundamental points: 
first, "a tendential web of bureaucratic control... and 
[second] the interpenetration of government and big 
business... such that Nazism and the New Deal are related 
systems" (Postmodernism xviii). What this 
"interpenetration" of government and industry meant was 
a fascistic organization of society. As Herbert Marcuse 
argued, fascism "is not only a terroristic political 
coordination of society [i.e. Nazi Germany], but also a 
non-terroristic economic-technical coordination [that] 
operates through the manipulation of needs by vested 
interests [i.e. American big business]," which also 
"precludes the emergence of an effective opposition 
against the whole" (One-Dimensional Man 3). The 
Frankfurt School redefined fascism in order to record 
the emergence of similar tendencies in Germany and the 
United States; according to Horkheimer and Adorno in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), "One day the edict of 
production, the actual advertisement... can turn into the 
open command of the Fuhrer. In a society of huge Fascist 
rackets which agree among themselves what part of the
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social product should be allotted to the nation's needs, 
it would seem anachronistic to recommend the use of a 
particular soap powder. The Fuhrer is more up-to-date in 
unceremoniously giving direct orders for both the 
holocaust and the supply of rubbish” (160). Horkheimer 
and Adorno's comparison of Nazi propaganda— "blarring 
from radios, movies, and bullhorns”— and the commericial 
media in the United States, or what they called ”the 
culture industry,” is not simply a warning about the 
brutality of the Fuhrer; it is a radical reformulation 
of the idea of the subject, a reformulation which is 
historically determined by the rationalization of two 
related systems, Nazism and American mass consumerism.
The figure of the Fuhrer is more ”up-to-date” only 
because it represented a hyper-rationalization of 
production that made the "edict of production” in the 
United States, by comparison, seem "anachronistic." 
Indeed, as Andrew Hewitt asserts, the "key analytical 
observations [in Dialectic of Enlightenment! arise from 
the insights afforded by the comparison of capitalism 
and fascism," which Horkheimer and Adorno use to "insist 
upon a historical mutation in the structure of 
subjectivity, a mutation brought about by capitalism as 
the rational instantiation of Enlightenment thought" 
(144-45; italics removed). By identifying the subject as 
an effect of the "technological rational" that dominated
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late-capitalist cultures, Horkheimer and Adorno 
suggested that representations and models of the liberal 
subject (constituted by the culture industry and always 
present in memory) were being used repressively to 
reduce subjectivity to a series of "protocols" or, as 
Marcuse argued, "pre-given external standards."
Their discovery was a radical rewriting of Freud's 
theory of introjection. In other words, as Marcuse 
suggested at the time, introjection no longer described 
how individuals internalized social controls because it 
represented "a variety of relatively spontaneous 
processes by which a self (Ego) transposes the 'outer' 
into the 'inner,'" a process that was hostile to 
external standards and modes of behavior and therefore 
created "an individual consciousness and an individual 
unconscious apart from public opinion and behavior."
Under late-capitalism, or what Marcuse called "the 
machine age," "inner freedom" or "private space" had 
been "invaded and whittled down by technological 
reality": "Mass production and mass distribution claim 
the entire individual.... The result is, not adjustment 
but mimesis: an immediate identification of the 
individual with his society and, through it, with 
society as a whole" (One-Dimensional Man 10; italics 
original).
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Horkheimer and Adorno in turn argued that this 
claiming, or interpellation, of the subject produced 
instrumental reason: "Through the countless agencies of 
mass production and its culture the conventionalized 
modes of behavior are impressed upon the individual as 
the only natural, respectable, and rational ones. He 
defines himself as a thing, as a static element, as 
success or failure" (28). They believed that individual 
consciousness was being reduced to a series of 
homogenous codes or modes of operation found on the job, 
on the radio, in the movies, and in the then emerging 
television industry. For Adorno, these standardized 
models signaled the end of the liberal subject since 
"motivation in the old, liberal sense" was being 
appropriated and "systematically controlled and absorbed 
by social mechanism which are directed from above" 
("Freudian Theory" 13 6). In other words, the subject's 
desire for success— for material wealth, to "get 
ahead"— , which the subject believed was self-generated, 
was, in fact, his identification with the rationale of 
the apparatus, which had programmed individual 
consumption as spontaneous thought or reason or the 
assertion of individual will.
The effect of their rewriting of the subject 
radically destabilized received cultural knowledge about 
masculine autonomy and revealed desire as a self-
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alienating structure constituted by the other. In 
effect, they revealed the national subject of American 
culture as a contradiction, as a sort of Orwellian 
cliche (i.e. conformity is freedom), and in so doing 
tarnished the most sacred object of American life— the 
self-made man, the rugged individual, the exceptional 
American. The effect of Dialectic of Enlightenment was 
to reduce the hero of the nation to its hated opposite, 
the victim. His desire was constituted and structured by 
the edict of production; his reason had become 
instrumental; it was used by the apparatus for profit. 
Thought had become anachronistic and reappeared as 
"stereopathy," the desire to conform. In Horkheimer's 
estimation, reason was merely "the ideological 
projection of a false universality which now shows the 
autonomy of the subject to have been an illusion": 
"exploration of meanings is replaced by an acquaintance 
with functions"; to be successful, the subject need only 
"sound like the vocal chords of the radio, film and 
magazine" ("The End of Reason" 36-40).
•kick
I do not want to suggest here that Tennessee 
Williams was an avid reader of the Frankfurt School— he 
was not. Nor do I want to suggest that he was a cultural 
theorist. What I do want to suggest, however, is that 
many of Williams' plays written in the forties reflect
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the transformation of subjectivity theorized by the 
Frankfurt School, and that he linked these changes to 
political movements in Europe. More specifically, he 
compared the construction of American masculinity to the 
practices of European fascism. In my opinion, he would 
have agreed with Marcuse's argument that fascism is the 
coordination of "society" from above, which masks the 
agenda of vested interests and blocks the emergence of 
humane social relations.1 This belief is especially 
evident in his two most famous plays, The Glass 
Menagerie (1945) and The Streetcar Named Desire (1947), 
in which artistic figures struggle against a 
homogenizing, repressive masculinity that seeks to 
eliminate difference. Scholars and critics have resisted 
such overt "political" readings of Williams' plays 
because they have been too interested in defining his 
"Southernness," or they have been too interested in 
universalizing his aesthetic using neo-Aristotelian
1 In his Memoirs. Williams suggests that he was 
interested in discovering a "new social system": "One 
day Leonard Bernstein and I were both invited to lunch 
by a pair of very effete American queens. Bernstein was 
very hard on them and I was embarrassed by the way he 
insulted them. 'When the revolution comes,' he declared, 
'you will be stood up against a wall and shot.'
Bernstein has since been accused of something called 
'radical chic.' But looking back on that luncheon, I 
wonder if he is not as true a revolutionary as I am, the 
difference being that I am not interested in shooting 
piss-elegant queens or anyone else, I am only interested 
in discovering a new social system— certainly not 
Communist, but an enlightened form of socialism, I would 
suppose" (93-4).
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categories in order to bring it in line with New 
Critical ideologies. A third tendency has also emerged, 
most notably in readings of The Glass Menagerie; that of 
reading the plays using the playwright's biography or 
family history (notably absent in this narrative, until 
recently, however, is any concrete theorization of the 
author's homosexuality).2 While these approaches 
somtimes yield interesting results, they fail to account 
for the author's realoolitik during the decade of the 
forties. In fact, in the hands of many critics,
Williams' politics are reconstituted as a non-politics, 
as a kind of neo-Romantic evasion of the political.
Like Arthur Miller, Williams was acutely aware of 
the economic and technological changes taking place 
during the two decades that followed the Depression. The 
more autonomous practices of labor were slowly becoming 
obsolete as scientific innovation further homogenized 
the workforce and often reduced work to a series of 
"Taylorized" movements. The "managerial revolution" that 
took place during these two decades, which brought large 
numbers of white males into the middle class, programed 
men to fit into a homogenous corporate structure. Like
2 Two recent and notable exceptions to this trend 
are John Clum's Acting Gav: Male Homosexuality in Modern 
Drama and David Savran's Communists. Queers, amd 
Cowboys; The Politics of Masculinity in the Work of 
Arthur Miller and Tennessee Williams. See Clum 149-66 
and Savran 76-174.
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their working-class counterparts, the labor of these men 
was often reduced to a series of repetitive tasks. 
Culture too was being homogenized as the emergent 
entertainment technologies (radio, movies, television) 
were used to produce consumers. The consumer became an 
"abstract" projection of the publicity apparatus of 
capital; the white, male, heterosexual American citizen 
was now the universalized consumer. In other words, the 
wishes of the "individual" (an empty category, according 
to Horkheimer) were equal to the desires of the machine, 
of which the individual was a function.
* * *
One of the earliest plays in which Williams deals
with the standardization of American culture is The Last
of Mv Solid Gold Watches, a one-act written circa 1940.
In the play, Charlie Colton, "the last of the Delta
drummers" (Wagons 75) lectures Bob Harper, a young
corporate salesman, about the changes in the economy:
The road is changed. The shoe industry is 
changed.... You can take it from me— the world that I 
used to know...is slipping and sliding away from 
under our shoes....The ALL LEATHER slogan don't sell 
shoes anymore. The stuff that a shoe's made of is 
not what's going to sell it anymore! No! STYLE! 
SMARTNESS! APPEARANCE! That's what counts with the 
modern shoe-purchaser, Bob....Why I remember the 
time when all I had to do was lay out my samples 
down there in the lobby...A sales-talk was not 
necessary. A store was a place where people sold 
merchandise and to sell merchandise the retail- 
dealer had to obtain it from the wholesale 
manufacturer, Bob! Where they get the merchandise 
now I don't pretend to know. But it don't look like 
they buy it from wholesale dealers! Out of the air—
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I guess it materializes! Or maybe stores don't sell 
stuff any more! Maybe I'm living in a world of 
illusion! (Wagons 81-2; italics removed)
Colton goes on to tell Harper that "Initiative...self-
reliance. .. independence of character," the "old sterling
qualities that distinguished one man from another," are
"Gone with the roses of yesterday" (Wagons 83-4; italics
removed). Harper, bored with Colton's speechmaking,
insists that Colton has missed the "vital statistics"
and that Colton belongs to the "past" (Wagons 84).
Furious, Colton, with a final warning, throws Harper out
of his hotel room: "My point is this: the ALL-LEATHER
slogan is not what sells anymore— not in shoes and not
in humanity, neither. The emphasis isn't on quality.
Production, production, yes" (Wagons 84).
Colton's exchange with Harper reflects Williams'
understanding of the structural changes taking place
within monopoly capitalism during the first four decades
of this century: in theory, the shift from monopoly
capitalism to late capitalism represents itself as the
eventual elimination of the "Delta drummer" in the face
of the organizational man, Bob Harper, who Williams
views as a product of the restructuring of the economy.
The further rationalization of production, which was
intensified by the advent of World War II, made the
qualities that Colton values— initiative, self-reliance,
independence— obsolete, at least as these qualities were
embodied in the practices of a drummer. Likewise, 
Colton's complaint about the disappearence of the 
wholesale manufacturer points to a consolidation of 
production and distribution brought about by centralized 
corporate planning, a practice which also eliminated 
traditional practices and meanings. In Williams' view, 
the standardization of production represented by Harper 
reduces social relations to "vital statistics" so that 
men (and women) became interchangeable. That is, the 
symbolic apparatus deployed to construct consumers 
constituted them as generic so that they became 
indistinguishable from one another. The transubstantion 
of meaning represented by the replacement of "ALL­
LEATHER" with "STYLE! SMARTNESS! APPEARANCE!" marks the 
advent of the publicity apparatus, the illusion, the 
simulacra. Meaning is no longer immanent in the 
material; it has been detached from the object so that 
it can be used to program consumption.3 Desire is 
thereby transformed, and the subject is now merely a 
consumer— an abstract projection subject to the same 
slogans and desires as all consumers, a statistic.
Bob Harper represents Williams' earliest critique of 
a standardized masculinity determined by intrumental 
reason. He is also an early version of both Jim O'Connor
3 For an explanation of style, or preplanned, 
obsolescence see Marchand 156-63.
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and Stanley Kowalski.4 Harper also resembles another
salesman, Willy Loman, in that like Willy Loman, Harper
is a consuming/producing identity; he consumes the mass-
produced objects of commodity culture— Williams has him
carrying a comic book throughout the play— , and he
generates sales for the concern of "Schultz and Werner."
His surname is meant to remind readers of Harper's
Magazine. and, as such, it suggests a standardization of
the subject by making Harper conterminous with the
commodity form. And this is precisely the
rationalization of consciousness (conformity) that
Williams sought to oppose in his plays.
As he wrote in 1945, "art is a kind of anarchy, and
the theater is a province of art" (Wagons vii):
Art is only anarchy in juxtaposition with organized 
society. It runs counter to the sort of orderliness 
on which organized society apparently must be based.
It is a benevolent anarchy: it must be that and if 
it is true art, it is. It is benevolent in the sense 
of constructing something which is missing, and what 
it constructs may be merely criticism of things as 
they exist. (Wagons vii-viii)
Here Williams was commenting on the function of
community theater, which he felt had become too
4 Charlie Colton, on the other hand, with his 
insistence on "tradition," is meant to represent what 
Williams perceived as the passing of Southern 
aristocratic culture, the collapse of a traditional 
social structure in which relationships were regulated 
by rigid social codes and a class hierarchy based on 
race, gender, and inherited wealth and property. In this 
sense, Colton resembles both Amanda Wingfield and 
Blanche DuBois.
"respectable" (i.e. "the province of grey-suited 
corporate lawyers and...their wives... impeccably lady­
like" [Wagons vii]). But he was also commenting on the 
conformity of American life in general, which, he 
argued, was a reaction to European Fascism and 
Communism— and the opposite of the "Democratic impulse" 
as envisioned by Jefferson and Lincoln (Wagons xi). For 
Williams, this enforced conformity resulted from a 
paranoia (Williams calls it confusion) that threatened 
to eliminate the "freaks": "It seems to me, as it seems 
to many artists right now, that an effort is being made 
to put creative work and workers under wraps. Nothing 
could be more dangerous to Democracy, for the irritating 
grain of sand which is creative work in a society must 
be kept inside the shell or the pearl or idealistic 
progress cannot be made. For God's sake let us defend 
ourselves against whatever is hostile to us without 
imitating the thing we are afraid of" (Wagons xii); and 
in Williams' mind, America had come to imitate "the 
thing" it feared, as the antagonism between the 
"irritating grain of sand" and the progress of the 
nation became more one-sided in favor of repressive 
forces. At this point, Art, or artistic labor, became a 
kind of resistance, criticism, or anarchy that sought to 
oppose standard modes of thought or conduct.
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Williams specifically calls for a "new" artistic 
praxis in the "Production Notes" to The Glass Menagerie, 
where he aligns himself with the European avant-garde by 
calling for "a new, plastic theater" that would "take 
the place of the exhausted theatre of realistic 
conventions" (GM 7); this "must" be done, he argued, if 
"the theatre is to resume vitality as a part of our 
culture" (GM 7).5 Commenting on these lines, Esther 
Merle Jackson notes that Williams associated "vitality" 
with "the return of the theatre to its natural fuctions: 
to joyous and irreverant entertainment, to shock and 
terror, to symbol-making, and to the figurative 
exploration of life" (Broken World ix). Neverthless, 
Williams' adoption of expressionist techniques in The 
Glass Menagerie was, in my opinion, primarily driven by 
his opposition to realism, which he associated with the 
homogenizing forces, or "orderliness," of "organized 
society."6 Realism, which he describes as "the
5 Because it is the most widely circulated version 
of the play, I have used the "reading edition" of The 
Glass Menagerie . For an explanation of the debate 
surrounding the "reading" and "acting" editions, see 
Rowland 62-74.
6 By "expressionist" I mean to suggest an attitude 
or praxis rather than a specific artistic style that can 
be defined as expressionistic. That is, many of the 
"isms" of the modernist or avant-gardistist movements 
are opposed to the status quo of institutionalized art 
and hegemonic cultural arrangements. For discussions of 
Williams' "expressionism," see Esther Merle Jackson 3- 
42. See also Frank Durham 121-34 and Nancy Tischler 31-41.
unimportance of the photographic in art" (GM 7), had 
become ineffective for conveying the "truth": 
"Expressionism and all other unconventional techniques 
in drama have only one valid aim, and that is a closer 
approach to truth" (GM 7). He was attempting to discover 
"a more penetrating and vivid expression of things as 
they are" because "truth, life, or reality is an organic 
thing which the poetic imagination can represent or 
suggest... only through transformation, through changing 
into other forms than those merely present in 
appearance" (GM 7). For Williams, "the merely present in 
appearance" was the dominant way of narrativizing 
experience in a commodity culture, a structure or way of 
seeing that led away from the truth. By adopting a 
position antagonistic to the realistic narrative of 
American culture, then, he hoped to resist the "means- 
ends rationality" dominating state "Democracy." One of 
the models he chose for such a task was Picasso's 
Guernica.
The word "Guernica" appears twice in The Glass 
Menagerie, and most critics have assumed that Williams 
used it merely as part of the "social background" of the 
play (GM 23). Readers will remember that the city of 
Guernica was leveled by German and Italian fighters and 
bombers on the afternoon of April 26, 1937. The city 
burned for three days, and over three hundred people
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were killed, mostly civilians. The destruction of 
Guernica was part of a Nazi policy to use the "Spanish 
Civil War as an arena for trying out the airmen and 
planes of [Goering's] new Luftwaffe" (Chipp 24, 32-34).
This early coordination of land and air forces also 
became the model for the Nazi Blitzkreia; that is, the 
attack on Guernica was part of the Nazi concept of 
"total war." As German military journals argued at the 
time, "war [was] not just between armies but between 
whole peoples— thus justifying the bombing of civilians 
as well as of the armed forces" (Chipp 22). It is clear 
that in bombing Guernica no effort was made to 
differentiate between military and civilian targets. Key 
military targets were, in fact, not even touched, and 
eyewitnesses reported seeing German fighters kill 
peasants and townspeople by strafing the streets and the 
countryside. Guernica marks the first atrocity of the 
Second World War— a bloody example that would be 
followed by the firebombing of Dresden, Shanghai, and 
London, the nuclear conflagrations of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and the Holocaust. Goering's "laboratory 
experiment" was also paradigmatic of the type of 
masculine violence and domination that led to mass 
slaughter and annihilation: men were programed by the 
war machine to kill one another, and they were joined 
together with other instruments (guns, tanks, airplanes)
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in order to accomplish their killing in a more efficient 
manner. Organized by their alienation and fear, men 
became parts of the killing machine that destroyed other 
human beings.
In mentioning Guernica, critics have systematically
taken Tom Wingfield at his word— that as part of the
"social background" of the play, Guernica is only an
isolated reference to the social, and it is therefore
not essential to the play's (universal) meaning. A good
example of this type of reading is found in Gilbert
Debusscher's "Tennessee Williams's Unicorn Broken
Again." In this essay, Debussher attacks Grigor Pavlov
for misrepresenting the following lines from Tom
Wingfield's opening narration:
In Spain there was revolution. Here there was only 
shouting and confusion. In Spain there was Guernica. 
Here there were disturbances of labor, sometimes 
pretty violent, in otherwise peaceful cities such as 
Chicago, Cleveland, St. Louis...
This is the social background of the play. (GM 23) 
Pavlov, according to Debussher, interprets these lines 
in the following manner: "That was a time of profound 
social and political upheaval in the bourgeois world." 
Debussher claims that Pavlov's "description of the late 
thirties illustrates his characteristic method of 
twisting the work out of shape to fit his preconceived 
[read: political] views" (50). He goes on to berate 
Pavlov for presenting the narrator's comments "out of 
context," thereby "imply[ing] that the destruction of
the Basque city, and more generally, the events of Spain 
are comparable in impact to the social unrest prevalent 
in American urban centers" (50). According to Debussher, 
"What Tom says...is precisely the opposite of what Mr. 
Pavlov leads us to believe: compared to Spain, where 
World War II was in rehersal, America witnessed only 
minor disturbances" (50). Quoting the critic Joseph N. 
Riddel, he then argues that Williams was "grouping for a 
more universal statement" (51) . And just what was that 
more universal statement? "It is less the social picture 
in itself that Williams is interested in than the effect 
of strained circumstances on his characters, less 
middle-class America under financial stress than man in 
general reacting to adversity of any nature" (51).
But Williams has not specified general adversity; he 
has specified adversity of a very specific nature— "the 
fiery Braille alphabet of a dissolving [American] 
economy" (GM 23), which Williams, as Pavlov suggests, 
compares to events in Europe. Debusscher chooses to deny 
this link, and in so doing becomes like "the huge middle 
class of America [that] was matriculating in a school 
for the blind"( GM 23). His eyes have failed him, and he 
thereby becomes a reader very much like Amanda Wingfield 
who rereads the social text by repressing it and 
engaging in nostalgia (Debussher, for his part, prefers
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the untainted categories of Aristotelian analysis.).7 
Further, his repression of history from the text as a 
way to rescue it from contamination (or "false" 
contextualization) leads to an eventual and violent 
return of the repressed, much like Chamberlain's 
strategy of appeasement led to genocide. The connection 
for Williams, as I suggest above, is that by making 
European Fascism or Communism the Other of American 
Civilization, difference is repressed, and we become the 
thing we fear.8 Historically, the "disturbances of 
labor" that Tom Wingfield mentions in his introduction 
are the first instances of a renewed battle over the 
instrumentalization of the workplace, which is finally 
accomplished in the full-blown late capitalism of the 
Reagan era. The disturbances of the thirties mark the 
initial engagements of this centripetal movement; as 
"big business" and the state began to consolidate their
7 Debussher also misses another of Williams' 
gestures meant to comment on the blindness of the 
middle-class. In scene five, Amanda sits on a newspaper 
whose "enormous headline reads: 'Franco Triumphs'" (GM 
56; italics removed). Amanda ignores current events as 
"She spreads [the] newspaper on a [fire escape] step and 
sits down, gracefully and demurely as if she were 
settling into a swing on a Mississippi veranda" (GM 56; 
italics removed); this gesture can also be read as the 
author s[h]itting on Franco. Jim O'Connor makes similar 
(mis)use of the newspaper when he spreads it on the 
dining room table to prevent candle wax from staining 
the finish.
8 Michael Rogin has theorized this mindset as the 
"countersubversive mentality." See Rogin 44-80.
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control over the apparatus, a homogenization of 
consciousness was produced that eventually manifested 
itself as McCarthyism.9
I would now like to return to Guernica to expand on 
an earlier point: that it provided an important example 
for Williams. My remarks here will also serve as a 
transition to more specific remarks about the The Glass 
Menagerie. Picasso's painting, as Herschel Chipp notes 
in his study of Guernica, "became the most discussed 
work of art of the time, and the story of the tragic 
defense of the Republic might have faded from world 
consciousness much sooner had it not been for Picasso's 
powerful imagery" (166). Indeed, as soon as the painting 
arrived in New York in May of 1939, it became a cause 
celebre for the artistic left and an object of derision 
for more conservative elements in the artistic 
community. Its arrival corresponded with the opening of 
the Modern Museum of Art in New York, which had mounted 
a forty-year retrospective of Picasso's work to 
celebrate the occasion. Guernica was also exhibited in 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Chicago to raise funds 
for the Spanish Refugee Relief Campaign. The American 
avante-garde championed the painting as the most 
important example of modernist art yet seen in the
9 For a detailed explanation of the defeat of the 
American labor movement during this period see Mike 
Davis 52-101.
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United States. Defenders of realism, or what Chipp calls 
traditionalism, however, ridiculed the painting as 
"cuckoo art" (163). In a review in the New York Times, 
for instance, the influential critic Edwin Allen Jewel 
attacked Guernica's "foreign values" and was upset by 
the "grotesque shapes, human and animal, flung into a 
sort of flat maelstrom" (qtd. in Chipp 162).10
Williams was certainly aware of the debate 
surrounding the painting, and it is very probable that 
he saw Guernica since, as Donald Spoto documents, he was 
in New York during the time the painting was first 
exhibited there.11 Picasso's masterwork would have 
interested him for two reasons. First, Guernica's 
fragmented imagery represented a type of modernism that 
Williams was trying to adapt for the stage, an 
"expressionism" that would challenge the realism that 
conformed to the instrumentality of organized society.
The montage, in effect, was a way for the artist to 
construct a "higher truth"; this is precisely what 
Picasso's mural aimed to do, and this is what Esther 
Merle Jackson argues Williams was attempting to do with 
his art:
For the images created by Williams are not conceived 
as copies of any known reality. If there is a
10 For an extended discussion of "Guernica in 
America" see Chipp 156-79.
11 See Spoto 64-114.
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nature, a state, an individual, a reality, a truth, 
or a God in the universe of Williams, it has been 
derealized. For Williams, reality itself lies 
shattered. In the fragmentary world of his theatre, 
new images are pieced together form partialities: 
they are composed from splinters of broken truths. 
(Broken World 36)
Second, the critique of Picasso's painting from the
right— that it was ugly, that it was political, that it
was subversive— also figured for Williams the experience
of the artist in a culture that was increasingly
dominated by rationalistic ways of thinking, a
conformity that endangered modernist artistic practices.
As C.W.E. Bigsby notes, "Williams was... inclined to see
the public world as an image of determinism that could
never be successfully defeated or transformed by the
impact of the moral will, but only resisted by the
imagination" (2: 30). The rationality that dominated the
public world, that determined male conduct, was in
conflict with non-productive forces of art and the
imagination freed from the efficiency of the apparatus;
this antagonism between two opposing forces plays itself
out in many of Williams' dramas where two different
types of masculinity (or ways of being)— the
instrumental or the heteronomous and the artistic or
spontaneous— produce the conflict which sustains the
momentum of action.
The appearance of Guernica/Guernica in the text of
The Glass Menagerie acts as a link between the type of
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German nationalism (Nazi instrumentality) Picasso was 
protesting and the type of fascism Williams saw as 
latent in the dominant American masculinity, or 
nationalism. Williams' intervention can thus be 
theorized as an example of what Homi Bhabha calls "the 
antagonistic perspective of nation," whereby the 
marginalized intervenes in discourses that "rationalize 
the authoritarian, 'normalizing' tendencies within 
cultures in the name of national interest" (Introduction 
4). Williams did not intervene only from the marginal 
position of the artist, however; he also intervened, as 
Gore Vidal points out, from the marginal position of a 
gay man who was always aware of his "otherness"-— in a 
culture that sought to extirpate every vestige of 
homosexuality (xix-xxv). Nowhere is Williams' 
intervention into the dominant masculinity more 
pronounced than in The Glass Menagerie.
* * *
The setting of The Glass Menagerie marks the same
economic consolidation and resulting crisis of the
subject that we see in Death of a Salesman and in the
theorizations of the Frankfurt School:
The Wingfield apartment is in the rear of the 
building, one of those vast hive-like 
conglomerations of cellular living-units that flower 
as warty growths in the overcrowded urban of the 
lower middle-class population and are symptomatic of 
the impulse of this largest and fundamentally 
enslaved of American society to avoid fluidity and 
differentiation and to exist as one interfused mass
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of automatism....At the rise of the curtain, the 
audience is faced with the dark, grim rear wall of 
the Wingfield tenement. This building is flanked on 
both sides by dark, narrow alleys which run into 
murky canyons of tangled clotheslines, garbage cans, 
and the sinister latticework of neighboring fire 
escapes. (GM 21; italics removed).
The rationalization of the economic and the social
structures of the nation ("The Century of Progress") has
not, in Williams7 estimation, resulted in the liberation
of the lower middle-class, or any class (except,
perhaps, those who run the apparatus). "Symptomatic" of
this class' enslavement, Williams suggests, is its
homogenization by the forces of production; its members
are like worker bees, instruments that move to the tempo
of the apparatus; they thus lack "fluidity" and
"differentiation." They are not only self-alienated, but
they are also alienated from each other in the
"sinister," "murky," "tangled" environment of the
tenements, a system of habitation that enforces
isolation and alterity. People living in this space
exist as atomized producer/consumer bits of a
homogenized workforce.
These buildings are also the "warty growths" of what
Southern cultural historians like to call the "New
South," the "hive-like conglomerates" of the working
class that sprung up in cities like St. Louis during the
process of industrialization— a process that is
narrativized as the "collapse" of Southern culture.
(i.e. the "Old South"). According to Joseph Davis, the
narrative is a synthesis of W. J. Cash's The Mind of the
South and Paul Gaston's The New South Creed. In this
conceptualization, Southern "history" emerges by
repressing slavery and constructing "the Old South...as
an almost idyllic agricultural society of genteel people
and an aristocratic way of life, exemplary in its
pattern and content. A visionary moment of the American
dream occured and past; now its history transformed into
the story of a fallen order, a ruined time of nobility
and heroic achievements that was vanquished and
irrevocably lost" (203). The tenements represent
elements of this "fallen order." Davis calls them
"landscapes of the dislocated mind" (192), and he argues
that Williams employs the imagery of a tenement in order
to problematize Amanda Wingfield's nostalgia for the
"Old South." That is, because Amanda is unable to
understand her historical situation, she invents (or
goes along with) a "pseudo-history" which condemns her
to a "marginal, inauthentic existence" (Davis 203). As a
result, for Davis, Amanda becomes the "prototype for all
of Williams' southern women":
...Amanda is directly responsible for the terrible 
and permanent alienation of Laura and Tom. Because 
she herself has withdrawn from reality, preferring 
rather dreams of a lost time in the South, Amanda 
has handed her children over to a similar, if not a 
worse, psychology and grim fate. The Glass 
Menagerie, in effect, gives us Williams' poignant 
dramatization of the dreadful human waste of
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illusions. The majority characters in this play are 
so warped and their lives so distorted and perverted 
by fantasies that each is left with only broken 
fragments of what might have been. (205)
Two things strike me about Davis' reading of Amanda.
First, he deals with Amanda unfairly, and, second, his
reading is melodramatic in the sense that it is
reductive. I agree with Davis that Amanda is unable to
understand her historical position, but he places too
much responsibility for her children's "dreadful”
illusions on Amanda's shoulders. I would argue, in fact,
that her children have no illusions— they realize that
the culture in which they live is hostile to artists and
"cripples.” As Nancy Tischler suggests, Williams
”endow[s] the mother with some masculine practicality,
thus giving Amanda Wingfield an exceedingly complex
personality" (34). "Although she has approached much of
her life unrealistically," Tischler writes, "her plans
for her children and her understanding of their
shortcomings are grimly realistic.... She tries to find
Laura a protective corner of the business world. When
this fails, she rallies for the valiant but hopeless
attempt to marry the girl off" (35). In the absence of
the father, Amanda acts as the father.
What concerns me here, however, in regard to both
Davis' and Tischler's remarks are the ideas of agency
represented by both. Davis sees Tom and Laura as
distorted or perverted by the psychology of their
mother. Tischler, more the diplomat, sees the faults of 
the children as "shortcomings, *' politely suggesting that 
the children have failed to conform to a normative model 
of behavior. The comments of both, however, reveal an 
interesting problem for readers of the play, a problem 
which Tischler is more self-conscious of than Davis. 
Namely, as she suggests, all the characters fall outside 
the Aristotelian or Neo-Classical categories of the 
tragic. In describing Amanda's failure to marry off 
Laura as "tragic," Tischler notes that her "use of the 
term tragic corresponds with Mr Williams's": "I do not 
see most of his people as having the stature of 
classical or neo-classical tragic heroes, but in their 
symbolic value they do express heroism. Their status and 
their values are not so exalted as in the older plays. 
They are more realistic and pathetic than the 
traditional hero was allowed to be. (35)
Tischler seems to be suggesting that although 
Williams' characters express or embody "the heroic," 
they are somehow diminished because they lack the status 
and/or values of kings, queens, or aristocrats. One of 
their "shortcomings" is that they lack agency or 
autonomy— the fundamental criteria of the tragic hero 
and not coincidentally the "quality" our culture most 
values, at least in males. In the eyes of Davis and 
Tischler, Amanda seems to be "short" this quality, just
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as are Tom and Laura. A similar subtext often motivates 
criticism of Death of a Salesman since, as I suggest in 
the last chapter, Willy Loman is programed by the 
apparatus to fit the body of capital; he is therefore 
not responsible for his subjectivity because he has 
none, at least in the normative sense of the word. The 
Wingfields and their "gentleman caller" are a bit 
different than the Lomans, however.
Amanda, like Willy, is only too willing to become an 
instrument of the apparatus. Amanda's nostalgia is, in 
fact, appropriated by the publicity apparatus of the 
machine; that is, in an effort to keep her from thinking 
herself as a subject the apparatus instrumentalizes her 
desire using the narrative of romance. Her desire for 
the "Old South" is represented by her constant retelling 
of courtship stories from her youth: "One Sunday 
afternoon in Blue Mountain— your mother received—  
seventeen!— gentleman callers! Why, sometimes there 
weren't chairs enough to accomodate them all....My 
callers were gentleman— all! Among my callers were some 
of the most prominent young planters of the Mississippi 
Delta— planters and sons of planters (GM 26). Amanda's 
romance, however, ends unhappily; she married the wrong 
man— not a gentleman, but "a man who worked for the 
telephone company" (GM 82)— and he deserted her. In an 
attempt to rewrite history, Amanda tries to provide her
162
daughter with the "happy ending" that has eluded her. As
Tom reports, after his sister has failed to become a
typist, "the idea of getting a gentleman caller for
Laura began to play a more and more important part in
Mother's calculations" (GM 37).
In order to accomplish this task, to raise money to
"properly feather the nest and plume the bird" (GM 37),
Amanda sells subscriptions to The Homemaker's Companion.
Tom describes the magazine as "the type of journal that
features the serialized sublimations of ladies of
letters who think in terms of delicate cuplike breasts,
slim, tapering waists, rich, creamy thighs, eyes like
wood smoke in autumn, fingers that soothe and caress
like strains of music, bodies as powerful as Etruscan
sculpture" (GM 37). In her telephone sales pitch (an
early version of telemarketing) to Ida Scott, Amanda
raves about a "new serial" by Bessie Mae Hopper:
Oh, honey, it's something you can't miss! You 
remember how Gone with the Wind took everybody by 
storm? You simply couldn't go out if you hadn't read 
it. All everybody talked about was Scarlett O'Hara. 
Well, this is a book that critics already compare to 
Gone with the Wind. It's the Gone with the Wind of 
the post-World-War generation! (GM 38)
Later, this time speaking to Ella Cartwright, she pushes
the same author: "It's by Bessie Mae Hopper, the first
thing she's written since Honeymoon for Three....It's
has a sophisticated, society background. It's all about
the horsey set on Long Island!" (GM 55).
Williams, of course, is critiquing Amanda's taste in 
literature; this is, after all, the same woman who 
refuses to have the novels of D. H. Lawrence in her 
house since she prefers the virtues of subliminated sex 
to "That hideous book by that insane Mr. Lawrence [Lady 
Chatterlv's Lover? 111 (GM 39). Amanda, in essence, 
resists the type of artistic production that her son 
finds liberating. The "literature" that she reads and 
that she peddles to her sisters in the D.A.R. represents 
a homogenization of form that Williams sees as 
repressive. Harper's comic books in The Last of Mv Solid 
Gold Watches are another example of the mass-produced 
fiction that Williams hated and so ofter parodied in his 
plays. (The plot of The Glass Menagerie, as Rodger Stein 
points out, is, in fact, a "failed" romance [136].) The 
standardization of "romance" represented by Bessie Mae 
Hopper's latest novel has appropriated Amanda's desire 
for the "Old South"; Amanda's description of the novel 
suggests that antebellum Georgia and modern Long Island 
have become the same thing (exotic locations) which only 
appear to be different. As mise en scene, these 
locations are emptied of their specificity and become 
fields in which interchangeable characters act out 
scenes for interchangeable plots. Romance and desire 
have been instrumentalized.
My characterization of the popular romance, as 
Janice Radway would certainly point out, is reductive 
and pessimistic, for as she argues in her research, 
women often read romances as an oppositional act that 
Radway calls "combative and compensatory" (211). 
Nevertheless, as Radway herself admits, the social 
practice of reading (consuming) a romance helps the 
reader to engage "in an activity that shores up her own 
sense of her abilities, but she also creates a 
simulacrum of her limited social world within a more 
glamorous fiction. She therefore inadvertently justifies 
as natural the very conditions and their emotional 
consequences to which her reading activity is a 
response" (214). My point here is also Williams'— that 
Amanda's consumption of romance fiction helps her to 
create a simulacrum within the oppressiveness of the 
tenement, which is a flight from history: the other 
justifies her misery. In her desire, like Willy Loman, 
she is (has become) a consuming/producing identity. She 
consumes by reading; she produces by selling the desires 
of others to others. She also reproduces, or attempts to 
reproduce, the desire of the other in her children. This 
is manifest by what Erich Fromm calls "pseudo-thinking" 
whereby, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, "The might 
of industrial society is lodged in [people's] minds"
165
(Fromm 208-30; Horkheimer and Adorno 127). As with Willy
Loman, memory becomes the site of the other.
Amanda functions as a manager or regulator for the
apparatus because she attempts to assimilate her
children to the program of the machine; she wants them
to conform, to be "normal people" as she puts it (GM
75). She wants them to become instruments, not "freaks"
or "cranks." Indeed, as James Reynolds writes, "Tom and
Laura are pushed into commercial careers that conflict
with their temperaments and aspirations" (523). Amanda's
first words in the play are the words of the other:
Honey, don't push with your fingers. If you have to 
push with something, the thing to push with is a 
crust of bread. And chew-— chewI Animals have 
secretions in their stomachs which enable them to 
digest food without mastication, but human beings 
are supposed to chew their food before they swallow 
it down. Eat food leisurely, son, and really enjoy 
it. A well-cooked meal has lots of delicate flavors 
that have to be held in the mouth for appreciation. 
So chew your food and give your salivary glands a 
chance to function! (GM 24; italics removed)
Her "constant directions" and "calculations," as Tom
calls them, also include advice about health, work, and
success. At various points in the play, for example,
Amanda tells Tom to eat a good breakfast, drink less
coffee, and spend less money on cigarettes so that he
will be a productive worker:
Amanda:.... Eat a bowl of purina!
Tom: Just coffee, mother.
Amanda: Shredded wheat biscuit?
Tom: No. No mother, just coffee.
Amanda: You can't put in a day's work on an empty 
stomach. You've got ten minutes— don't gulp!
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Drinking too-hot liquids makes cancer of the 
stomach...Put cream in.
Tom: No, thank you.
Amanda: To cool it.
Tom: Noi No, thank you. I want it black.
Amanda: I know, but it's not good for you. We have 
to do all we can to build ourselves up. (GM 49).
Elsewhere, when Tom informs his mother that he goes to
the movies every night because he "likes adventure"
("Adventure is something I don't have much of at work,
so I go to the movies" [GM 51]), Amanda tells him that
"Most young men find adventure in their careers" (GM
51). Tom responds, "most young men are not employed in a
warehouse" (GM 51). To which Amanda responds, "The world
is full of young men employed in warehouses and offices
and factories" (GM 51). She concludes the exchange by
reemphasizing that most men find adventure in their
careers, or "they do without it!" (GM 52). Amanda
insists that Tom conform so that he can work his way up
the ladder: "Try and you will succeed! (GM 49; italics
removed).
The lines of Amanda's just quoted are typical of her 
idiolect— as such they represent the voice of the 
publicity apparatus, or as Horkheimer and Adorno 
suggest, the heteronomous knowledge of the non-subject. 
Amanda believes that what she is thinking is hers, that 
she has arrived at her beliefs through her own thought 
processes, but this is an illusion. Most of what she 
says and thinks is given to her by the other: magazines,
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radio, newspapers (when she reads them). Like Willy 
Loman, she has been colonized from without, and the 
subject/object, inside/outside split of identity has 
collapsed. Her goals are determined externally. As 
Horkheimer wrote in 1941 ("The End of Reason"), "The 
individual has to do violence to himself and learn that 
the life of the whole is the necessary precondition of 
his own" (30). Non-subjectivity has been 
instrumentalized as subjectivity, as agency or 
character.
Nowhere is this non-subjectivity in subjectivity— an 
inversion that goes unrecognized by the subj ect— more 
apparent than in her advice to Tom about success and in 
her desire for "the gentleman caller"; both embody the 
rationalization of the whole. AS both James Rowland and 
Rodger Stein stress, Amanda's cliches about success are 
part of the Horatio Alger/Dale Carnegie narrative of 
masculinity. According to Stein, for example, "Try and 
you will SUCCEED!" "is another of Amanda's illusions,
[and] it is one shared by her fellow Americans, for 'try 
and you will succeed' is the traditional motto of the 
American dream of success, the theme of confident self- 
reliance canonized in the romances of Horatio Alger"
(Stein 137; Rowland 69). Stein might have said 
"traditional model"; this would have been more accurate 
because hard work and perseverance as the "keys" to
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success are the behaviors most often modeled by the
publicity apparatus in its formalized version of
American citizenship.
To Amanda, the gentleman caller embodies "this
image, this specter, this hope" (GM 37). As she
interrogates Tom about Jim O'Connor, it becomes clear
that this is the type of man she wants, not only to
"replace" Tom but also to provide financially for
herself and Laura. But as we will see in a moment, Jim
O'Connor, as Rodger Stein points out, represents an
inversion of "democratic values" (142). Because he
desires to use "knowledge to gain power and money,"
O'Connor is an "apologist" for the economic system that
has imprisoned the Wingfields (Stein 142).
When Tom tells his mother that O'Connor is a
shipping clerk, Amanda says, "Sounds like a fairly
responsible job, the sort of job you would be in if you
just had more get-up" (GM 63). Amanda also asks about
his salary and is pleased to learn that he earns
"approximently eight-five dollars a month" (GM 63). What
really pleases her, however, is when she discovers that
O'Connor is the "type that's up and coming" and that "he
goes in for self-improvement" (GM 64); this is
"splendid" news to her:
Then he has visions of being advanced in the world!
Any young man who studies public speaking is aiming 
to have an executive job some day! And radio
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engineering? A thing for the future! Both of these
facts are very illuminating" (GM 65).
In contrast to her son, the gentleman caller has the 
"get-up" needed to advance in the corporate world. Like 
Willy Loman, O'Connor possesses the desire of the other, 
the instrumentalized reason of the publicity apparatus; 
he too is programmed to fit the body of American 
capital. He is the hero of the Algerian romance; he 
desires upward mobility, and he is preparing for this 
expected eventuality by going to night school. What 
appears in his "character'1 to be subjectivity (free 
will, the desire to better himself) is actually external 
knowledge, the goals of every other that have been 
determined by the other. Jim O'Connor is not unique.
Like Willy Loman, he is a "desiring machine" created by 
the culture industry to fit the needs of the apparatus.
As a "type" he is necessary, but he does not necessarily 
have to be successful; he can desire success as long as 
he works and consumes, as long as he is not a "crank" or 
a "cripple," as long as he avoids the "sin" of 
inefficiency.
Jim O'Connor's conformity, however, has not brought 
him success. Tom tells us that after moving in a 
"continual spotlight" in high school, O'Connor's rise 
has slowed: "He was shooting with such velocity through 
his adolescence that you would logically expect him to 
arrive at nothing short of the White House by the time
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he was thirty. But Jim apparently ran into more 
interference after his graduation....His speed had 
definitely slowed. Six years after he left high school 
he was holding a job that wasn't much better than mine”
(GM 68). His "uniqueness" or "celebrity" achieved in 
high school disappears as he enters the regulated 
structure of the corporation; he becomes like all men.
In fact, Tom suggests that he is useful to O'Connor 
merely because he can "remember his former glory" (GM 
68). In order to resume his rise, O'Connor embraces the 
normative model of masculinity, the national identity, 
the masculine unconscious. His decisive non-decision to 
be unique (i.e. successful) represents an absolute 
conformity to the apparatus; his desire for autonomy is 
really its opposite. As Horkheimer and Adorno note, "The 
perfect similarity is the absolute difference....Now any 
person signifies only those attributes by which he can 
replace everybody else: he is interchangeable, a copy.
As an individual he is completely expendable and utterly 
insignificant" (145-46).
Williams calls attention to Jim O'Connor's 
instrumentality on the first page of the play, where he 
describes Jim as "A nice, ordinary, young man" (GM 5). 
"[N]ice," "ordinary," and "young" are the only qualities 
Williams assigns the character. What calls even more 
attention to his description of Jim is that Williams
uses at least three sentences to describe the other 
characters. Jim gets only five words. My dictionary 
gives nine definitions of nice, four of which apply 
here: ’’Pleasing and agreeable in nature; enjoyable”; 
"Having a pleasant or attractive appearance"; "Courteous 
and polite; considerate"; "Of good character and 
reputation (American Heritage 840-41). Jim could 
certainly be described as "pleasing and agreeable," 
"pleasant" and "attractive," and "courteous." In fact, 
he's a stereotypical "nice guy." That is, he conforms to 
the dominant model of middle-class behavior: He's white, 
heterosexual, optimistic, hardworking; he's the high 
school hero that Laura worships; he's the the gentleman 
caller that Amanda worships. In his banality, he's 
indistinguishable from the matinee idol that embodies 
what Williams calls "our national myth, the cornerstone 
of the film industry if not Democracy itself," the 
"Cinderella story": "Anyone with such beautiful teeth 
and hair as the screen protagonist of such a story was 
bound to have a good time one way or another, and you 
could bet your bottom dollar and all the tea in China 
that that one would not be caught dead or alive at any 
meeting involving a social conscience" (GM 11). He has 
the commodified appearance that the publicity apparatus 
engenders, but like the products he resembles, he is all 
surface; he lacks depth. He resembles all the others; he
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is the normative, universal model that has reduced 
difference to repetition.
Jim O'Connor is also "ordinary": "Commonly 
encountered; usual"; "Of no exceptional degree or 
quality; average" (American Heritage 875). In this, he 
represents the standardization of American culture and 
masculinity that Harper was a precursor of in The Last 
of My Solid Gold Watches and that Stanley Kowalski 
represents in Streetcar. In Williams' view, he lacks 
imagination. He also represents the concept of 
instrumental reason as described by the Frankfurt 
School: "His yardstick is self-preservation, successful 
or unsuccessful approximation to the objectivity of his 
function and the model established for it" (Horkheimer 
and Adorno 28). Jim O'Connor, like Willy Loman, speaks 
as the other, and this voice is most apparent in his 
contact with Laura Wingfield.
Laura, as readers will remember, is crippled, and 
because of this, she is "terribly shy"; she is so shy, 
in fact, that Amanda is unable to assimilate her into 
the dominant modes of the apparatus. Laura is unable to 
conform to the codes of Rubicam's Business College. As 
her mother sarcastically says, "We won't have a business 
career— we've given that up because it gave us nervous 
indigestion!" (GM 34). The name "Rubicam" is an allusion 
to Raymond Rubicam, owner of, at the time, the nation's
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most famous and powerful advertising agency, Young and
Rubicam, which helped to develop the now hegemonic
practices of the advertising industry.12 Williams uses
the name to figure the kind of machinery that was
deployed to insure conformity. Just as ad agencies view
individuals as statistics to be manipulated, so too the
Rubicam Business College reduces Laura to the abstract
by employing a universal training method. The individual
matters to the other only because he or she is able to
become (to act, to perform) like every other. Unable to
conform, Laura spends her days on the margins of the
culture she cannot join:
I went to the art museum and the bird houses at the 
Zoo. I visited the penguins every dayI Sometimes I 
did without lunch and went to the movies. Lately 
I've been spending most of my afternoons in the 
Jewel Box, that big glass house where they raise the 
tropical flowers. (GM 33)
Laura's problem— her inability to standardize herself—
only arouses feelings of frustration in her
mother/manager, whose solution is to marry Laura off to
a "normal" man. Laura is apprehended by her
administrator as a problem; she is at odds with the
logic of the system and therefore must be reintegrated.
Amanda believes, as the song goes, that "love is the
answer," or at least romance and marriage.
12 See Marchand 33.
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The gentleman caller, however, does not bring the 
"longed for" success. He is, as Tom Wingfield says, "an 
emissary from a world of reality" (GM 23), and as a 
"real" man, O'Connor is a target in much the same way as 
"real men" are targets for the gay community in the film 
Paris Is Burning. His masculinity is "staged" from/by a 
marginal position in order to expose its limits and 
reveal it as socially constructed; it is not natural or 
transhistorical. In fact, as we will see in a moment, 
the hegemonic masculinity represented by O'Connor is a 
threat.
Nancy Tischler argues that "Jim is not an especially 
effective character study because Williams can feel 
little sympathy with such a substantial and placid 
citizen" (37). "Yet," she claims, "he is a kindly 
reminder of the reasonable, normal human pattern, like 
the men Williams had met at the shoe factory--clean- 
living, honest, sweet-natured, materialistic, eager 
American businessman" (37) . I would argue that Jim is 
ineffectual rather than ineffective since he does not 
produce the intended effect, at least in Amanda's mind.
To call him ineffective as a character study, however, 
is to miss Williams' point. That is, his placidness is 
meant to convey a banality which appears to be kindly or 
reasonable but, in actuality, represents the 
repressiveness of instrumental reason. In other words,
Williams desired the type of masculinity that Jim 
represents because as its absolute other— artist and 
homosexual— he was constantly comparing himself to it 
and measuring himself against it. Jim performs a 
normative masculinity that is essential to the 
operations of American culture. Williams does not, 
again, find his type either "kindly" or "reasonable,11 
and to make this judgement is to misread the play, for 
although he may appear to to be, Jim is neither 
reasonable nor kindly. The text of the play suggests the 
opposite. It is also important to note here that the 
conflict between Tom (Wingfield and Williams) and Jim is 
a precursor to a more brutal relationship; the conflict 
between artistic being, or what Fromm calls 
"spontaneous" being, which Tom and Laura represent, and 
instrumental being, which Jim represents, is compressed 
and intensified in Streetcar in the conflict between 
Blanche DuBois and Stanley Kowalski.
O'Connor's banality is what makes him a threat. His 
banality is also what causes many critics to overlook 
him, to dismiss him. His pursuit of happiness, his 
desire for success, his "clean-living, honest, sweet- 
natured, materialistic," American-businessman eagerness 
is perceived as the "normal human pattern." Like Willy 
Loman, he is not a great man; he is not a king; he is 
not in the papers, but like millions of others he
desires to be other than he is. His "archetype" is so 
ingrained in the American grain as to be natural. He is, 
as E. E. Cummings wrote, simultaneously "a yearning 
nation's blueeyed pride" and a "blueeyed monster." To 
underestimate Jim is to see him as inevitable, as comic, 
as a "stumblejohn" (from a superior position, of 
course), and not as socially constructed and therefore 
resistable. This misrecognition of the 
instrumentalization of masculinity leads to a fatal 
error, for as a type, as a domiant cultural tendency, he 
is the uber mensch. As Jim says in 1945, "I'm Superman!" 
(GM 88). And we would be foolish to ignore Williams' 
implicit warning: "Look how big my shadow is when I 
stretchl" (GM IQ2).
Jim claims to be Superman after Amanda asks him if 
he can carry a candelabrum and a glass of wine. Read in 
the context of American popular culture, Jim's remark 
is, of course, an allusion to Superman the comic book 
hero, who was first introduced by Action Comics in 1938. 
Read in a larger historical context, however, the remark 
is used to remind theatergoers and readers— then and 
now— of Hitler's Final Solution and the men who 
attempted to carry it out. The two readings might at 
first appear to be contradictory, but they are not. That 
is, Superman the comic book character was a response to 
Nazi Germany; he was a freedom-fighter who represented
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"Truth, Justice, and the American way." He was the enemy 
of the Third Reich; he was the enemy of the uber mensch.
But he was also like Hitler's superman in that his 
freedom or autonomy expressed itself as a nationalistic 
chauvinism or conformity. Although ostensibly less 
brutal than Hitler's forces, he was still an instrument.
He was a weapon, and as a weapon he was totally 
subordinate to the United States government, just as as 
a reporter— as "mild-mannered Clark Kent"— he was 
totally subordiate to the apparatus of The Daily Planet. 
Like European fascists, he is controlled by the other—  
just as is Jim O'Connor.
O'Connor's otherness represents itself as 
(instrumental) reason programmed by the publicity 
apparatus, as an absolute conformity that sees itself as 
difference. Indeed, like Willy Loman, he is defined by 
serial alterity, which keeps him isolated from others 
and aliented from himself. "In the series," argues 
Sartre, "everyone becomes himself (as Other than self) 
in so far as he is other than the Others, and so, in so 
far as the Others are other than him" (262). The 
consequence of this alterity, as Sartre points out, is 
that individuals are different from each other only 
because they are the same. Alterity is both a link 
between individuals and, as such, a "paradoxical 
structure": "the Other has his essence in all the
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Others, in so far as he differs from them (263). Jim's
desire to be successful is like the desire of all
others, and this is how he becomes a "somebody," how he
defines his "uniqueness":
Why, man alive, Laura! Just look about you a little. 
What do you see? A world full of common people! All 
of 'em born and all of 'em going to die. Which of 
them has one-tenth of your good points! Or mine! Or 
anyone else's, as far as that goes— gosh! Everbody 
excels in some one thing. (GM 99)
The essence of his masculinity, which he has in common
with all others, is what makes him special. Horkheimer
and Adorno call this "pseudo individuality":
"individuals have ceased to be themselves and are now
merely centers where the general tendencies meet" (155).
He speaks the voice of the apparatus; he is not
conscious of the self. In fact, he wishes to eliminate
the self. Jim tells Laura, for example, that she
shouldn't be so "self-conscious" (GM 93), that her
difference can be extirpated by self-alienation. Jim is
only conscious of the other, and he desires that others
conform. Any difference is an obstacle to be "overcome."
His advice to Laura is an expression of his conformity,
of his rationalization and the standardization of
consciousness that Horkheimer and Adorno theorize in
Dialectic of Enlightenment.
The voice that speaks through Jim is the voice of
the publicity apparatus. That "as a devoted student of
the science of self-improvement," as Delma Presley
commennts, "Jim's attitude perfectly matches [Dale]
Carnegie's view of the ideal man, as outlined in How to
Win Friends and Influence People, a best-seller since
1936" (60) . In his book, Carnegie stressed that "the man
who has technical knowledge plus the ability to express
his ideas, to assume leadership, and to arouse
enthusiasm among men— that man is headed for higher
earning power" (qtd. in Presley 60). Jim advises Laura
as the other has advised him: he tells Laura that she
"low-rates" herself, that she has an "inferiority
complex": "Yep— that's what I judge to be your principal
trouble. A lack of confidence in yourself as a person.
You don't have the proper amount of faith in yourself"
[GM 99). He "understands" her "case" because he has
experienced the same problem, "until I took up public
speaking, developed my voice, and learned that I had an
aptitide for science" (GM 99). Jim has conformed to the
model of the publicity apparatus. He has also discovered
the "one thing" at which he "excels":
Jim:....My interest happens to lie in electro­
dynamics. I'm taking a course in radio engineering 
at night school.... Because I believe in the future 
of television...I wish to be ready to go right up
along with it. Therefore I'm planning to get in on
the ground floor. In fact I've already made the 
right connections and all that remains is for the 
industry itself to get under way! Full steam— (His 
eyes are starry.) Knowledge— Zzzzzp! Money—
Zzzzzzp!— Power! That's the cycle democracy is built 
on! (GM 99-100; italics removed)
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Others, of course, also believe in the future of
television, and they will be ready "to get in on the
ground floor." They may also have made "the right
connections." They may even have the same blind faith in
"democracy," which the apparatus has transformed into
knowledge, money, and power. Commenting on these lines,
James Reynolds notes that "'Knowledge' means inventing
new technologies and capitalizing on their financial
success, which in turn gives the system power over those
without technology" (525). That is, those who control
the system have power over those who are dependent on
the technology of the apparatus. This power is mystified
by the publicity apparatus in the form of the ideology
of progress, or what Williams calls the "Century of
Progress" after the Chicago Exposition of 1893 (GM 90).
The ideology of progress represents what Raymond
Williams calls "technological determinism," which, he
writes, "is an immensely powerful and now largely
orthodox view of the nature of social change"
(Television 13). According to Williams,
New technologies are discovered, by an essentially 
internal process of research and development, which 
then sets the conditions for social change and 
progress. Progress, in particular, is the history of 
these inventions, which 'created the modern world.'
The effects of the technologies, whether direct or 
indirect, foreseen or unforeseen, are as it were the 
rest of history. The steam engine, the automobile, 
television, the atomic bomb, have made modern man 
and the modern condition. (Television 13; italics 
removed)
The "rest of history" is further mystified by the
"levelling" process of the publicity apparatus, which
further marginalizes the effects of technology by
reducing knowledge about these processes to exchange
value. In this popular narrative, "Wrigley," "Franklin,"
and "Edison" blend together with "light bulbs," "Mazda
lamps," "victrolas," and "chewing gum" to produce
knowledge with no use value; these bits of information
become things a person might know, a universal cultural
capital that can be exchanged for recognition or status.
Most often, however, this type of knowledge (what E. D.
Hirsch calls "background information" or "cultural
literacy") is used to control social relations by making
language (and reason) heteronomous. That is, like
advertising, "the important individual points, by
becoming detachable, interchangeable, and even
technically alienated from any connected meaning, lend
themselves to ends external to the work" (Horkheimer and
Adorno 163). This transformation from usable knowledge
to publicity creates dependency rather than freedom. As
Amanda says when the lights in her apartment go out,
Isn't electricity a mysterious thing? Wasn't it Ben 
Franklin who tied a key to a kite? We live in such a 
mysterious universe, don't we. Some people say that 
science clears up all the mysteries for us. In my 
opinion it only creates more! (GM 86)
Amanda, like Jim and Willy Loman, can name Ben Franklin
as the "discoverer" of electricity and "Mr. Edison" as
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the inventor of the "Mazda lamp," but she (and they) 
cannot see "the rest of history." Knowledge has become 
exchange value: universal bits of information that 
marginalize the real processes of technology and 
history. "Distant from both the practical and 
theoretical elements of technology," Reynolds suggests, 
"[Amanda] is made its servant" (524). Science has not 
brought progress, just technology and profit for those 
who control technology, whose history, as Raymond 
Williams argues, is based on the "assumption" of 
progress (Television 14).
As the "emissary" of progress, Jim O'Connor is 
manufactured to serve the apparatus. He is a product and 
a (re)producer. His desire is to remake Laura (and Tom) 
in his own image; this desire produces the central 
conflict of the play, which is "resolved" only when 
Laura's unicorn is castrated and Tom runs off to Mexico.
As an artifact, the unicorn represents the antithesis of 
Jim's instrumentation. On one level, it symbolizes the 
hand-made craft of mercantile capital (like Willy 
Loman's father's flute). More important for Williams the 
artist, however, is that the unicorn symbolizes the 
position of the art object (and therefore the artist) in 
an increasingly mechanized world; it is the opposite of 
the mass-produced shoes, gum, and newspaper sports 
heroes that are identified with Jim O'Connor. As Fredric
Jameson argues in Postmodernism. "Modern art...drew its 
power and its possibilities from a backwater and an 
archaic holdover within a modernizing economy: it 
glorified, celebrated, and dramatized older forms of 
individual production which the new mode of production 
was elsewhere on the point of displacing and blotting 
out. Aesthetic production then offered the Utopian 
vision of a more human production generally; and in the 
world of the monopoly stage of capitalism it exercised a 
fascination by way of the image it offered of a Utopian 
transformation of human life" (307). Laura's collision 
with Jim is a displacing or blotting out of older forms 
that do not fit the dictates of the new economy. The 
unicorn must become "like all the other horses" because, 
as Jim says, "Unicorns— aren't they extinct in the 
modern world?" (GM 104, 101). Laura's renunciation of 
her difference is complete with the breaking of the 
horn. Although Jim "was the cause," Laura will "just 
imagine he had an operation. The horn was removed to 
make him feel less— freakish....Now he will feel more at 
home with the other horses, the ones that don't have any 
horns" (GM 104). Ultimately, Laura cannot conform to the 
values of either business or marriage, so she renounces 
the real world in favor of the couch, where she plays 
with her menagerie and listens to records. The 
"operation" that breaks the unicorn's horn, as Thomas
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Scheye comments, "takes on nightmare proportions" when 
we remember that Williams' sister Rose, on whom Laura 
Wingfield's character is based, had a prefrontal 
labotomy in order to make her less "freakish" (211).13
Jim O'Connor also attempts to teach Tom how to "fit 
in," but their collision is less violent. In the end,
Tom does not renounce the "real world" like his sister, 
nor does he intergrate like his mother; he is in flight. 
Like Jameson's utopian modernist, Tom attempts to escape 
the world of late-capitalism by engaging in a form of 
artistic production that Jameson calls "the aesthetic of 
sheer autonomy, as the satisfactions of handicraft 
transfigured" (Postmodernism 307). Tom resists the 
Taylorization of labor and consciousness by closeting 
himself "in a cabinet of the washroom to work on poems"
(GM 68). Tom tells us his "secret practice" made "the 
other boys in the warehouse [regard] me with suspicious 
hostility" (GM 68). "Jim," however, "took a humorous 
attitude toward me" and "Gradually his attitude affected 
the others, their hostility wore off and they also began 
to smile at me as people smile at an oddly fashioned dog 
who trots across their path at some distance" (GM 68-9).
Jim's patronage (and patronizing) of Tom is an 
effort to win Tom's confidence in order to teach him to 
conform to the routine of work and the ideology of self­
13 For an account of the tragedy see Spoto 59-61.
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improvement. In the process, Williams reveals Jim as
"suspicious” by demonstrating that his pedagogy is a
hoax. When Jim warns Tom that "You're going to be out of
a job if you don't wake up" (GM 78), Tom tells him that
he has already awakened: "I'm planning to change [Tom
has joined the Merchant Marine}," he says, which
confounds Jim because he can see "no signs" of Tom's
transformation. Jim cannot recognize the signs since, as
Tom teases, "The signs are interior" (GM 78). In fact,
Jim can only recognize the superficial, the standard
gestures and motivations that permeate his culture and
which appear as self-replicating, mass-produced models.
In his advise to Tom, Jim's speaks as the standard
gestures and motivations of the apparatus:
Jim: You know, Shakespeare— I'm going to sell you a 
bill of goods!
Tom: What goods?
Jim: A course I'm taking.
Tom: Huh?
Jim: In public speaking! You and me, we're not the 
warehouse type.
Tom: Thanks— that's good news. But what has public 
speaking got to do with it?
Jim: It fits you for— executive positions!
Tom: Awww.
Jim: I tell you it's done a helluva lot for me.
Tom: In what respect?
Jim: In every! Ask yourself what is the difference 
between you an' me and men in the office down front? 
Brains?— No!— Ability?— No! Then what? Just one 
little thing—
Tom: What is that one little thing?
Jim: Primarily it amounts to— social poise! Being
able to square up to people and hold your own on any
social level! (GM 77).
Tom understands in advance that Jim is selling him "a 
bill of goods." Jim "ordinariness," however, prevents 
him from seeing "his" advice as collusion or self- 
deception because, as Andrea Dworkin writes about 
Stanley Kowalski, he is "untouched by the meaning of any 
experience because he has no interior life, he is 
invulnerable to consequences, he has no memory past 
sensation. He is ordinary" (41). Jim's language further 
indicts "self-making when he describes his night course 
as "fitting" him for executive positions— that is, he is 
being shaped by the other to conform, just as are the 
others in his class. Williams makes it clear that Jim is 
participating in his own deception because his public 
speaking has done nothing for him; he has gone nowhere 
in the six years after graduating from high school, and 
Williams gives us every indication that this pattern of 
moving without moving will continue. Jim will continue 
to be deceived by his desire, and like Willy Loman, he 
will continue to believe in his autonomy at the same 
time he is exploited by the apparatus.
Williams also undermines the ideology of self- 
improvement by showing that ability and hard work are 
not rewarded, but rather the artificial, interchangeable 
practices of late-capitalism. It is more important for 
Jim to "make the right connections" (he can imagine 
people only as "social contacts") and manipulate social
appearances (i.e. have "social poise") than it is for 
him to have "brains" or "ability." It is more important 
for him to conform to the mass-produced values of the 
other. In this practice, he resembles not the valorized 
autonomous male of the American Culture Industry, but 
rather the standardized mode that the same apparatus 
produces. As Horkheimer and Adorno argued, "On the faces 
of private individuals and movie heroes put together 
according to the patterns on magazine covers vanishes a 
pretense in which no one now believes; the popularity of 
the hero models comes partly from a secret satisfaction 
that the effort to achieve individuation has at last 
been replaced by the effort to imitate, which is 
admittedly more breathless" (156). Jim O'Connor is 
breathless in his imitation, not only because he desires 
the "excitement" the perfect copy brings, but also 
because desiring machines too are without breath, dead, 
corpse-like. In respect to the latter, Jim O'Connor does 
not subvert the practices of democracy by using "his" 
knowledge to gain money and power; he is rather the 
perfect copy of a citizen; he is what the apparatus 
desires. He uses his knowledge to exploit himself and 
others.
Delma Presley is correct when she sees a 
correspondence between Jim O'Connor and David Riesman's 
"other-directed man": "Jim splendidly represents
Riesman's other-directed man who operates as though he 
were controlled by radar, constantly sending out signals 
and adjusting his movement to conform to his 
environment" (57). Presley also argues that Tom rejects 
"other direction" "in favor of engaging in a quest for 
adventure" (57). According to Presley, "[Tom] generally 
fits the 'new' type of personality Riesman sees on the 
horizon, the autonomous man....He obtains sustenance 
from the inner-directed pattern of existence. He has an 
internal guidance system...and he does not constantly 
adjust his behavior to fit the expectations of his known 
and unknown peers (57-8). While Presley's 
characterization of Tom's autonomy may ring true for 
some readers, I believe her reading is too optimistic. 
His autonomy, or freedom, is always limited because he 
is in flight from the values of the other. As Horkheimer 
and Adorno put it, "Every bourgeois characteristic, in 
spite of its deviation and indeed because of it, 
expressed the same thing: the harshness of the 
competitive society" (155). As a non-supporter, Tom too 
bears a disfiguring mark, a mark that makes him 
suspicious to his co-workers and his mother, or freakish 
like Laura's unicorn. As an artist, the closeted poet, 
he desires Jameson's utopian transformation of the 
economic and social forces that control his life, yet 
his flight from these forces embodies what Peter Burger
sees as the central contradiction of modernist art: the 
"autonomy aesthetic...contains a definition of the 
function of art: it is conceived as a social realm that 
is set apart from the means-ends rationality of daily 
bourgeois existence" (10) . At the same time, however, 
because of the rationalization of the social under late 
capital, "Only in the isolated form of monad-like works 
of art can truth still be spoken about this society.
This is the function of art that Adorno [refers] to as 
'functionlessness' because it can no longer be hoped 
that art will provoke change" (11). By being 
"functionless," Tom's writing of poetry on company time 
is a protest against "what is"; however, his secret act 
also affirms "reality" by offering only compensation for 
repressive social conditions. In this respect, Tom's 
seclusion in the bathroom is analogous to the atomistic 
moments of consumption witnessed throughout the play: 
Amanda's reading of romances, Jim's reading of the 
sports page, Laura's listening to records, and Tom's 
viewing of movies.
The standardization of the economy also turns social 
relations into relations of production. As Tom says 
about his job, "The warehouse is where I work, not where 
I know things about people! (GM 113). Workers move as 
isolated units suspicious of any part that does not 
conform to the gestures or values of the apparatus. As
Tennessee Williams observes in the "Production Notes" to 
The Glass Menagerie, modernization has not brought 
progress because technology has not been used to 
liberate men and women: "We should do more for ourselves 
or let the machines do for us, the glorious technology 
that is supposed to be the light of the new world. We 
are like a man who has brought a great amount of 
equipment for a camping trip...but who now, when all the 
preparations and the provisions are piled expertly 
together, is suddenly too timid to set out on the 
journey but remains where he was yesterday and the day 
before and the day before that, looking suspiciously 
through white lace curtains at the clear sky he 
distrusts. Our great technology is a God-given chance 
for adventure and for progress which we are afraid to 
attempt" (GM 15). To underscore this point in The Glass 
Menagerie— that technology has not been used to 
liberate, to light the new world— Williams borrows the 
central image from Picasso's Guernica.
At the top center of the painting, there is a light 
bulb, complete with filiment, enclosed in a disk-shaped 
form that illuminates the chaos and death of the 
bombing. Picasso, in my reading, does not use the 
electric light to symbolize hope or "enlightenment," as 
some have suggested. On the contrary, it seems to me he 
uses the image of the light bulb for the opposite
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reason— to express his profound doubts about the way 
technology has been used to destroy human life. In the 
painting, the light merely illuminates the slaughter of 
the bombardment; it is part of the narrative of progress 
that has promised salvation but, in fact, has brought 
destruction and death. The light is like the light of 
the bombs; it produces illumination but not 
understanding; it hangs suspended above the scene and 
appears as if by magic. Yet like the "celotex" lights 
that illuminate the warehouse where Tom Wingfield works, 
which he finds so oppressive, Picasso's light only 
illuminates brutality and in turn mystifies the values 
that structure social relations— "knowledge," "money," 
"power." The oppressiveness of the celotex light is 
Williams' deliberate borrowing and transformation of 
Picasso's image, as is his use of the light imagery 
throughout the play. In their dominant form, these 
images represent an ideology at odds with what Williams 
sees as his more humanistic values. As James Reynolds 
argues, "Those without access to the real power of 
technology are limited as mere users unable to 
understand and control it. They remain outside the 
sphere created by larger cultural forces that place 
technology not as the servant of humanity but as a 
venture for capital investment, nationalistic rivalries, 
and costly toys" (526). Those unable to sustain,
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purchase, or represent the instrumental values of 
technological progress, as Lee Iacocca says in a recent 
commercial, had better "get out of the way."
Nowhere is Williams more critical of these values 
than in the final lines of the play. Here the assumption 
of progress that informs our cultural institutions— * 
education, the media, science, and industry— is 
deconstructed in a gesture which fuses individual and 
international history, his sister's lobotomy and the 
bombardments of World War II. The lightning of Ben 
Franklin's discovery and the light of Thomas Edison's 
mazda lamp are turned into the bombardments of the 
Second World War, for, as Tom says, "nowadays the world 
is lit by lightning" (GM 115). At the same time, Laura's 
light is blown out: "Blow out your candles, Laura— and 
so goodbye" (GM 115). Williams' sister Rose, of course, 
did not blow out her candles; she was the victim of a 
technological experiment, just as were the citizens of 
Guernica. For Williams, both events are symptomatic of a 
historical crisis in which technology was increasingly 
being used to subdue or destroy human beings who did not 
conform to the dominant values, whether those values 
were American or Nazi. Both systems demand that subjects 
conform to the whole; any resistance is suspicious. In 
an American context, the dominant masculine model— with 
its attendant ideologies of self-improvement and
mobility— is used to fit individuals to the corporate 
whole, reducing men to the role of instruments who are 
exploited by those above them for profit. In reality, 
the desire to be unique or successful is, as Williams 
points out, the desire to be "ordinary"; it is the 
desire of every other. Men are only valuable, then, when 
they become like the "cellular living-units" in which 
the Wingfield family lives, which in 1945 Williams saw 
as "symptomatic" of the "lower middle-class": "to avoid 
fluidity and differentiation and to exist and function 
as one interfused mass of automatism" (GM 21). In the 
meantime, the "impulse" of this class has become the 
impulse of every other since the apparatus has 
penetrated, every sphere of social life. Men today are, 
more than ever, valuable to others (and to themselves) 
only when they conform to the dictates of the machine, 
only when they tacitly adjust themselves to fit what is. 
Tennessee Williams' construction of Jim O'Connor (and 
later Stanley Kowalski) was prophetic. In a recent essay 
on Poland's conversion to a "free market" economy, for 
example, Lawrence Weschler reports that the most coveted 
men in Poland are the old party "nomenklatura." These 
career bureaucrats are valued by Western companies 
because they fit; the "skills" they learned in the 
Communist bureaucracy have given them the ability to 
conform to a Western corporate model. No one, Weschler




Willy Loman as Desiring Machine
Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman (1949) conveys 
its critique of American capital in a far more complex 
and subtle manner than critics have thus far recognized. 
Most criticism of the play, as Sheila Huftel points out, 
is "governed by the need...to know and understand Willy 
Loman" (103). Unfortunately, much of the energy expended 
to understand Willy has been too narrowly focused on 
analyzing the individuated character traits of the 
protagonist and the attendant issue of tragic stature. 
The problem with these arguments is that they assume 
Willy has a character, that he is an autonomous subject. 
The play, in fact, suggests just the opposite— that 
Willy is not autonomous, self-generated, or self-made 
(even in "failure"), but that he is completely other to 
himself; he is more puppet than person, more machine 
than man, and as such he announces the death, or 
disappearance, of the subject, the death of the tragic 
hero, and the birth of "the desiring machine."
Most critics recognize that Arthur Miller intends 
Willy Loman as a victim of "society." But Willy's 
construction as a victim is interpreted within the 
parameters of a self-generated individual and is used as 
the main reason conservative critics deny Salesman
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tragic status. As a victim, the argument runs, Willy has 
no understanding of his situation; he is, in the words 
of Dan Vogel, "too commonplace and limited" (91). Unlike 
Oedipus or Hamlet or Lear, Willy is incapable of self- 
knowledge and is therefore not heroic but pathetic; "he 
cannot summon the intelligence and strength to 
scrutinize his situation and come to some understanding 
of it," writes Irving Jacobson (247). Even liberal 
critics like Thomas Adler and Ruby Cohn, who are 
generally sympathetic towards Willy, judge him harshly; 
in their estimation he is either incompetent because "he 
is the victim of himself and his choices," or he is a 
failure because he "has achieved neither popularity nor 
success as a salesman, and has failed as a gardener, 
carpenter, and father" (Adler 102; Cohn 44). Even as 
astute a critic as Thomas Porter finds fault with 
Willy's "character" when he argues that "the 
Salesman...has accepted an ideal shaped for him and 
pressed on him by forces in his culture" (24) . Willy's 
problem (or part of his problem), then, according to 
these critics, is that he accepts his fate; he does not 
possess the vision, volition, capacity, strength, 
knowledge, pluck to fight against the cultural forces 
that shape his life.
The underlying assumption of these arguments is that 
Willy can change his life— with a little hard work,
perhaps— but that he will not. Behind these arguments is 
a model, what I call the national subject and/or the 
masculine unconscious: the autonomous, active male 
subject. The subject that determines itself, that makes 
itself, the liberal subject, the rugged individual, the 
exceptional American. Whatever linguistic sign the 
masculine unconscious uses to communicate itself, it is 
wholly other to the subject since it is "enjoined" on 
the subject by the publicity apparatus of late- 
capitalism. Miller calls this other the "law of 
success": "The confusion of some critics viewing Death 
of a Salesman...is that they do not see that Willy Loman 
has broken a law without whose protection life is 
unsupportable if not incomprehensible to him and to many 
others; it is a law which says a failure in society and 
in business has no right to live. Unlike the law against 
incest, the law of success is not administered by 
statute or church, but it is very nearly as powerful in 
its grip upon men" (Collected Plays 35; hereafter CP).
In Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno identify the "law of success" as an 
effect of the "technological rationale" which dominates 
the cultural and economic institutions of modern 
industrial nations: "Through the countless agencies of 
mass production and its culture the conventionalized 
modes of behavior are impressed upon the individual as
the only natural, respectable, and rational ones. He 
defines himself as a thing, as a static element, as 
success or failure" (28). That is, under what Horkheimer 
and Adorno call late capitalism, individual behavior is 
reduced to a series of "protocols" or stereotypical 
responses found on the job, on the radio, in the movies, 
and in the then emerging television industry. For 
Adorno, these standardized models of behavior signaled 
the end of the liberal subject since "motivation in the 
old, liberal sense" was being appropriated and 
"systematically controlled and absorbed by social 
mechanism which are directed from above" ("Freudian 
Theory" 136). In other words, the subject's desire for 
success (e.g. for material wealth, to "get ahead"), 
which the subject believes is self-generated, is, in 
fact, his identification with the rationale of the 
apparatus, which has programmed individual consumption 
as spontaneous thought or reason or the assertion of 
individual will.
Viewed in light of Horkheimer and Adorno's 
discovery, the operations of Willy Loman's mind reflect 
this change in subjectivity. Specifically, Willy assumes 
that his desire is spontaneous, when in fact, as Miller 
suggests in Timebends (1987), it has been "hammered into 
its strange shape by society, the business life Willy 
had lived and believed in" (182). Willy's desire does
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not make him autonomous; it makes him "common" since 
that desire is what motivates all the men in the play 
and indeed most men in our culture. In constructing 
Willy, Miller exposes the liberal subject as a fiction, 
as part of a structure of value that is an effect of the 
economy. To dismiss Willy as "pathetic" because he does 
not have the strength of character to understand his 
situation or because he has made the wrong choices is to 
recode the play according to the protocols of the 
apparatus (i.e. a man is either a success or he is a 
failure). Willy chooses nothing; he merely follows a 
blueprint. Like a machine, he operates according to 
plan. The publicity apparatus tells Willy that if he 
works hard like "Edison," that if he persevers like 
"Goodrich," that if he is "well-liked" like Dave 
Singleman, then he will rise like Charley and become 
rich and powerful like "J.P Morgan." The blueprint also 
tells Willy that if he does not become "a success," that 
if he does not become like a "Gene Tunney" or a "Red 
Grange," then he is a failure— and that this is his 
fault. Willy's question to Ben and to Bernard— "What's 
the secret?"— is therefore by design. Willy cannot see 
that there is no secret— that success or status is 
largely determined by extrinsic factors.1
1 Willy's question also signals the breakdown of 
the machine. The machine has started to malfunction; it 
can no longer perform its labor because it drives off
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In more recent remarks made in his autobiography, 
Timebends (1987), Miller has also made it clear that 
Willy Loman was intended to challenge the expansion of 
American capital after World War II: "there was the 
smell in the air of a new American Empire in the making, 
if only because, as I had witnessed, Europe was dying or 
dead, and I wanted to set before the new captains and 
the so smugly confident kings the corpse of a believer" 
(184). He hoped that the play would be a time bomb 
"under the bullshit of capitalism, this pseudo life that 
thought to touch the clouds by standing on top of a 
refrigerator, waving a paid-up mortgage at the moon, 
victorious at last" (Timebends 184). In other words,
Miller sought to counter the agenda of the new American 
Empire by exposing the citizen (read: obedient consumer) 
as a fraud or a corpse. Before examining how Miller 
accomplishes this subversion, however, it is first 
necessary to contextualize the play in terms of the 
cultural forces that Miller was attempting to resist.
The consolidation and expansion of American business 
and the state that took place during and after World War 
II produced a cultural transformation that signaled the
roads and talks to itself in the backyard. It is "tired 
to death" (CP 131), and it has started to ask questions 
it was not designed to ask. In fact, the machine is 
becoming self-conscious, becoming aware of its self­
alienation. But the machine is designed too well— it 
will, according to plan, seek its own repression.
beginning of the Cold War. The economic policy of the 
United States government during the war, George Lipsitz 
points out, "permanently altered economic and political 
power relations within American society, and produced a 
totalitarian oligarchy of the major interest groups," so 
much so that the "elite that emerged from the war held 
unprecedented control over government and the 
economy....[and] unprecedented control over the lives of 
ordinary citizens" (Class 2).2 At the same time that 
political and economic power became increasingly 
concentrated, industry and the government acted to 
regulate the economy by keeping levels of consumption at 
(high) wartime levels, since they believed this spending 
would cause the economy to expand. The rebuilding of 
Europe and Japan was an effort to gain control of 
foreign markets that the United States had supplied 
during the war. The Marshall Plan became the focal point 
of the "Truman Doctrine," which asserted a "vital 
connection between foreign policy and domestic well 
being": "Truman identified American interests as 
contingent upon three connected principles: world 
stability, expanding markets, and the defense of 
freedom. In practice, the three principles collapsed
2 For a detailed discussion of this process see 
Lipsitz (Class and Culture) 1-12, 135-42. See also C. W. 
Mills 3-54. For a related discussion see Diggins 54-94, 
177-219.
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into one, as stability came to mean security for 
American business and the measure of freedom became the 
extent of Western-style 'free' enterprise in any given 
country” (Lipsitz Class 136).
The market for consumer goods and services at home 
was also reconfigured— that is, labor markets were 
recategorized, and the practices of saving and community 
that developed and evolved during the Depression and the 
war were reconverted into spending and individualism.
The nuclear family emerged as the locus for the new 
emphasis on consumption. Using network television, 
government propaganda films, Hollywood movies, and 
advertising, the publicity apparatus of American capital 
helped transform the labor market. Women and minorities 
were urged to return to their homes or low-paying jobs 
so that veterans could have their (presumably) old jobs 
back, thus returning them to the position of 
paterfamilias. Mass cultural models set before men once 
again stressed self-agrandizement. As Robert Mitchum 
says in Till the End of Time (1946), "We were a team in 
the war— everybody was together....Now we're civilians, 
rugged individuals. We're on our own, all of us" (qtd. 
in Lipsitz Class 181). The Western was resurrected— My 
Darling Clementine (1946) and Fort Apache (1948), for 
example— and again focused its attention on male 
autonomy and self-assertion. Magazine and newspaper
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biography continued to report and describe the lives of 
successful men: military heroes, actors, politicians, 
athletes, businessmen, inventors. These men were, of 
course, model citizens; they were assertive, hard­
working men who had risen to the top of their profession 
and had achieved great power and wealth, and their 
status as cultural celebrities confirmed their 
worthiness.
The masculine paradigms constructed by capital's 
publicity machine were, as C. Wright Mills notes, based 
on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conceptions of 
masculinity and success (xiii-xv). These paradigms 
combined with the discourse of advertising, which 
pervaded all mass cultural practices, to produce, or 
sponsor, gendered consumption. The result of the fusion 
of residual masculinity with the consumer ideology was 
that male autonomy or self-determination was again 
manifest by the practice of social aspiration through 
conspicuous consumption. Success and competence were 
defined as the ability of the national subject to 
provide for his family, and it was through this 
expression of "love" that masculinity, or power, was 
asserted.3
3 Lipsitz argues that the goal of male labor in 
early network sitcoms— The Goldbergs. Hey. Jeannie. The 
Life of Riley. I Remember Mama. The Honevmooners— was to 
obtain "material reward to enhance one's standing within 
the family or to obtain some leisure-time commodity"
The new medium of television provided the publicity 
machine with a mass audience whereby the home became the 
primary site of the struggle between older, more 
traditional cultural identities and the new consumer 
identity that television was constructing. "Television," 
Lipsitz argues, "advertised individual products, but it 
also provided a relentless flow of information and 
persuasion that placed acts of consumption at the core 
of everyday life" (Time Passages 42-6). Early network 
television was especially effective at shaping this 
transition. As Lipsitz notes, "Commercial network 
television emerged as the primary discursive medium in 
American society at the precise historical moment when 
the isolated nuclear family and its concern eclipsed 
previous ethnic, class, and political forces as the 
crucible of American identity. Television programs both 
reflected and shaped that transition, defining the good 
life in family-centric, asocial, commodity-oriented 
ways" (Time Passages 55).
Post-war movies also redefined family life in 
asocial, commodity-oriented ways. Mr. Blandings Builds 
His Dream House (1948) is typical of many Hollywood 
films (and network sitcoms) produced between the years
(Time Passages 59). Women were interpellated in two 
ways; they were expected to care for the family by 
managing domestic consumption and to be a "helpmate" to 
the husband/father as he progressed up the corporate 
ladder.
of 1946 and 1955. In the film, James Blandings, a New 
York advertising executive, played by Cary Grant, moves 
his wife and two daughters out of their cramped 
Manhattan apartment to suburban Connecticut. In the 
process, Blandings and his wife (Myrna Loy) discover 
that the house they have purchased is structurally 
unsound, and Blandings reluctantly agrees to build a new 
one. Through a series of comic accidents and 
misunderstandings, the price for the new house escalates 
until Blandings almost gives up the project; but Myrna 
Loy persuades him to pay the money and finish the house 
("We're not just building a house. We're building a 
home!" she says, and this, naturally, convinces him to 
finish). In the end, however, everything is accomplished 
with relative ease: the house is built, the construction 
problems are quickly forgotten, and Blandings writes a 
book about his "dream house."
The most interesting thing about Mr. Blandings is 
that it is a lesson in consumption (specifically, how to 
buy property and build a home). Much of the film is 
taken up watching architects, contractors, lawyers, 
artisans, and laborers consume money and materials; and 
although the film pokes fun at Blandings, it also 
valorizes his role as the head of the household; he is a 
model of success, and the tableau that ends the film, 
which resembles an advertisement, explicitly underscores
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this point. As the camera pulls back, Blandings, pipe in 
hand, sits comfortable on a lawn chair in front of his 
large house. His beautiful wife sits near him, and his 
two daughters play with the black maid. The camera pulls 
back again, and we see Blandings' property: lawn, trees, 
and the sky. No other houses are visible. His daughters 
run into the house with the maid; his wife follows, and 
Blandings, smiling and relaxed, is left alone on his 
spacious lawn. The cramped apartment in Manhattan is 
completely forgotten.
Like Mr. Blandings. other movies, advertisements, 
and television shows produced during this period were 
used by the publicity apparatus to program consumption 
or desire in order to further stimulate the economy. As 
a cultural practice or symptom, their technology 
represents a rationalization of production that 
transformed subjectivity, a process recorded by the 
operations of Willy Loman's mind. Specifically, Willy 
assumes that his desire is spontaneous, when in fact, as 
Miller suggests in Timebends. it has been "hammered into 
its strange shape by society, the business life Willy 
had lived and believed in" (182). Willy's desire does 
not make him autonomous; it makes him "common" since 
that desire is what motivates Blandings as well as 
himself. As I suggest above, in constructing Willy,
Miller exposes the liberal subject as a fiction, as part
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of a structure of value that is an effect of the 
economy. To dismiss Willy as "pathetic” because he does 
not have the strength of character to understand his 
situation is to recode the play according to the 
protocols of the apparatus.
Conservative critics, such as Vogel and Joseph Wood 
Krutch, will not recognize Willy as an effect of the 
economy because the critical field in which they operate 
does not permit this. For them, he is a problem, not a 
cultural symptom. Critics from the left, such as Raymond 
Williams, Michael Spindler, and John Orr, while they see 
Willy as a symptom of capitalist culture, have focused 
more on Willy's objectification than on his relationship 
to the apparatus that produced him.4 Williams, for 
instance, argues that "Willy Loman is a man who from 
selling things has passed to selling himself, and has 
become, in effect, a commodity which like other 
commodities will at a certain point be discarded by the 
laws of the economy" (104). While Williams's argument 
concerning Willy is certainly accurate, given Willy's 
desire to "make an appearance in the business world" (CP 
146), I would like to suggest a different way to read 
Willy, which is more in keeping with the model of 
subjectivity theorized by Horkheimer and Adorno in
4 See Williams 103-05, Spindler 202-13, and Orr 
208, 225-37.
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Dialectic of Enlightenment. and which, I believe, more 
fully represents the rationalization of consciousness 
brought about by the symbolic apparatus of late 
capitalism.
In their book Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1983), Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
problematize previous models of subjectivity by 
eliminating the opposition around which the subject is 
constructed: "There is no such thing as either man or 
nature now, only a process that produces the one within 
the other and couples the machines together. Producing- 
machines, desiring-machines...the self and the non-self, 
outside and inside, no longer have any meaning 
whatsoever" (2). According to Deleuze and Guattari, the 
cognitive subject no longer exists since the subject- 
object split on which its identity is based has 
collapsed. The boundary between subject and object 
collapses, they argue, under the weight of the publicity 
apparatus of late capitalist cultures, which colonizes 
the subject from without by pouring its narratives 
inward. They replace the cognitive model with a quasi- 
cybernetic model, the desiring machine. The desiring 
machine runs on information from the outside; its goals, 
writes Jean-Francois Lyotard, are "programmed into it" 
and therefore it cannot "correct in the course of its 
functioning" (16). The man/machine is programmed to fit
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the body of capital, to adjust to the demands of 
efficiency of the larger system. Deleuze and Guattari 
stress that the identity produced by the system is "a 
producing/product identity" (7). That is, the machine 
produces, or in Willy's case reproduces, not only 
biologically but also ideologically, for the system at 
the same time that it is produced or constructed by the 
system.
A more effective way to interpret Deleuze and
Guattari's "producing/product identity," especially when
we consider Willy Loman and the other men in Salesman.
is to see it as a producing/consuming identity. The male
subject desires to reproduce itself (pass itself on) at
the same time it desires to consume success narratives,
cheese, Chevrolets, Studebakers, aspirin, women,
refrigerators, etc. The male subject reproduces itself
by having children and acting as a model for those
children. Willy, for instance, wants his sons to learn
the law of success embodied by his brother Ben: "when I
walked into the jungle, I was seventeen. When I walked
out I was twenty-one. And, by God, I was rich" (CP 159-
60). The male subject consumes by buying products.
Listen to Happy:
...suppose I get to be merchandise manager? He's a 
good friend of mine, and he just built a terrific 
estate on Long Island. And he lived there about two 
months and sold it, and now he's building another 
one. He can't enjoy it once it's finished. And I
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know that's just what I would do. I don't know what
the hell I'm workin' for. (CP 139)
Or listen to Howard Wagner talk about his wire recorder:
"I tell you...I'm gonna take my camera, and my handsaw, 
and all my hobbies, and out they go. This is the most 
fascinating relaxation I've ever found" (CP 178).
Willy's desire has also been programmed; listen to Linda 
tell us why he bought a "Hastings" refrigerator: "They 
got the biggest ads of any of them!" (CP 148).
The three passages suggest that Miller is aware that 
(re)production and consumption are programmed. Desire is 
mediated by an other, by the publicity apparatus of 
capital. The "subject" merely occupies a circuit or an 
outlet, or, to use Lyotard's word, a "post," through 
which messages or units of information pass (15). Willy 
(or Happy or Howard Wagner) is reduced to the function 
of a receptacle/transmitter; information travels through 
him and in him. In this process, memory (the site of the 
other) becomes a depository for and a transmitter of the 
masterprograms or "masternarratives" of the system in 
which the desiring machine operates. The machine's 
program can thus be viewed as a metanarrative that is 
used to reinscribe or recode reality into a pattern that 
the larger system finds acceptable. The metanarrative 
acts like the unconscious because it is wholly other to 
the subject and because it works through the subject to 
structure social life. This operation is seen in Happy's
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description of the merchandise manager's mindless
consumption, in his building of houses which he soon
deserts only to build new houses; his desire spins
metonymically out of control seeking difference or
fulfillment in what is essentially the same. Neither man
understands why he buys things or why he works, yet they
both buy and work without question. Presumably they work
to "get ahead," to "accomplish something," but in
reality they are, like Willy, programmed for the body of
capital; it doesn't matter if they get ahead, if they
succeed, or even if they become "number-one man." What
does matter, however, is that everybody desire to work
so that everybody can afford to consume. Desire, to use
Sartre's term, has been "massified."
At this point, we turn our attention to Willy Loman
in order to more specifically explore how the dreams of
capital have programed his "life." Throughout the play,
Willy consumes and then reproduces models and axioms
that are part of the masculine unconscious:
Be liked and you will never want. (CP 146)
A man oughta come in with a few words. (CP 149)
I gotta overcome it. I know I gotta overcome it. I'm 
not dressing to advantage, maybe. (CP 149)
Everybody likes a kidder, but nobody lends him 
money. (CP 168)
But remember, start big and you'll end up big. (CP 
168)
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Start off with a couple of your good stories to 
lighten things up. It's not what you say, it's how 
you say it— because personality always wins the day.
(CP 169)
Business is definitely business.... (CP 180)
It's who you know and the smile on your face. (CP 
184)
These axioms (and the model they represent) appear in 
the text as isolated linguistic events, as the 
recitations of a lone idiolect, but they are in fact 
"splinters" or units (traces) of the metanarrative of 
national identity that speak through the idiolect.5 
Willy consumes these bits of information just as he 
consumes aspirins and cheese. Their presence indicates 
that Willy has been interpellated by the publicity 
apparatus. Another indication of Willy's interpellation
5 Their emphasis on personality indicates, as 
Theodore Greene notes in another context, a historically 
mediated adjustment in the narrative, and the emphasis 
is consistent with the time period of Willy's "life." 
According to Greene, around the turn of the century 
masculine success models began to sound a "new note": 
"The new note was one of power. It called for strength 
of will, forcefulness, and what the period termed 
'animal magnetism.' It was a change of emphasis not 
ideology" (112). In other words, new models were 
deposited on top of residual models with the authority 
of the residual models remaining in tact; this same 
authority remained in tact during a similar adjustment 
in the late 40s. This may seem a minor point, but it is 
important to note that Miller locates his critique of 
capital in an era once removed from the period which he 
attacks; he does this so as to draw upon what he 
witnessed first hand during the Depression— the lived 
experiences of his father and brother.
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are his numerous contradictory statements.6 Early in the 
play, for instance, Willy calls Biff a "lazy bum" 
because Biff does not have a steady job. Three lines 
later, however, after Linda tells Willy that Biff is 
"lost," Willy replies incredulously, "Biff Loman is 
lost. In the greatest country in the world a young man 
with such— personal attractiveness, gets lost. There's 
one thing about Biff— he's not lazy" (CP 134). Willy 
then reminds Linda that Certain men just don't get 
started till later in life. Like Thomas Edison, I think.
Or B.F. Goodrich" (CP 135).
In this instance, the masterprogram operates to 
allegorize the experience of the "subject" by making the 
subject part of the national narrative of progress; the 
process is therefore synecdochical (e pluribus unum).
The process reveals itself as a fusion or syndesis of 
narratives, modes of masculinity from different 
historical periods, that cover over the reality of the 
present and mystify history. This fusion is first
6 Brian Parker sees these contradictions as 
evidence of Willy's "incorrigible inability to tell the 
truth even to himself"; they therefore express an 
"emotional, nonlogical mode of thought, which allows him 
flatly to contradict himself, and of which schizophrenia 
is merely an intensification" (33). Bigsby argues that 
Willy's "constant contradiction is a linguistic 
reflection of the collapse of rational control, but, 
more fundamentally, for all the Loman men it is 
indicative of a basic contradiction between their 
aspirations and the reality of their lives, between 
their setting and the essence of their dream" (2: 177).
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discovered in the practices of late nineteeth-century 
advertising, where the consumer ideology is bound 
together with eighteenth- and nineteenth- century 
conceptions of masculinity. The adjusted or emergent 
narrative is deposited on the hegemonic narrative, which 
in turn lends the newer representation its legitimacy or 
authority.7
However, the crucial thing to note about the 
masterprogram is the way in which Miller suggests it 
operates through Willy to reinscribe his family history 
as part of the success narrative of the national 
subject. Willy desires to be the same as his father or 
his brother Ben; he desires to be other than he is, to 
inhabit earlier periods of capital through an other's 
body, which is essentialized or universal. By banishing 
differance, Willy hopes to construct a stable 
subjectivity. He no longer wishes to feel "temporary"
(CP 159) about himself. He no longer wants to be part of 
the body of capital, which is always (magically) 
transforming itself, adjusting itself, expanding itself- 
-like the neighborhood in which he lives. The desire to 
be successful, then, is the desire to connect himself to 
a transcendental masculinity that erases the reality of 
his present social position. This erasure is achieved,
7 For a detailed discussion of the emergence of the 
consumer ideology see Jackson Lears ("Salvation to Self- 
Realization") 3-38.
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however, at a cost. The subject is restored to fullness 
by transforming extrinsic social factors into personal 
failure. Willy performs this function to empower 
himself, to restore the independence of the subject, 
which has been irretrievably lost. In the process, 
however, he learns to misrecognize himself (and 
Brooklyn). At the same time, Willy also learns to 
marginalize other masculinities, the alternative men he 
might represent, in favor of the dominiant models 
advocated by the culture industry (i.e. Edison, 
Goodrich, etc.).
As C.W.E. Bigsby notes, "Willy Loman's life is 
rooted in America's past" (2: 184). More precisely, his 
identity is rooted in models from two different periods 
of American capital, which have become conflated in his 
mind.8 Willy's father represents the unfettered and
8 Michael Spindler, for instance, writes that "In 
Willy's family history we are offered a cameo of social 
change in America, from the pioneering father who drove 
his wagon and horses westward, to the elder brother who 
gained a fortune in the great outdoors, and finally to 
the travelling salesman hemmed in by the towering 
tenement blocks of the modern big city" (204). Brian 
Parker suggests a similar reading of Willy's family when 
he argues that "the deterioration of American 
individualism is traced through the Loman generations in 
a descending scale, from the Whitman-like exhuberance of 
Willy's father, through Ben, Willy himself, to the empty 
predatoriness of Happy" (32). Thomas Adler also reads 
Willy's family history as symbolizing a gradual 
disappearance of American exceptionalism: "Willy's 
ancestors represent and recreate within themselves 
different stages in the country's history: Willy's 
father as the last of the pioneers, a hardy, self- 
reliant carver and peddler of flutes who made his way
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unalienated labor of mercantile capital. His brother Ben 
represents the accumulative processess of monopoly 
capital. Both figures are mythic, that is, both figures 
embody a heroic past that is disseminated by the 
symbolic practices of capital and reproduced in 
individual men. Together, Miller suggests, they 
represent the (his)tory (not a history) of the (white) 
race in America.9 Or, as Irving Jacobson suggests, "What 
Willy Loman wants, and what success means in Death of a 
Salesman, is intimately related to his own, and the 
playwright's, sense of the family. Family dreams extend 
backward in time to interpret the past, reach forward in 
time to project images of the future, and pressure
west across the continent; his brother, Ben, as a self- 
made capitalist and living proof of the rags to riches 
who went to Africa and discovered diamond mines. By the 
time, though, that Willy, as a salesman who lived 
through the Depression and World War II, tries to make 
the dream of Ben Franklin, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and 
Horatio Alger operative, it has been reduced and even 
become debased" (101). The above interpretations of 
Willy's family history either ignore or underestimate 
the effect of the dream on the present, how, in fact, 
the dream creates an illusion which subverts its 
potential reduction or debasement. For a reading of the 
conflation of Willy's father and Ben, see Gross 405-10. 
See also Bates 164-72.
9 Thomas Porter, for example, asserts that Willy's 
"background fits an idealized model rather than any 
plausible or realistic family-tree. As a typical 
character, the salesman has a typical background; he 
envisions his origin in terms of the American 
experience. It is one version of the idealized 
experience of the race" (29).
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reality in the present to conform to memory [ideology] 
and imagination" (248).
The flute "melody" that marks the beginning and the 
end of the play, and which is heard periodically 
throughout, is the emblem or signature of Willy's lost 
father. According to the stage directions, "It is small 
and fine, telling of grass and trees and the horizon"
(CP 130) . It is, as numerous critics point out, the 
aural symbol of his "pioneer virtues" (Brian Parker 33).
It is the sound of the unaliented commodity, which later 
returns (transformed) as the mass-produced "golden" pen 
that Biff steals. It is the sound of the past in the 
present, the still active residual model which operates 
to marginalize the present. It represents the desire for 
opportunity and mobility associated with westward 
expansion. Willy's father, as Ben tells him, was a small 
entrepreneur whose life was determined by the structures 
of a mercantile economy: "Father was a very great and 
very wild-hearted man. We would start in Boston, and 
he'd toss the whole family into the wagon, and then he'd 
drive the whole team right across the country; through 
Ohio, and Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and all the 
Western states" (CP 157). Willy's father was a "great 
inventor" who would "stop in the towns and sell the 
flutes he'd made on the way" (CP 157). "With one
gadget," Ben tells Willy, "he made more in a week than 
man like you could make in a lifetime" (CP 157).
Ben's last statement seems unlikely, and its 
hyperbole marks a confusion in Willy's "mind" produced, 
or mediated, by the other's desire. Willy desires to be 
like his father because his father is like other 
successful men, other "great" inventors; he is a model 
citizen— he has amassed a fortune. He is like America's 
first model citizen, Ben Franklin, who "invented" 
electricity and the lightening rod. He is like Thomas A 
Edison and B.F. Goodrich, both rich and famous because 
of their inventions. Nevertheless, given the mercantile 
economy in which Miller locates Willy's father, it is 
unlikely that he would have produced a "gadget" that 
earned him more in a week than Willy earns in his 
lifetime. This type of event was more common (but still 
relatively isolated) in the period of capital Ben 
represents (monopoly capital) when "great" inventors 
like Edison and Goodrich did earn more money in a week 
(by producing technology/inventions for an emergent 
industrial economy) than a salesman could earn in 
thirty-five years. The figure of Willy's father exists 
simultaneously in Willy's "mind" with the figures of 
Edison and Goodrich. The simultaniety of the Franklin- 
Edison-Goodrich-father Loman narrative produces a 
fusion, or syndesis, of the individual stories, which
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erases the specific history of the individual figures by 
marginalizing their difference; this fusion, again, is 
produced by the publicity apparatus of capital. Through 
the other, that is, Willy plugs himself into the success 
narrative as he rereads his family history.
A more elaborate example of this type of conflation 
is found when we examine Ben Loman. On one level, Miller 
uses the figure of Ben to link the formation of the 
national identity to the founding of the Republic— that 
is, Miller clearly chooses the name Ben to remind his 
readers of Ben Franklin's paradigmatic American 
masculinity. Ben's continual repetition of the rags to 
riches story— "Why, boys, when I walked into the jungle,
1 was seventeen. When I walked out I was twenty-one.
And, by God, I was rich" (CP 157)— is a deliberate echo 
of Franklin's Autobiography. in which Franklin tells his 
readers that he walked into Philadelphia with the 
clothes on his back and a loaf of bread and within a few 
years became rich and famous. Notably, Miller conflates 
the Franklin myth with another version of masculinity 
from a later stage of American capital, not to 
differentiate the two, but to suggest that they are both 
operative, and that the latter version is just a 
rearticulation of the former. The phrase "acres of 
diamonds," which Ben continually uses, alludes to a 
series of lectures and books written by the evangelist
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Russell Conwell in the 1890s "to spread the gospel of 
material wealth" (Innes 64-5; Porter 24-7). Conwell's 
writings, which included The Safe and Sure Wav to Amass 
a Fortune and Be a Benefactor, and Achieve Greatness, 
were typical of the "success cult" that dominated 
American magazine and popular book culture around the 
turn of the century (Greene 111).
The assumptions about masculinity at the core of 
Franklin's Autobiography are present in Conwell's 
writings as well. Both writers construct masculinity in 
very unproblematic ways by insisting that "success" is 
the result of personal agency or character. Miller uses 
Ben's speech, which Willy is remembering, to illustrate 
that language has a history. The traces of Franklin's 
and Conwells's stories survive as moments of the past in 
the present, and because they have been decontextualized 
by the operations of the publicity apparatus, they exist 
only as ideology within memory (i.e. devoid of their 
cultural context, they become part of the same moment, 
the typology of American maleness and not products of 
specific historical periods and circumstances). These 
representations do, however, bear the mark of their 
history, and, as such, their difference can only be 
recognized when their history is restored. The 
conflation of Franklin and Conwell in Ben's speech is 
recognized when we try to account for the fact that Ben
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Loman and Russell Conwell inhabit an America radically 
different from Franklin's. Ben's ascendancy to what 
Willy calls "success incarnate" (CP 152) takes place in 
the late 1880s, a period marked by intense imperial 
expansion and expropriation of native labor and 
resources.10 As what Ruby Cohn calls a "ruthless 
adventurer" (41), Ben represents the accumulative 
processes of monopoly capital (roughly 1880 to 1910).
Further, the mode of masculinity that Ben represents 
is radically out of place in the America of the late 
1940s (as is Willy's father's "pioneer" masculinity).11 
Willy's desire to be like Ben and like his father 
manifests itself as a nostalgia that seals him off from 
the present. As a result, Willy cannot recognize 
"reality," and he therefore engages in the success 
fantasy given to him by the other. In addition, Miller 
also suggests that the nostalgia for previous models or 
paradigms is constituted by their ability to provide
10 From indications that Miller gives in the play, 
Ben Loman was probably born around 1869; this would put 
him in Africa between the years of 1886 and 1890. Biff 
Loman, interestingly, was born in 1915, the same year as 
Arthur Miller.
11 Brian Parker argues along the same lines when he 
writes, "The values represented by Ben need not detain 
us very long. Their inadequacy is apparent. Miller's 
work, as a whole, does reflect a certain admiration for 
the pioneer virtues of courage and self-reliance, but 
this is matched by an awareness that such attitudes are 
dangerous in modern society: the aggressiveness which is 
admirable in combatting raw nature becomes immoral when 
turned against one's fellow men" (33).
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ready-made (read: reductive) interpretations of the
world; this operaton, as Hayden White suggests, is
disabling (and therefore destructive) because it
prevents individuals and societies from constructively
confronting the problems of the present: "history is not
only a substantive burden imposed upon the present by
the past in the form of outmoded institutions, ideas,
and values, but also the way of looking at the world
which gives to these outmoded forms their specious
authority" (39; italics removed).
One result of Willy's interpellation is that he
cannot see Brooklyn as it is— that is, he is not
satisfied with seeing it the way it is; he desires to
see it as other, as the old west or the frontier. As he
tells Ben, "It's Brooklyn, I know, but we hunt too" (CP
158). Willy's desire to see Brooklyn as other is also a
symptom of the machine in crisis. The flute melody that
represents the fiction of infinite space and unfettered
masculine autonomy of the frontier (i.e. the mobility
that most Americans expect and desire) is an ideological
formation directly at odds with Willy's "reality." Willy
can see the "towering, angular shapes" that surround his
house "on all sides" (CP 130), and he is aware the
changes in his neighborhood:
The way they box us in here. Bricks and windows, 
windows and bricks....The street is lined with cars. 
There's not a breath of fresh air in the 
neighborhood. The grass don't grow anymore, you
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can't raise a carrot in the back yard. They 
should've had a law against apartment houses.
Remember those two beautiful elm trees out there?
When I and Biff hung the swing between them....They 
should've arrested the builder for cutting those 
down. They massacred the neighborhood....(CP 134-35)
Yet the cultural processes that allow the "they" to box
him in, to massacre the neighborhood, go unrecognized
because his models program him for "oversight." In other
words, his knowledge of the world is produced by the
models that act to exclude or screen out disruptive bits
of information. Willy's knowledge of his world
represents a desire for older modes that reduce his
understanding of his social position.
His models also prevent him from seeing the history
of his present (ultimately they push his vision inward,
which leads to annihilation). His question to Linda that
concludes the diatribe about the neighborhood— "How can
they whip cheese?"— outlines the contour or boundary of
his knowledge about the operations of capital; this
question marks the limits of his awareness, outside (or
inside) of which he cannot see or transgress. The
question represents his limit as a "subject." The
salesman does not understand how products are made. They
appear to him, as they sometimes did to Marx, "as
autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own"
(165). Willy's seemingly trivial question reveals how
effective the publicity apparatus (with its
fetishization of consumption) is in marginalizing the
effects of technological change. As William Brucher 
points out, Willy's "unexpected, marvelingly innocent 
question about whipping cheese reveals an ambivalence 
toward technology livelier and more interesting...than a 
simple dichotomy between farm and factory, past and 
present" (83-4). Willy's "marvelingly innocent question" 
reveals a complete ignorance of the cultural processes 
that affect his life, that cause him to lose his job.12 
Willy's life is, in fact, a denial of the transformative 
powers of capital. Any recognition of change is 
subverted by the transcendent (fetishized) models that 
he worships, which do not record or reflect any change. 
Celebrity— the lives of B.F. Goodrich and Thomas Edison 
and Dave Singleman— has replaced history. The 
consumption of technological "progress," as Willy's 
broken cars, refrigerators, fanbelts, and leaky shower 
and roof attest, has replaced concrete social relations.
A second result of Willy's interpellation is that he 
"embues" his sons with the values of the other, what he 
calls the spirit of the jungle. These values are
12 In the conversation Willy has with Howard Wagner 
immediately before Wagner fires him, Willy seems to 
(almost) recognize that his job has become obsolete: "In 
those days there was personality in it, Howard. There 
was respect, and comradeship, and gratitude in it.
Today, it's all cut and dried, and there's no chance for 
bringing friendship to bear— or personality. You see 
what I mean? They don't need me anymore" (CP 181-82). 
Willy's comments here also resemble the comments of Jack 
Colton in Tennessee Williams' The Last of Mv Solid Gold 
Watches.
mediated through the figure of Ben Loman. "There was the 
only man I ever met who knew the answers," says Willy 
(CP 155). "There was a man started with the clothes on 
his back and ended up with diamond mines" (CP 152). How 
does Ben achieve this goal? According to Willy, "The man 
knew what he wanted and went out and got it. Walked into 
the jungle, and comes out, the age of twenty one, and 
he's rich!" (CP 152). And this is just what Willy wants 
for his boys; when Ben comes to visit, Willy brags to 
him that "That's just the spirit I want to embue them 
with! To walk into the jungle!" (CP 160). He's bringing 
them up to be "rugged, well-liked, all-around" (CP 157). 
Ben, of course, approves: "Outstanding, manly chaps!"
(CP 159). Willy's desire is therefore reproduced through 
and in Biff and Happy; because of Will's pedagogy, they 
become carriers of the program. Willy wants them, as Ben 
advises him, to "Screw on your fists and...fight for a 
fortune" (CP 183). He doesn't want them to be "worms," 
like Bernard (CP 151). But as Brian Parker points out, 
the aggressive practices Ben represents while "admirable 
in combatting raw nature [become] immoral when turned 
against one's fellow man" (33).
I suggest above that Ben's aggressiveness represents 
a brutality that Miller equates with American 
imperialism. Another way to read Ben's 
"aggressiveness"— this time, within the boundaries of
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the nation— is as competition. Historically, as C.
Wright Mills notes, "for men in the era of classical 
liberalism, competition was never merely an impersonal 
mechanism regulating the economy of capitalism, or only 
a guarantee of political freedom. Competition was a 
means of producing free individuals, a testing field for 
heroes; in its terms men lived the legend of the self- 
reliant individual" (11). Whether or not what Wright 
argues is historically representative, it is safe to 
assume that in a decentralized economy (an economy 
without the hierarchy of industrialized structures), 
individual competition through labor was a way for many 
to create mobility and wealth. However, as the economy 
of the nation became more centralized and hierarchical, 
competition, as Willy says, became "maddening" because 
it did not have the same results (imagined or otherwise) 
as it did for men of Willy's father's and Ben's 
generations.
In Willy's time, in fact, competition has become 
war-like. After returning from a selling trip, for 
instance, Willy tells his family he "Knocked 'em cold in 
Providence, slaughtered 'em in Boston" (CP 146). Willy's 
gift to his sons on his return from this same trip is a 
punching bag with "Gene Tunney's signature on it."
"[I]t's the finest thing for the timing," he tells his 
apprentices (CP 144). Elsewhere Willy describes business
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as "murderous" (CP 159). When Biff goes to ask Bill 
Oliver for a loan, Willy's advice is "Knock him dead, 
boy" (CP 170).
The violence of Willy's language echoes the 
ruthlessness of his model, Ben— the man who attacks 
Biff: "Never fight fair with a stranger, boy. You'll 
never get out of the jungle that way" (CP 158). Willy's 
desire to emulate Ben's power thus leads him to bring 
"the spirit of the jungle" into his home, where it 
reveals itself as what Sartre calls "counter­
finality."13 His positive intention of providing his 
boys with a model for success results in the negative 
legitimation of theft and fantasy.14
Miller pEQblematiz.es Willy's pedagogy by suggesting 
that even sanctioned expressions of masculinity involve 
theft. In the scene which follows Ben's fight with Biff, 
for instance, Willy has his sons start to "rebuild the 
entire front stoop" (CP 158) because Willy doesn't want 
Ben to think he is just a salesman; he wants to show Ben 
that Brooklyn is not Brooklyn ("we hunt too" [CP 158]);
13 For a detailed account of "counter-finality" see 
Sartre 153-96.
14 Willy's positive intention of providing for his 
family has also led to the isolation and betrayal of his 
wife Linda (much like the career of James Tyrone in Long 
Day's Journey into Night leads to the isolation and drug 
addiction of Mary Tyrone). For extended discussions of 
the representation of women in Salesman see Austin 59- 
66, Stanton 67-102, and Mason 103-15.
he wants to show Ben what kind of "stock” his sons come 
from: "Why, Biff can fell any one of these trees in no 
time!" (CP 158). Instead of providing the materials to 
rebuild the front stoop, however, Willy directs his sons 
to "Go right over where they're building the apartment 
house and get some sand" (CP 158). Charley warns Willy 
that "if they steal any more from that building the 
watchman'll put the cops on them" (CP 158). Willy 
responds, addressing Ben, "You shoulda seen the lumber 
they brought home last week. At least a dozen six-by- 
tens worth all kinds of money" (CP 158). This, of 
course, is a parody of Ben's logging operations in 
Alaska, but it also suggests that the individualism that 
the success ideology sanctions legitimates theft, just 
as that ideology legitimates the expropriation of 
foreign land and mineral resources. This is made even 
clearer in the following lines, when Willy excuses his 
sons' behavior because, as he says, "I got a couple of 
fearless characters there" (CP 158). Charley counters: 
"Willy, the jails are full of fearless characters" (CP 
158), and Ben says, "And the stock exchange, friend!"
(CP 158). Again, these lines suggest that for Miller 
even legitimized expressions of masculine behavior, 
practices and beliefs, which the American publicity 
apparatus valorizes, involve theft.
A further example of Miller transforming the success 
ideology into theft is found in the scene where Biff 
"borrows" a football from his high school locker room so 
that he can practice with a "regulation ball" (CP 144). 
Willy, predictably, laughs with Biff "at the theft," and 
rewards the action by saying, "Coach'll probably 
congratulate you on your initiative!" (CP 144). 
Initiative, even in Franklin's day, is one of the key 
elements of masculine autonomy, and here Miller insists 
that initiative is a form of theft. Later in the same 
scene, Biff tells his father, "This Saturday, Pop, this 
Saturday— just for you, I'm going to break through for a 
touchdown" (CP 145). Happy then reminds Biff that he is 
"supposed to pass" (CP 145). Biff ignores Happy's 
warning and says, "I'm taking one play for Pop (CP 145; 
italics mine). This taking is a pattern that will 
eventually take over Biff's life, for as Biff tells 
Willy at the end of the play, "I stole a suit in Kansas 
City and I was in jail....I stole myself out of every 
good job since high school!" (CP 216). More important 
for Miller, however, is that this one moment of taking 
represents a typical moment in the dominant version of 
American masculinity. Biff's theft of the play is 
another instance of his initiative, another example 
drawn from the headlines which celebrate individual 
achievement. For a moment in Willy's mind Biff is like
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Red Grange or Gene Tunney. As he tells Charley, "When 
this game is over...you'11 be laughing out the other 
side of your face. They'll be calling him another Red 
Grange. Twenty-five thousand a year" (CP 186). What is 
lost in Biff's taking, however, is the team. Biff's 
initiative and his desire to place himself above the 
goal of the team has, for a moment at least, jeopardizes 
the collective goal of the team— to win the City 
Championship.
Miller addresses the counter-finality of fantasy in 
the "climax" of the play, which is organized around 
Biff's trip to Bill Oliver's office where he plans to 
ask Oliver to "stake" him in a new business venture,
"The Loman Brothers," a line of sporting goods.15 This 
fiction has been created as a way to deflect Willy's 
fury at learning that Biff plans to "[s]crew the 
business world!" and return to the West, because in the 
West he can do as he pleases. That is, he can swim in 
the middle of the day, and working as a carpenter, he 
can whistle on the job; he also tells Happy that "we 
don't belong in this nuthouse of a city! We belong 
mixing cement on some open plain" (CP 166). At the same 
time, Biff expresses his hatred of the business world
15 HThe Loman Brothers" is an ironic echo of the 
phrase "The Carnegie Brothers," which Andrew Carnegie 
uses in his autobiography to describe his family's 
industrial empire.
because "They've laughed at Dad for years" (CP 166). 
Willy responds in a characteristic manner: "Go to 
Filene's, go to the Hub, go to Slattery's, Boston. Call 
out the name Willy Loman and see what happens!" (CP 
166). At this point, to quell Willy's anger, optimistic 
Happy starts the familiar story— "He's going to see Bill 
Oliver, Pop" (CP 167)— that quickly developes into a 
success fantasy before the fact: Happy's "feasible idea" 
is to borrow money from Bill Oliver to start a line of 
sporting goods (CP 167). Of course, Happy's idea is 
neither feasible nor sensible; it is in fact absurd that 
Biff believes he can borrow ten thousand dollars from a 
man he has not seen in fifteen years and from whom he 
stole merchandise.
At the end of the second act, however, Happy's "pipe 
dream" comes apart as Biff begins to insist on the 
"truth"; Biff tells Willy that he "was never a salesman 
for Bill Oliver," that he was a shipping clerk. Willy 
insists that Biff was a salesman for Oliver, and when 
Biff tries to correct Willy by asking him to "hold on to 
the facts," Willy says he's not "interested" in the 
facts (CP 198-99). What he is interested in is another 
"story," and Willy and Happy begin to work to reimpose 
the success fantasy they have constructed at the end of
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the first act, but the fantasy is interrupted by Biff's 
announcing that he has stolen Bill Oliver's fountain 
pen.
The final confrontation occurs two scenes later when
Biff tells Willy "you're going to hear the truth— what
you are and what I am" (CP 216). Biff rejects Willy's
"phony dream" because
I ran down eleven flights [of stairs] with a pen in 
my hand today. And suddenly I stopped....I saw the
things that I love in this world. The work and the
food and time to sit and smoke. And I looked at the 
pen and said to myself, what the hell am I grabbing 
this for? Why am I trying to become what I don't 
want to be? What am I doing in an office, making a 
contemptuous, begging fool of myself, when all I
want is out there, waiting for me the minute I say I
know who I am!. (CP 217)
This is an assertion of Biff's desire against Willy's
desire and the fantasy that Willy's desire constructs.
Because Biff recognizes that his father's dream is
"false," that his father has been positioned by the law
of success to believe in the autonomous male, he is in a
position to resist (at least partially) the ideology.
Biff does not believe in the version of universal
citizenship that Willy believes in. Biff recognizes that
he is "a dime a dozen" (CP 217), that he will never be
B. F. Goodrich or Thomas Edison or Red Grange or J. P.
Morgan or Gene Tunney. He attempts to resist the
ideology of the success narrative because he doesn't
want to be other; he doesn't want to be number one: "I
am not a leader of men, Willy, and neither are
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you....I'm a dollar an hour, Willy....A buck an hour"
(CP 217). Willy, a believer to the bitter end, insists 
that he is exceptional: "I am Willy Loman, and you are 
Biff Loman" (CP 217).
At this point there is a complete repudiation of the 
success fantasy: Biff screams, "Pop, I'm nothing! I'm 
nothing, Pop" (CP 217), and he begins to hug his father 
and cry. Commenting on this scene, Miller writes that 
Biff embodies "an opposing system which...is in a race 
for Willy's faith, and it is the system of love which is 
the opposite of the law of success" (CP 36). However,
Miller claims that "by the time Willy can perceive 
[Biff's] love, it can serve only as an ironic comment 
upon the Life he sacrificed for power and for success 
and its tokens" (CP 36). Biff rejects the law that makes 
men compete with each other and steal from each other in 
order for them to be successful. Instead, through his 
characterization of Bernard, Charley, and, (at the end 
of the play) Biff, Miller seems to offer the possibility 
of a system where men love each other and try to help 
one another, rather than exploit one another. His 
solution to the problem of "individualism" is moral 
rather than revolutionary, for as he points out, the 
"most decent man" in the play "is a capitalist (Charley) 
whose aims are not different from Willy Loman's" (CP 
37). The "difference" between Willy and Charley "is that
Charley is not a fanatic": "he has learned how to live 
without that frenzy, that ecstasy of spirit which Willy 
chases to the end" (CP 37). Likewise, "Bernard...works 
hard, attends to his studies, and attains a worthwhile 
objective" (CP 37). Miller also notes that these
"people" all come from the same social class (CP 37),
yet Charley and Bernard do not succumb to the "frenzy"
because, in Miller's view, they manage to resist the law
of success and can act like decent men. What makes their 
resistence possible? Miller offers no specific answer. 
The play suggests that some men are able to do this 
while others are not; it offers hope, but no specific 
program: "What theory lies behind this double view? None 
whatever. It is simply that I knew and know that I feel 
better when my work is reflecting a balance of the truth 
as it exists" (CP 37).
Nevertheless, because the play is organized around 
the consciousness of Willy Loman, the play does not 
reflect the balance that Miller seems to have intended. 
Because Willy is such a "strong" presence, he pushes 
Bernard and Charley to the margins of the play. Willy's 
is the dominant voice, and it is through this voice that 
Miller maps the discourse of national identity as it 
interpellates the "low man." Through this process,
Miller attempts to construct a counter discourse by 
exposing the contradictions within the dominant
understanding of the social world. The power of the 
dominant discourse lies in the ability of its codes and 
protocols to regulate understanding of the social world; 
they allow individuals to interpret their experience 
only in previously elaborated paradigms. In Salesman. 
Miller shows how these codes and protocols are 
reproduced through memory as they are recirculated and 
repeated in the texts and representations of the 
publicity apparatus. The epilogue of the play also 
suggests that we are free of these representations only 
in death. When Linda says "We're free....We're free" (CP 
222), Miller is not just ironically commenting on the 
paid-up mortgage; he is also suggesting that Willy is 
free from the law of success only in death.
D. L. Hoeveler suggests that Linda's lines are 
ironic for another reason. Reading the drama as a 
"psychomachia," Hoeveler stresses that the Requiem 
functions as a final comment on "Willy's dream": "All 
the characters who had previously functioned as parts of 
Willy's dream or nightmare are now supposedly free of 
him....But each of the characters continues to embody 
the values that Willy demanded of them" (80). These 
"parts," however, to revise Hoeveler, not only embody 
the values that Willy demands of them, but also they 
embody the values of the dominant mode of production and 
the cultural apparatus which reproduces that mode by
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reproducing its values. Willy is a part of the body of 
capital, just as are Happy, Biff, Charley, Bernard,
Howard Wagner, and Linda; and as Mark Poster writes, the 
capitalist mode of production forces human beings not 
only to become "things...in appearance," but also "They 
undergo...a profound interior alteration" (53). They 
become desiring machines, or as Sartre stresses in 
Critique of Dialectical Reason, they become other to 
themselves. They embody the values of the Other (the 
publicity apparatus) that programs them to see others as 
rivals. The irony of this operation, as Sartre points 
out, is that in attempting to be different (in 
attempting to be number-one, to earn the most money, to 
conquer the world) everyone's desire is the same. Desire 
therefore organizes individuals so that it can isolate 
them. Sartre calls this formation serial, or unified, 
alterity.16
By highlighting the consequences of Willy's 
interpellation, Sartre's concept of serial alterity 
offers us an alternate way of reading the play. That is, 
Willy is the only man in the play isolated by the 
pursuit of happiness. Most critics imagine that he is 
because Willy's voice marginalizes the other characters, 
and because Miller's commentary on Willy results in a 
kind of damage control whereby the success of the play
16 See Sartre 256-310.
is dependent on Willy functioning as an aberration (a 
"failed social adjustment," as Thomas Greenfield 
suggests). Miller's argument that the social positions 
of Willy (the salesman) and Charley (the business owner) 
reflect a balance is also misleading since it suggests 
that mobility itself is a balanced operation. Charley's 
rise seems to be magical since, as Charley says, "my 
salvation is that I never took an interest in anything" 
(CP 191). Miller, to his credit, does problematize the 
mobility myth in other parts of the play. Ben's success 
is dependent on "a faulty view of geography": I 
discovered after a few days that I was heading due 
south, so instead of Alaska, I ended up in Africa" (CP 
156); and Happy, no matter how hard he works, won't 
progress up the corporate ladder until the merchandise 
manager dies (CP 139). The most potent symbol of Willy's 
desire, Dave Singleman, whose name, as Ruby Cohn notes, 
embodies the irony of male desire in American, also 
problematizes the mobility myth (43). These instances of 
problematization, however, suggest that the myth is 
merely arbitrary in distributing it goods (somewhat like 
a lottery) instead of an ideological formation which 
disguises a structural limitation at the very center of 
capital. The secret of the myth (the national subject, 
the masculine unconscious) is that admission to the 
higher echelons of capital is limited. The publicity
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apparatus therefore organizes the cultural field around 
a false promise that sets men against other men.
Willy, again, is not the only one implicated. All 
the men in the play compete with each other, either 
directly or indirectly. The most obvious examples (other 
than Willy) are Happy and Biff and Ben. Happy's desire 
turns him into an inveterate liar and, in a scene that 
recalls Peter's betrayal of Jesus, leads him to deny his 
father: "No, that's not my father. He's just a guy" (CP 
205). Biff's desire turns him into a criminal. Ben 
scoffs at Willy for being a salesman: "What are you 
building? Lay your hands on it. Where is it? (CP 184).
Even Howard Wagner, Bernard, and Charley are implicated 
in. the frenzy, although to a somewhat lesser extent.
Howard Wagner's fear of other businessman leads him to 
fire Willy because he is inefficient. "Successful"
Bernard, who embodies Franklin's dictum "Well done is 
better than well said," does not have a loving 
relationship with his father because he is too busy 
competing with other lawyers (CP 191).
Charley's "compassionate treatment" of Willy, 
however, seems to contradict the dominant male behavior 
of the play; but, as Bigsby points out, "the system of 
which he [Charley] is the most admirable representative 
can clearly accomodate itself to individual acts of 
charity provided that these don't threaten its
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structure. The fact is that Charley underwrites the 
system that destroys Willy" (2: 180). Charley's desire 
is more manageable than Willy's only because he is in a 
superior position to Willy; he's got the goods; he is 
the other to Willy, which separates him from Willy.17 
Willy, however, wanting what the other has, denies 
Charley's charity because taking charity is a sign of 
weakness or failure. Willy wants to be self-made— and 
this desire not only isolates him from Charley but also 
separates him from his sons and his wife.
Ultimately, all the men in the play labor in 
alterity programed by the other (or others) as parts of 
the machine of capital. Their desire and their 
isolations are expressions of the larger machine. Their 
"prefabricated being" (being as other-than-itself) is 
fixated on consumption by the publicity apparatus of 
capital (Sartre 227). Even when they question the 
program, as Biff does when he says "I don't know...what
17 Charley's desire to help Willy is also an effect 
of the apparatus, which does nothing to disrupt the 
demands of the system (i.e. Willy still gets fired 
because the company considers him inefficient).
Likewise, Willy's refusal of Charley's job offer is 
based on Willy's desire to emulate the protocols of the 
apparatus: Willy wants to be successful; he wants to 
continue to play the role of the provider, and Charley's 
loans enable him to do this since loans can be repaid; 
but his acceptance of a job from a friend is charity and 
therefore signifies failure, according to the models he 
emulates.
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I'm supposed to want," they know what the machine wants
them to desire:
...I spent six or seven years after high school 
trying to work myself up. Shipping clerk, salesman, 
business of one kind or another. And it's a measly 
manner of existence. To get on that subway on the
hot mornings in the summer. To devote your whole
life to keeping stock, or making phone calls, or 
selling or buying. To suffer fifty-two for the sake 
of a two-week vacation...And always to have to get 
ahead of the next fella. And still— that's how you 
build a future. (CP 138)
Biff's "moment of epiphany" is not disruptive or
transcendent because Miller can imagine no mechanism
whereby Biff's insight is translated into social action
(Bigsby 2: 185). In fact, as Bigsby suggests, Biff's
return to the West, like Crevecoeur's farmer's return to
the wilderness, or Huck Finn's "lighting out for the
territory," is an empty, ahistorical gesture, a flight
from reality: "in The Misfits....Biff Loman has become
Gay [Langland], an aging cowboy as bewildered by the
collapse of the world as Willy Loman has been. And so
Biff, who at the end of Death of a Salesman has
supposedly learned the lesson which Willy could not,
seems to be committed to the same mistake of seeking in
movement and space what he could perhaps have sought in
relationship" (2: 185).
The system of value that the play represents, as I
have argued, permits no true relationship between men;
it permits only isolation through competition. The
dissatisfaction of the desiring machine can therefore
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only express itself through nostalgia, an eternal return 
to previous models and their (pre)determining goals. The 
consequence of this interpellation is that solidarity is 
nullified by the desire of the other, thereby ensuring 
that men will continue to be exploited by their desire.
It is fitting then that in death Willy returns to 
the earth that sustains his dream in life. The garden 
scenes that frame Willy's life in the play represent 
Jefferson's agrarian vision, or what Thomas Porter calls 
"a pre-Alger agrarian way of life” (42), which no longer 
exists— except in memory kept alive by popular 
representations of masculinity. The autonomy, wealth, 
and power that Willy longs for are as sterile as his 
garden. Surrounded and closed off by the post-war 
suburban expansion, nothing will grow. His attempts to 
control and to understand this transformation— by 
retreating into representations of the past— have failed 
to free Willy, have failed to earn Willy the title of 
"single man,"— so he kills himself. The desire of the 
success machine cannot be deceived. As Deleuze and 
Guattari point out, "Desire can never be deceived.... It 
happens that one desires against one's interests: 
capitalism profits from this" (257). In the end, then, 
"attention must be...paid" (CP 162) to Willy Loman not 
because he is exceptional (by being an aberration) but 
because his repression in paradigmatic. Not because, as
Michael Spindler writes, "Willy has seized upon the 
notion of commercial success as a substitute for genuine 
identity" (206). Willy, again, seizes nothing; his gods 
are given to him. Attention must be given to such a man 
by readers of Salesman who would fetishize masculine 
autonomy, since Miller powerfully suggests that 
masculine desire is an instrument used by the American 
culture industry to organize and regulate social 
relations and the economy.
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